# Commission of Inquiry <br> Into the Wrongful <br> Conviction of David Milgaard <br> before 

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE EDWARD P. MacCALLUM
and
Testimony before the Commission
sitting at the
Sheraton Cavalier Hotel at
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

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Inquiry Proceedings

## Page 16628

## Commission Staff:

Mr. Douglas C. Hodson,
Commission Counsel
Ms. Candace D. Congram,
Executive Director
Ms. Sandra Boswell,
Document Manager
Ms. Kara Isabelle,
Document Assistant

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| Mr. Jerry Wilde, | Security Officer |
| Mr. Aaron Ladd, | Inland Audio Technician |

## Appearances:



Mr. Alexander Pringle, Q.C., for Justice Calvin Tallis
(Retired)

THOMAS DAVID ROBERTS CALDWELL, CONTINUED

- BY MR. HODSON

Q

## Transcript of Proceedings

(Reconvened at 1:04 p.m.)
COMMISSIONER MacCALLUM: Good afternoon.
ALL COUNSEL: Good afternoon.

MR. HODSON: I would ask Mr. Caldwell to come back to the stand, please.

COMMISSIONER MacCALLUM: Mr. Caldwell.

## THOMAS DAVID ROBERTS CALDWELL, continued:

BY MR. HODSON:

Before we get started, Mr. Caldwell, I thought I would do a brief recap of areas that we covered two weeks ago when we finished your evidence and give you an idea of where $I$ intend to go today and possibly tomorrow and just one housekeeping matter. I understand from your counsel, Mr. Caldwell, that on occasion you would find it easier to look at the paper document as opposed to the screen not only with your original files, but in fact some of the transcripts, and I've advised Ms. Knox that if you wish to have a paper copy as we go along, that's quite fine. We of course will
keep it on the screen for the public and for counsel. Okay?

That would be fine, sir, thank you.
You let me know if you are having difficulty with
the screen. So again I'll just quickly go through what we covered last time. We went through your pre-charge involvement with the Saskatoon City Police prior to the charge being laid against Mr. Milgaard and we talked about the charge being laid, we went through in great detail what information you believe the police provided to you as prosecutor, we went through your communications with defence counsel, Mr. Tallis, we reviewed the police theory $I$ think we called it and Crown theory of the offence in some detail looking at some of the documents from the day, I asked you your dealings with some of the witnesses and your impressions of some of the key witnesses, we went through parts of the preliminary hearing, we went through I think all of your preparation notes for both the prelim and trial, we went through your opening address to the jury, parts of the trial and we were just going through the closing address, we weren't quite finished, so I think that's what we covered last time, and there's just one -- in going back over the transcript, $I$ think, Mr. Caldwell, we had talked about or I had asked you a question about Marie Indyk and whether or not she had testified at trial, she did at the
preliminary hearing, and $I$ think $I$ said $I$ would check that out and $I$ have. I believe Mrs. Indyk did testify at trial and she was called at the request of Mr . Tallis and so there is a short transcript for that. Does that -That's what -- that's correct, sir, we've ascertained that in the mean time, if you will. Okay. And so where I intend to go today, I'll finish the jury address and then $I$ want to go back, Mr. Caldwell, and I'm going to walk through parts of your examination of Ms. John and the section 9(2) application, not all of it, but just parts of it, and then $I$ want to go and touch on a couple of parts of Chief Justice Bence's charge to the jury. I will then move on to your conviction and your concluding report, $I$ will ask you some questions about the appeal, I will then move to 1970, '71 and any recollections you have about the Larry Fisher charges and I'll ask you some questions about how things were done at that time. We'll then move to your dealings with the parole board in the 1970 s, then move into the early 1980 s and I'll have some questions regarding your dealings with counsel and representatives of David Milgaard; namely, Gary Young and Tony Merchant and

Peter Carlyle-Gordge. We'll then go to the Section 690 involvement and your dealings with Mr. Williams and Mr. Pearson, a bit on the Police Commission review of files and then follow up, you were interviewed on three occasions subsequent by the RCMP in 1993, you were examined in a civil proceeding and you testified at the Fisher trial, so I'll have some questions about the transcript, and so that's where $I$ intend to go, Mr. Caldwell. If we could go to 141905, please, this is your address to the jury, and if we can go to page 141941 and you'll recall, Mr. Caldwell, when $I$ was asking you about this address to the jury, this is the transcript of what you said in your closing remarks. Do you want to have a paper copy of that, Ms. Knox?

I think if it's convenient, sir, I would like to try that.

It's certainly -- if you would like, Mr. Caldwell, and if you go to page 36 on that document.

Very good.
And $I$ want to again in going through your address to the jury have you elaborate and get a sense of what it was you were saying and in some cases the reasons for that.

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BY MR. HODSON
There's not a lot that $I$ have to go through, so let me know if that's a problem.

A

Q All right, sir.

If we just go down to the bottom, this is where we left off last day, and you talk here about, and again $I$ think you told us that you are trying to anticipate what Mr. Tallis might say to the jury and you are saying here that based on some of the cross-examination, you are saying that your friend may intend to suggest the improbability of anybody exposing themselves long enough to have sexual intercourse in these conditions, and then if you can scroll down, and $I$ think Mr. Tallis had asked some questions of witnesses about that and there's a couple of things $I$ want to ask you about. What you end up saying here, you say:
"... I submit to you, that it is beyond dispute that somebody did indeed have intercourse with that girl in that back alley, without her consent, and in that freezing weather ..."

So pause there. I take it that what you are saying is that somebody had to have had intercourse and raped and killed this woman in the alley in that weather and that's what you are saying to the jury that's proof enough that it could happen?

A
Q
I would think so, sir, yes.
And then you go on to say:
"... and probably when she was
unconscious or dead, and it is idle to
suggest that nobody would force a girl
to undress in that weather to gratify
his sexual urges because you have the evidence right before you, $I$ submit, that is exactly what he did ..."

And I think either we went through it with you or with Dr. Emson. Was it the Crown theory, again as stated here, that the intercourse took place when Ms. Miller was either unconscious or dead, was that based on Mr. Emson's examination of Gail

Miller?

A
I would think it would include both the latter, Mr. Hodson, as $I$ recall his evidence was that there were no wounds, if you will, to the external genitalia, if $I$ remember his -- and that would be one of the possibilities, as would unconscious, and -- yeah, unconscious or dead are the two categories there. Does that -Yes, and would it be fair to say that that theory would explain then why there was not physical damage?

It would be consistent with that.
If we can go to the next page, I want to talk here about the car, or the use of a car theory, and I will just read over parts of this and ask you a question. You say: "Now again, $I$... anticipate the things that my learned friend may raise, and $I$ don't know if he may suggest to you the possibility that the victim was driven there by car, unloaded from the car in this spot or what, but I think

Lieutenant Penkala cleared that up for us. He said that, his evidence is from what he saw in the snow the victim and
the killer could have walked or run to
the place where the body ended up, along
the travelled portion of the two lanes." Talking about the tire tracks, etcetera. And I take it from this, Mr. Caldwell, and I would like your comment, that the Crown's theory was that the car was not involved in the offence; is that a fair read of your address to the jury?

That is, and the car in my mind was always the Wilson vehicle, sir.

Right. So the Wilson vehicle, and we've gone through that last time about where it was and about the version of events where Mr. Milgaard and Mr. Wilson left the vehicle, and so that was the -- the Wilson vehicle was near the scene, that was the Crown theory?

A That's correct.
And am $I$ correct to say that if the car was involved, in other words, that Gail Miller was in the Wilson car at any time, then that would cause Mr. Wilson and/or Ms. John to be either accomplices or suspects; is that fair?

I think suspects at least, if not accomplices.
Right. And so again when you are putting this to the jury, did you consider saying, well, who
knows, maybe Gail Miller was in the back seat of the car and that's when her coat was removed and the top of her uniform taken off and then she fled the car, would it be fair to say the problem with that theory is that the evidence -- first of all, the evidence of Wilson and John didn't support that, but secondly, Wilson and/or John would either have to be in the car or -- and then therefore be aware of the offence, or out of the car at the same time and not be aware of it. Do you understand my question?

A
I hope so, sir. I had no evidence that Gail Miller was in the Wilson vehicle of any description from anywhere, so that simply -there's no way I could, you know, put a foundation under that because $I$ had no evidence to that effect.

Okay. But you didn't have any evidence about how Miss Miller's coat may have been taken off and put back on, the fact that you didn't have any evidence did not preclude you from advancing a theory as to what might have happened or what might be inferred from the circumstantial evidence?

A
That's right, it was -- the evidence about the
clothing I thought was very clear and what $I$ called unexplained at the end of the trial and it could be explained in some fashion or another involving a second vehicle. I, in my view, had no evidence of the second vehicle.

No, let's just talk about the one, the Wilson vehicle.

Very good.
Let me put it this way. We've heard evidence at the inquiry and we've certainly read and we'll hear more about people who have, after the fact, looked back and said a number of the circumstances and the evidence at the time certainly would suggest that a car might be involved, and let me just go through a couple of those. One, the fact that it's 40 below and it being outside for a lengthy period of time might be unusual and people might want to be inside. Secondly, the state of Gail Miller's clothing with her coat being removed and then put back on some have suggested is more consistent with the fact that she was in a vehicle, had her coat removed, took her uniform top off, was raped, had the coat put back on and then fled the vehicle, and you understand that being a theory that has been advanced --

A Yes.

Q

Would one of the concerns be that if part of this offence took place in the car, again as I stated earlier, that either John, Nichol John or Ron

Wilson, might be considered accomplices?
That could be.
And, again, we touched on this last week or two weeks ago, $I$ don't want to go through it in detail, but $I$ think you told us that that might mean a caution to the jury about their evidence as accomplices?

That could well be, sir.
And, again, $I$ take it that that would be something that you would want to avoid; is that fair?

Devoid?
Avoid having Wilson and John's evidence, have the judge say to the jury "be careful about the evidence of Wilson and John because they are accomplices"?

Yeah. I don't think I could or would want to avoid it, because $I$ would think that would be improper if it were -- if there were any grounds for it, Mr. Hodson. So I would have no problem with the judge warning them in that fashion, warning -- pardon me -- the jury in that fashion, which apparently he did.

Q
Not as -- but as accomplices as opposed to being people of questionable character?

A
Well those are two different categories. I, if
the judge felt it proper to say, "By the way, they may be accomplices based on (a), (b), and (c), and if so you have got to discount their evidence", I would have no difficulty with that.

Okay. If you could go to the next page, please, and down at the bottom I just want to go through you deal or talk to the jury about the left hand/right hand issue, and just to clarify or to repeat what we heard last time we were together, that Dr. Emson's evidence was that the wounds appeared to be -- appeared to go a certain direction that were more likely from a right-handed, someone holding the knife in the right hand, I think was more or less what his evidence was?

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A Yeah, yeah.

I think that's a fair reading of -- we'll go through this.

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Okay.
This may assist you. You say:
"Now there is also a matter that $I$ suggest may be raised by my learned friend that $I$ want to deal with. The suggestion of the various Crown witnesses that they knew ... caused by a right-handed individual."

Maybe there is a problem in the transcription: "If you had paid careful attention to the evidence, and I'm sure you did, you noticed that Penkala agreed that the knife wounds were inflicted by a person who used his right hand. He made a distinction there, to the difference between being right-handed and using your right hand, and if you look at the photographs $I$ think you will see that there are slashes running down the neck diagonally towards the centre from either side ..."

And then if you can just scroll down:
"And you remember that Dr. Emson, when he was asked specifically ... by my learned friend, said there could be no
certainty about the left-handedness or right-handedness of the killer, but he would say he used the right hand."

And scroll down to the bottom. You say:
"I suggest that you use a great deal of caution before coming to a conclusion as to the handedness of the killer".

So I take it, from that, that you addressed that squarely with the jury, that Mr. Milgaard was left-handed, the evidence of Penkala and Dr. Emson suggested that the person who stabbed Gail Miller, at least some of the stab marks, likely used the right hand?

Right.
And what you are saying to the jury is not "so what", but pretty close to that, saying that "that doesn't mean it can't be Mr. Milgaard"; is that fair?

That's how I read it now, sir.
Then if we can scroll down, and $I$ won't go through these, but when we went through your notes you had a whole section there, a page about honest witnesses being honestly mistaken and talking about details, and you identify Mrs. Gerse, and on the next page the cars; is that what you were
talking about the other day?
I believe so, sir.
And if we can go to two pages forward, please, down at the bottom you say:
"Now there is the other category ...", so we can pause there. You've talked about I think the Danchuks, and you may have talked about Rasmussen and certainly Helen Gerse, about people making honest mistakes on details. You say: "Now there is the other category, including the main Crown witnesses, you are going to have to look carefully at their credibility. I do suggest to you, and leave it with you, that you may well find that the only one of them and ... major Crown witnesses, Wilson, Nichol John, Cadrain, who I submit ... lacking credibility is Nichol John, and I suggest that even in her case only that part of her evidence ... the central and most important part."

Now, again there may be some transcription problems there, but again would you be telling the jury "lookit, some of my witnesses may have credibility issues"?

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Absolutely, that that would be open to them, they would have to assess her and all the other witnesses as well, of course.

And Nichol John, and we'll hear a bit more about her later, but what you are saying is she's likely
the one that has the most problems with
credibility, --
I --
-- but only that part where she says she can't recall; is that fair?

I think, yeah, I started with the major three Crown witnesses, of which she's one, Mr. Hodson.

Okay.
And that's how $I$ read it now.
And then, if we can carry on, you say:
"Now in this trial there has been
evidence of two separate voluntary
admissions by Milgaard concerning the events in Saskatoon on January 31st,
1969. The first to Wilson in Calgary, at the bus depot at the time Wilson was not under the effects of drugs or intoxicants."

And then scroll down. You go on to talk about what the evidence was and you say:
"Now this, I submit, obviously can only refer to the episode in which Gail Miller was killed and Gail Miller's purse was put in the trash can, and I suggest that it would be ridiculous to even suggest this could speak to any other incident, there's no way that could be a coincidence."

So, again, what you are saying is Ron Wilson's evidence about David Milgaard's admission in Calgary had to relate to Gail Miller; is that fair?

A That's right, sir.
And then, so again you started off talking about two voluntary admissions by Milgaard, so the one is the statement to Ron Wilson. Then we go to the next page and you talk about Melnyk and Lapchuk and their evidence, we've been through that many times, $I$ won't go through it.

Uh-huh.
And then you say:
"Quite apart from that, we have independent evidence of this, through the youths from Regina, Melnyk and Lapchuk. Like Ron Wilson these are not
choir boys and the Crown is not putting them forth as an example of the all-American boy, but they are the people who happened to have been involved in these events".

And I take it that would have been your position at the time, again similar with the other Crown witnesses, you take them as you get them?

That's right.
And go on to the next page, please. And then, again, you go through the evidence, and then you talk about Lapchuk's evidence, there was a direct quote. And can you tell us, Mr. Caldwell, we may have touched on this last day, what was your impression of the evidence of Melnyk and Lapchuk at the trial as far as credibility; would it be fair to say -- let's take a step back, before you called them?

Uh-huh.
I think, as you said here, "they are not choir boys, they have records"; did you have concerns about their credibility?

No, I -- as you know, we -- I found out about them very late in the day, if you will, the day before the trial, I had them both up to Saskatoon as well
as Ute Frank, interviewed all three of them. In the case of Melnyk and Lapchuk I believe I interviewed them together and warned them that I didn't want them leaning, if you will, in either direction, whether they disliked the guy, loved him, they had to be truthful in their evidence, and they -- the Ute Frank is another topic. But the two of them, when they testified, I thought essentially repeated what they'd told me, and stood up to cross-examination, including their Regina criminal problems, etcetera, in a very, I thought, presentable fashion, Mr. Hodson.

What is it; did you find it unusual that -- and let's just talk about Melnyk and Lapchuk being -Yeah.

Let's start off, $I$ think you would have known at the time that they'd been in trouble with the law; is that correct?

I had found that out early in my dealings with them.

And that they have been, in one way or another, associated with a motorcycle gang; do you remember if you were aware about that?

I don't remember that. It wouldn't surprise me but --

And, as a prosecutor, would you have dealt with people like this before, people who are on the wrong side of the law, --

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Well, again, $I$ don't know about the biker part, I -- the way I dealt with these two young fellows is to $I$ think in effect say "we've got to have this go in, $I$ don't want you leaning against him or for him, but -- based on friendship or any of that, anything of that sort". And $I$ believed it was a genuine occurrence and they, they did show up, did testify, were cross-examined, and of course this was at trial, not prelim, because of the way the facts came up.

We heard Mr. Pringle cross-examine Ron Wilson
earlier in the Inquiry about the stature of an informant or a rat in the prison system --

A
Q Uh-huh. -- and amongst biker friends and I think, I stand to be corrected, $I$ think Mr. Wilson said that he and Melnyk and perhaps Lapchuk were at least associated in some way with the Apollo bike gang at the time. And I'm just wondering, Mr. Caldwell, whether that had been something that concerned you one way or the other on their credibility?

Yeah. I'm not sure, sir, that $I$ was here for the cross-examination, number 1. But if they were bikers, that was simply a part of the facts that they brought to me as witnesses, in other words I wouldn't not call them because of that, $I$ wouldn't --

Let me put it a different way, and some have suggested that it would be unusual for a person like Melnyk or Lapchuk to testify against a friend or an acquaintance or to testify against anybody, because it would not be, in their circle of friends, a good thing to do. In other words, their culture at the time was not to help the police and not to, if $I$ can use the word, "rat" on
a friend, and we have seen that and heard that from some witnesses. And my question, Mr. Caldwell, in that case were you concerned that Melnyk and Lapchuk might just say "lookit, I don't remember anything" --

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Well --
-- to help so that they wouldn't have to inform on somebody?
-- I can understand people not wishing to inform. Neither of them did in fact take that approach with me, saying "I don't remember anything, period". And just a very slight digression, Ute Frank did do that with me as one of those three witnesses, sir.

Saying, what, "I'm not prepared to" --
She simply -- I don't know that we went into her, but I got up all ready to examine her in the trial, and there are notes on everyone's file indicating that she got to a certain point where she simply was not going to go any further talking to me, and $I$-- from that, of course, $I$ knew she wouldn't testify.

That's -- let me pick up on that.
Okay.
So Ute Frank, are you telling us that you believe
that she did have some evidence to tell, that she just was not prepared to give it to you or to tell you?

A

And so, in the case of Lapchuk and Melnyk, is it fair to say they did not take the same approach as Ute Frank?

A No, they did not, they -- I think they gave me the
impression they understood they had to do this and they went ahead and did it.

And what if they would have said to you "lookit, we were stoned, $I$ don't remember anything, and something like that could have happened but I don't -- I'm not going to say anything"?

Well I'd be in a position there where I might have no what $I$ would call credible witnesses to the so-called reenactment, $I$ would have to assess that, then. I might have decided to -- that it was, you know, fit to be abandoned at that point. Okay. Did you find it unusual that these two individuals would give you evidence against one of their friends, damaging evidence against one of their friends?

It was unusual, and as was the way the thing came to light, yeah.

Now, again, it's been suggested by some that the reason they did so is because they had other criminal charges outstanding in Regina and that, by assisting the Crown in the David Milgaard prosecution, they would somehow get favourable treatment elsewhere; you've heard that suggestion being made?

A That's -- I have.

And I think last day, when we touched on that, you said that did not happen; is that fair?

That's right.
And so again, just back to the question that has been asked in the past as to why Melnyk and Lapchuk would testify against a friend, and as -given their walk of life at the time, give incriminating evidence. Your take on it at the time was that it was credible; is that fair? Absolutely.

And I think, maybe we can just touch on it on the next page, $I$ think you actually say that it might even be more credible than otherwise because of their criminal record. If I could just draw your attention to the top you say:
"And lady and gentlemen, again, this frankness of admission on the part of both of these youths not only does not detract from their credibility, that they have criminal records, I submit that it increases their credibility. The fact that they admit things damaging to themselves without any quibbling, I submit makes them more believable witnesses. And their evidence bears the
hallmark of genuine evidence, and that is that they show like the ... the differences you would expect between two people describing the same set of events, of the sort $I$ have already mentioned, they have a slightly different recollection of the news story but that ... one of them says the pillow episode happened on the bed, the other one says it happened on the floor and the description of the words used by the accused, while the meaning is certainly the same, were different one from the other."

A Right.
Q And then you say:
"Now that has to indicate to you that
they didn't cook this story up or get
together on it for some purpose of doing the accused harm."

And then:
"Where I suspect witnesses is when they walk into court and are clear: this is
what was said and ... word for word;
this is what was done, and we hear a pat
story. This is the hallmark of phony evidence when you come in here with word for word from that $I$ suggest that you may conclude that they did not cook a story up to do any damage to the accused here."

And $I$ take it Mr. Caldwell, and $I$ think we saw this in the transcript and we'll certainly hear it from Mr. Tallis when he testifies, the previous criminal record of Melnyk and Lapchuk and pending charges was a matter that was raised with them in their evidence; is that correct? I'm sure it was. I believe I was the one who marshaled that, but it was sorted -- assembled in Saskatoon in fairly short order, and it may have included charges as well as convictions, but it was what anyone would call a criminal record. Then you go on to talk about the fact that these people were stoned and you say:

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    "... and I suspect that my learned
    friend may invite you to conclude that
    the accused ..."
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        or let me back up. I think you talk about the
        fact that Mr. Milgaard was alleged to have been
        stoned and you say:
    "... and I suspect that my learned
friend may invite you to conclude that the accused did not know what he was saying at the time, and $I$ have something to say on that issue. And you will be pleased to know that we're getting to the end of what $I$ have to say."

And carry on, and you say:
"Now in law, the fact that a person is
intoxicated on liquor, and $I$ mean
intoxicated, does not prevent his
statement being given in evidence, it
only goes to the weight of his
statement."

And then you say:
"Now it is notorious that a person who
is intoxicated often says truthful
things that they wouldn't say when they
are sober ... you have the expression
the truth will ...",

I think it should be come:
"... out when one is intoxicated and it seems to me that the same argument can
apply to people that are stoned, that
the inhibitions are released, that is
the time when ...", and then you carry on to talk about how the fact that Mr. Milgaard was allegedly stoned at the time he made these statements may mean they are more truthful than if he would have said them when he were not stoned; is that fair?

Yes. Just, Mr. Hodson, that expression, "the truth will out" was current in my time, saying, you know, "the truth will out", as it were, will --

So that's not a typo, so "the truth will out"? Yeah.

So is it fair to say that the fact that Mr. Milgaard was stoned, at least according to Melnyk and Lapchuk, at the time he made the comments and did the actions about the murder, you are saying that might be considered by the jury to be suggestive that it's more truthful than if he would have done it when he was not stoned or sober; is that fair?

That could be open to them, sir.
And, if Mr. Milgaard would have testified, I take it you would have examined him or cross-examined him in some detail on the motel reenactment?

A I would have thought so.

And can you give us any idea, I take it you would have tried to elicit from him whether he said those things, why he said them, etcetera?

Yeah. If he had testified, of course it would have followed all of this, all of the Crown's case including the recital by Melnyk and Lapchuk of what they saw in the reenactment. So at that point $I$ would want him to, you know, explain it, in effect "if that's not true why did you say that", there would be -- you could approach him and try to, you know, try to prove that he did in fact say it and mean it.

I see. And so the fact that he did not testify, which was his right, you are then saying to the jury "well lookit, here are some explanations you might hear from defence counsel about this incident, but in the absence" -- and I know you can't say that to the jury, --

No.
-- but "in the absence of him not explaining it I'm asking you to think that because he was stoned means it's more truthful"; is that fair?

That was one thing they could decide, sir.
The other thing you just
mentioned, the fact that it did end up that no
defence evidence was called and $I$ in some sense was, in this address, attempting to cover things that I thought might come up after my address was over, in other words when Mr. Tallis went on, so it was -- at this point we knew that there would, of course, not be defence evidence called.

And I suppose there could be one of two possible explanations to the motel room reenactment, one would be that it didn't happen, that could be a position by the defence?

A
Absolutely.
And I take it you would then, if Mr. Milgaard had said that, you would have cross-examined him on that and challenged him about that?

That's right, sir.
And then, secondly, another position, and maybe there are more, were that if it was said it was taken out of context or it was a joke?

A

Q
And he would have to advance that, in my opinion, and see how he did with it, if you will.

And again, $I$ don't want to go through it, but $I$ think the evidence of Melnyk and Lapchuk, they talked about what they heard and observed, I don't know if they were ever directly asked the question "did you think he was joking", I don't believe
they were asked that directly; would that have -at least on your part, would that have been a reason for that?

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Q that I did.

Did, when you interviewed Melnyk and Lapchuk and they told you "yes, this happened and he said those things but it was clearly a joke and we were horsing around and neither of us took it seriously", would you have called that evidence?

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都 If, at the end of my preparation to deal with the so-called motel room reenactment, all I had was two witnesses who took the final position "it was all said in jest", $I$ may not have proceeded if that was the case. And I'm saying 'if that was' which --

Q Yes, okay.
A Yeah, yeah.
If we can just go down to the bottom paragraph, and then you are again talking about what's -what Mr. Milgaard was described to have done, you say:
"Now the actions he went through in the motel room obviously fit what happened in real life. You heard about what the injuries were to the body, how they were made. Kneeling over the pillow as if it were a body, making the stabbing motions and even to the extent of talking about a paring knife. Now there is no way the accused could have known those details ... it was the accused ... there is no way he could have known those details but that he was the killer in this instance ..."

Now if $I$ can pause there, do you know whether or not the police had asked Mr. Milgaard, when they interviewed him in March and April of 1969, about a paring knife, having a knife?

A
Offhand, Mr. Hodson, $I$ can't recall that.
Possibly someone can find that and point it out in
the transcript?
But just the fact that would it be reasonable to think that (a), if the police were questioning Mr. Milgaard about the murder, that they might inquire about a knife?

Absolutely, because there was a broken paring knife found at the scene.

Right. And so, again, back to if Mr. Milgaard would have testified and said "well lookit, the reason" -- and for example, I'm not saying he would have, but for example if he would have acknowledged the motel room reenactment, you would have asked him these questions about the knife and how did he know she was stabbed and the paring knife, etcetera?

I'd ask him questions about things that appeared to match the facts as they were given by those other motel room witnesses, sir, is how I'd put it. Because, of course, that's all I had to go on in terms of what had happened there.

And as the prosecutor, Mr. Caldwell, did this -and you talked about this last day, about the last-minute evidence. When you were preparing your case to present to the Court, and I think you told us this, you felt that you had a strong case
that could establish guilt on the part of Mr. Milgaard; is that correct?

A
$Q$

A
That's right.
And then when Melnyk and Lapchuk came along, in your mind, tell us what -- what did that do to your conviction or your belief about Mr. Milgaard's responsibility for this offence? Well, starting from the matter you had just mentioned, $I$ clearly felt $I$ had a strong and convincing case against Mr. Milgaard. The appearance of these two persons, or my learning about them the night before the trial and all that followed from it, was an absolutely unique experience to me and it certainly didn't lessen my belief in the Crown's case, Mr. Hodson. I certainly would have proceeded according to plan if it had never happened, if the event had never happened or $I$ had never heard about it, it wouldn't affect my plans to run the trial if you will.

And prior to hearing this evidence from Mr. Melnyk and Mr. Lapchuk were -- are you able to tell us, did you have any lingering doubts about whether the police had the right person, whether you were charging the right person, and whether you could
establish Mr. Milgaard's guilt?
Not at that point, $I$ did not.
And what, if any, effect did the Melnyk/Lapchuk evidence have on any doubts you may have had? Now, in fairness, $I$ think you said you didn't have any.

Well the Melnyk/Lapchuk evidence which I, you know, after I'd interviewed them and $I$ felt it was genuine, certainly didn't detract from my belief in the case as it was before. It, I suppose you could say it was, it was an unexpected piece of evidence, none of us expected it, but which certainly wouldn't harm the Crown's case any, as I saw it, in terms of success in the Queen's Bench trial.

And, certainly, you believed that it would have an effect on the jury; is that fair?

I would have thought so.
And then you go on to say at the bottom, it says: "... and it goes without saying that he could not have invented the details which would match the actual event so closely. And it also goes without saying that nobody who had, in fact, not done that deed would ever, drunk or
sober, jokingly or otherwise, admit to those deeds in any way, shape or form, let alone describe them with such accuracy as the accused did in that motel room."

And I take it, from that, again you are raising the question of it being said jokingly; is that fair?

A
Yeah, $I$ include it as one of the four conditions, drunk or sober, jokingly or otherwise.

And so what you are saying is no innocent person would say those things that were attributed to him, drunk or not, joking or otherwise?

Absolutely $I$ felt that way about it, sir.
And then you say:
"His admissions to the Regina boys are not only consistent with his guilt, I submit to you that they are inconsistent with any other explanation ..."

Is that --
A Yeah.
Q
And $I$ think your case against Mr. Milgaard was circumstantial evidence?

A
That's right. I went on, Mr. Hodson, just to say rational or otherwise there.

Q I'm sorry.

A

Q

A

Q
-
No, that's fine, but it was a circumstantial case
if viewed properly.
And is what you are saying to the jury, that take
these admissions, there's no other explanation
that can be made to explain why Mr. Milgaard would
have said and done these things if the truth of
what Melnyk and Lapchuk say is accepted by the
jury, what you are saying is that there's no other
explanation that's rational other than he
committed the murder?
That was my conclusion and I think I tried to set
that out in the closing here.
And then if we can just scroll down:
"In my submission $I$ see no possible way
they can be interpreted other than that
as a direct admission that he was the
person who stabbed and killed the girl
in Saskatoon. And that evidence is
completely and entirely independent of
Nichol John, of Cadrain --"
Etcetera. And would you agree, Mr. Caldwell,
that the evidence from Melnyk and Lapchuk might
put Mr. Milgaard in a more difficult spot as far
as the decision to testify? In other words --
put it this way, it might factor in his decision as to whether or not he testifies?

A Well, once they had testified it would be one more piece of evidence that $M r$. Milgaard would have to assess as to whether he, let's say, thought it was wise to testify, which of course was a decision for other persons than myself, but $I$ would think it was something that would have to be looked at, assessed like the other evidence, weak or strong, to say how do we cope with this and should we go ahead on that footing. That of course is only my own theory, Mr. Hodson.

And then if we can just scroll down, I think you finish up here on this point, you say it's completely independent of John, Cadrain and Wilson, the people that went on the trip. "Nothing to do with Saskatoon, and I submit that it is absolutely independent evidence which is reliable and which should be enough to remove any shadow of a doubt you may have had, if indeed you had any, up to this point as to the guilt of the accused."

And is what you are saying, is lookit, if you take John, Cadrain and Wilson, that's enough to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, but if you still had a doubt, Melnyk and Lapchuk's evidence ought to take that doubt away. Is that a fair read of that?

A
Yeah, $I$ was pointing out that it was independent of the John, Cadrain and Wilson evidence, the people that went on the trip. That's why I included nothing to do with Saskatoon, in other -the reenactment was, in effect, a Regina venture as we know.

And so you are saying that independent of any issues or concerns you may have had with Cadrain, John and Wilson, Melnyk and Lapchuk have really nothing to do with those three?

Yeah, I ended up saying remove any shadow of a doubt you may have had if indeed you had any at this point as to the guilt of the accused. That of course in part would depend on the evidence, as we know, of John, Cadrain and Wilson, Mr. Hodson, that last remark of course.

Right. We're done with that address. I would now like to turn to Nichol John at trial and we touched on this a bit the last time the Commission sat and $I$ just want to outline a couple of dates and facts here, Mr. Caldwell, and I'll be going
through the trial transcript of Nichol John's evidence, or parts of it, and we've heard evidence, just to set the stage here, that March 11th, 1969 Nichol John gave her first written statement to Inspector Riddell of the RCMP; correct?

I'm sure that's right.
That's the date, and in that statement she described her activities the morning of January 31 and said that David Milgaard was not away from her for more than $I$ think a couple of minutes and that he could not have committed the murder and certainly nothing incriminating about Mr. Milgaard. Is that what the statement says? A Yes.

Q
We then go to May $23 r d, 1969$ and that's when Inspector Roberts conducted the polygraph on Ron Wilson and then interviewed Nichol John and he reported, certainly when he testified at the Supreme Court in 1992, he said that during that interview Nichol John told him, after being shown the bloody uniform of Gail Miller, that she had witnessed the murder. Do you remember that, you know that that's what Mr. Roberts said happened on the $23 r d$ of May?

A Yes, sir.
Q
And then the next day, May 24 th, 1969, Nichol John gave a written statement to Detective Sergeant Mackie, $I$ think it was 11 pages, and the statement was actually sworn before a justice of the peace, and in that statement she made a number of incriminating statements against Mr. Milgaard, including that she saw him grab the girl, grab her purse, pull out a knife and stab her. Do you remember -- you know the statement I'm referring to?

I do.
And then last sittings we went through the preliminary hearing and at the preliminary hearing Nichol John did not repeat portions of the May 24 th statement; correct?

A
That's --
In other words, she talked about the morning, but when it came time to key pieces of evidence such as $I$ saw David grab a girl, I saw David stab her, she did not adopt that or repeat that at the prelim; right?

A
$Q$
That's my memory of it, sir.
And at the prelim you did not invoke section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, you left the evidence
as it was, and $I$ think you told us that you were satisfied you had enough for a committal and Mr. Tallis was aware of the statement because you had already given it?

A

Q

A
$Q$
$Q$

A

2
I think all that's right, sir.
So you saw no reason at the prelim to
cross-examine her and invoke section 9?
No, I didn't.
And you also told us about a statement that Nichol
John was heard to have said, $I$ think you said
around the time of the prelim, in a witness room
and it was overheard by Albert Cadrain, Mary
Marcoux and your note says Mrs. Miller?
That's right.
Where she said words to the effect about David
Milgaard, $I$ don't know why he didn't kill me
because $I$ saw it, but I'm not going to say
anything, or words to that effect. Do you
remember that note?
I do. Now, the name David Milgaard was not
mentioned in that thing that $I$ wrote down, sir,
but it clearly appeared to refer to him, and just
so that --
Fair enough. Certainly it was your understanding
that Nichol -- what was reported to you by others
in the room is that she was referring to David Milgaard?

A
$Q$

A

Q

A

Q

A
都
I would be surprised, sir, if I didn't because he was our immediate superior. He was the person who went to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal on a
frequent basis and they were the only, only in Regina did they hear criminal appeals in our Court of Appeal, so he was the person who would be up on the law, if you will. Now, having said that, sir, I can't believe that we didn't speak to him about it, but $I$ have no memory of it at this point. I will show you a document a bit later --

A
Q okay.
-- that suggests that you may have had discussions, and would it be, given that this may have been the first time that this section had been interpreted, at least in a Saskatchewan court, it was a fairly new section; right? It was.

That this might be something you would talk to your superior about and get some guidance?

Yeah. As I say, I would be amazed if Del Perras and myself did not do that because often Mr. Kujawa would be privy to what the law was in Saskatchewan up to date, if you will, most of which was eventually settled in the Court of Appeal in Regina. Do you remember if Mr . Kujawa ever attended at the trial?

I don't believe he -- no memory of him doing it
and $I$ don't think he did.
I want to now go through, if we could call up 003049 which is the Nichol John trial transcript, and $I$ want to go through just parts of this with you, Mr. Caldwell, just to identify how you questioned Ms. John, and I also want to get, where you have a recollection, your observations of Chief Justice Bence, what he said and impressions you may have had as to how he was dealing with the witness in the situation. Okay?

Very good.
And first if we could go to the next page, please -- sorry, this is just the index. If we could skip ahead to 003065 , and you've examined her for $I$ think the morning here, if we can just call out the top part, and so it was after a Court recess and you say here:
"Q I think, Miss John, before lunch that you had just described the episode of stopping to ask the young girl for directions?

A Yes.
Q And $I$ believe you said that you then started again - like the car started up?

A Yes."

And I just want to go through for the record, Mr. Caldwell, and identify where and how you tried to get from Ms. John her evidence about what happened around the critical time frame.

A

Very good.
Do you understand?
Very good, sir.
And then we go down, scroll down, and she says:
"A We went half a block to another intersection."

And again this is after stopping the young girl for directions, and the next page, and at the top she says:
"A Well, we were just about to go around the boulevard and we got stuck on some ice.

And if you can scroll down, and you ask again, well, what happened:
"A Well, Dave got out of the car to see if he could get out."
"A And then he got back into the car and he said we couldn't."

And then scroll down:
"Q And how long would he be out for incident?

A Oh, just to go to the back of the car and then to come back in.

Q Very shortly?

A Yes."

And then the next page, and then you carry on:
"Q Now, what happened after that?"

Nichol John says:
"A Well, somehow we got off the ice and then $I$ remember pulling over to the other side of the street, like after we got out, and then Dave got back in a few minutes later."

And then you say:
"Q Okay; now, if you can do your best just to tell us in the order in which things happened; we can start at the point where Dave got out and went around to the back of the car and then got back in and said - we can't get out of the ice and $I$ take it the three of you were in the car?

A Yes.
Q And was Ron driving?

A Yes.

Q And was it at this particular point you
say you got unstuck from there?
A You mean after Ron got back into the car?

Q After Dave got back in?
A I don't know how we got out or when we got out, I can't recall that."

And then next page, and again $I$ think you try again:
"Q Now, what was the next thing that happened, like after that?

A Well, the next thing $I$ can remember is pulling over to the curb and waiting a few seconds before Dave got back into the car.

Q Now, I take it very obviously you must have become unstuck before you pulled over?

A Yes."

And then scroll down to the bottom, and then you ask:
"Q Now, how long would you say elapsed after you got stuck on a bit of ice until you got unstuck then?

A I don't know.

Q What's the best you can say?

A Oh, five - six - seven minutes maybe." And then the next page, this becomes a bit confusing, Mr. Caldwell, because I think Nichol John describes, if $I$ may just clarify, $I$ think she describes before they get stuck behind the funeral home or in that vicinity, she describes another short period where they got stuck and David got out of the vehicle, so that's what I'm just going through here.

Very good.

She says -- the question at the bottom:
"Q And are we now to understand that the business of pulling over to the curb brought you to going back in that direction?

A In the direction where she was?"

Next page:
"Q Yes.

A Oh yes.

Q Now, Miss John, are we to understand then that that would put you going like completely opposite to what you had been when you talked to her?

A Right.

Q You were heading back ..."

So again $I$ think what she has described here, after seeing the lady they got stuck, they got unstuck and now they are driving back. Then go to the next page, $I$ think you try and clarify this, she says:
"A I remember waiting a few minutes before Dave got back into the car.

Q Now, Miss John, I understand - and not to belabour this - that David had gotten out briefly at the place where you stopped and got back in and said - we can't get unstuck - or words to that effect?

A Well, like I can't recall what his reason was for leaving but the next thing $I$ remember is going to the curb and waiting for Dave to get back in."

And then down at the bottom, and then Chief Justice Bence interjects and says:
"Q You have already told us the accused got out of the car to see if you could get unstuck and came back in and said you couldn't?

A Right."

And then scroll down here, and again this is
still Chief Justice Bence:
"Q Well, how can you say as you said a minute ago that after waiting a few minutes Dave got back in?

A Well, that's the next thing I recall when we pulled over to the curb.

Q Therefore he couldn't be in the car?
A Like, I don't know - this is what $I$ don't remember. Well, he couldn't be in the car if he got back in but $I$ don't know when he left, that's what I'm trying to say."

And then Chief Justice Bence:
"Q Tell Mr. Caldwell just exactly what happened with respect to either getting in or out of the car; if you can't give times and only guess say so but tell the Court as well as you can recollect it the actions of the other two people you didn't get out at all, did you?

A No."
Next page, this is again back to you, Mr. Caldwell:
"Q And as $I$ understand you the next thing is that as far as Dave goes, his
actions, that you recall his once again getting in?

A Right.
Q Now, do you recall him getting out prior to the second time you got in?

A No, I don't."
So that long, convoluted section, I think if I can summarize, what she was saying to your questions was that after they saw the girl for directions, they went to a boulevard, did a partial U-turn, got stuck, Dave got out, then they got unstuck, went up beside the curb and she remembers Dave getting back in but doesn't remember him getting out. I'm sorry, got back in at the intersection, but she doesn't remember him getting out, so again $I$ just want to put that before you, Mr. Caldwell, because it becomes relevant later to some of the judge's questions. I take it at this time you were having a bit of a challenge in getting Nichol John to tell you what it was that she remembered about getting stuck and where?

A
Well, $I$ wouldn't attribute it all to her, but $I$ was having difficulty getting sort of a coherent account of it, Mr. Hodson. One of the things, if

I may, is that I later found in evidence that what they talked about as a boulevard I think Nichol later identified as a so-called snow or ice boulevard. One of the odd features is that I don't think the police found any, you know, permanent boulevard near that location, and somewhere in the evidence she expanded on that, if that helps any.

And that's again what you are describing is where the snowplows have piled up snow in the centre of the street?

A
$Q$
That's how it was put, yeah.
If we can go to the next page, please, and then
again $I$ think you try another attempt here, so this is -- she has already described getting stuck and unstuck at the intersection, now going to the curb, and you say:
"Q Okay; what happened when you got to the curb?

A Well, we got to the curb and then I remember waiting a few minutes and then Dave got back into the car.

Q And that is the occasion you described all along?

A Yes.

Q Okay; now up to this point and after stopping to ask for directions, like from stopping to ask the lady for directions and up to the point where you say Dave for the second time got back in the car, had you yourself seen any more of the lady?

A No."

So I take it you were trying to find out from her, to get her to repeat what she had put in her statement about seeing the lady after being stuck or --

Or -- either that or to make this thing sensible so we could all understand it as $I$ would put it.

Go to the next page, please, and down at the bottom, you ask:
"So then when Dave got back in the car on what we have been calling the second time at the curb as you say, what happened then?

A Then we drove away.
Q Which way did you drive?
A The opposite direction to which the girl was walking."

And then the next page, and then you say:
"Q What is the next place you got to that you can assign a name to or a description?"

And then she says:
"A Well, I remember getting stuck in another alley which $I$ now know to be behind a funeral home.

Q Okay; you remember getting stuck in another alley which you now know to be behind a funeral home?

A Yes.

Q And from saying now you know that $I$ take it you have been back on another occasion?

A Yes I have.
Q With the police, I presume?
A Yes.

Q Okay; and you say that you got stuck in an alley behind a funeral home?

A On the incline actually.
Q On the incline?
A Yes, into the alley."
And this is the part of her statement, Mr.
Caldwell, where she then talks about seeing David grab a girl; is that correct?

My understanding, that's correct.
So the preamble we went through with the two previous being stuck, this is now the third incident she described, at least in her evidence-in-chief, of being stuck; is that fair? That's right.

And then if we can go to the next page, and then you just ask her about the funeral home, she said she recognized it when she went back with the police, and then down at the bottom:
"Q Okay; now would you tell the Court then

- as I understand it the getting stuck
on the incline to the alley which led to
behind the funeral home was the next
step after being parked at the curb?
A Yes.
Q And driving off it; and what happened when you got stuck at the juncture?

A Well, Dave got out of the car to see if we could get unstuck. He came back into the car and then he told Ron that we couldn't. So then $I$ remember both of them getting out and looking. Other than that $I$ think they tried to push the car; I'm not too sure
though."
Next page at the top:
"Q Okay; and just so we're clear, as I understand it it's on the incline leading into the alley behind the funeral home?

A Yes.
Q And what kind of trouble briefly were you in?

A Well, we were stuck in some snow.

Q I see, so that after - now if we can go
very slowly. You say Dave was out at
that point for a brief look again?
A Yes.
Q And was Ron out at that point too?
A They both went out together.
Q Well, can we go then from getting stuck step by step on the incline; who was the first one out?

A Dave.
Q And for how long?
A Only a few minutes - just to go to the back of the car and to come back in.

Q Alright; and he did go out and he did come back in?

A Yes.
Q And what is the best you can say about how long Dave was out on that occasion?

A Only a few minutes.
Q Okay; and did Ron get out on that occasion?

A Do you mean when Dave got out the first time?

Q Maybe you could - I had better put it after Dave got out and back briefly, what happened then?

A They both went out.
Q They both got out; okay; are we to understand that on this occasion on the incline where you were stuck that that would be the first time Ron was out, that is when they both went out together?

A Yes."
And then scroll down to here:
"Q Alright; what happened when the two of them got out?

A Then they both came back into the car.
Q And how much time elapsed between the two of them getting out and the two of
them coming back?

A Only a few minutes.
Q What is the best you can say as to - let me ask you - did they get back the same time as one another?

A I can't recall.
Q Well, you simply cannot recall that?
A Right.
Q And what is your best estimate then of how long they were out on that occasion when they left together?

A Only a few minutes. Just from the time that would be to go to the back of the car and come back into the car.

Q Alright; now, once they got out together on this occasion did you pay attention to where they went?

A No.

Q And did you sit in your same place in the car?

A Yes I did.
Q And this was in the entrance to the alley?

A Yes.

Q And did you look at all to see which way
either of them set off?

A No.

Q And did you see from which direction either one of them arrived back?

A No, I didn't.

Q And what happened when they arrived back?

A You mean from going to the back of the car and coming back, is that what you mean?

THE COURT: That's what you were asked.

A Okay. Could you repeat that please?" You say:
"Q I understand you to say you don't know whether they arrived back at once?

A Right.

Q But what happened when they did arrive back?

A Well, they came back and they decided to go for help.

Q Okay; and then what happened?

A Well, Ron went one way and Dave went the other way."

If $I$ can pause there. It looks as though she's describing when Ron and Dave went back just to
check the back of the car for a short period and then got back in and then went away again; is that fair?

A

Q
check

Yes.

And then you say:
"Q I see; okay; so that this incident we have been talking about up to now was simply a go to the back of the car and look sort of thing, was it?

A Yes.

Q Okay; then having come back they both set off again?

A Yes."

And then scroll down, you ask:
"Q Did you pay any attention to which way either of them went on that occasion?

A Ron went to the left and David went to the right as the car was facing."

Etcetera. And then the next page, and I think here is where you get into the relevant time period, and you say:
"Q Now, what is the next thing that happened?

A Well, I remember Dave getting back into the car, that's about all.

Q And who got back first of the two?
A Well, Ron must have because when Dave got back into the car $I$ moved over to Ron so --

Q You say Ron must have been back before Dave?

A Right.
Q How much before Dave?
A I don't know.
Q How long would you estimate Ron was out of the car on this occasion?

A I don't know.
Q And how long do you estimate Dave was out on this occasion?

A I don't know that either.
Q I take it all you can say is longer at any rate?

A Yes.

THE COURT: Longer than what?"
And:
"Q But longer than Ron?"
"Q And so when Dave got back there you say you moved toward Ron?

A Yes."

Next page, you ask:
"Q Now, up till the point that Dave got back in on this occasion had you up till this point seen anything of any other person than the two of them and yourself since you got unstuck at the intersection?

A Not that $I$ can recall."
I take it at that point, Mr. Caldwell, you knew in her statement that she said that before Dave got back into the car she had witnessed him grab a girl and stab her; right?

A

A
$Q$ That's right.

And so the question here is you are asking -- this is the question where you are inviting her to repeat what she had put in her statement about witnessing Dave grab a girl; is that fair?

That's my belief, sir.
And then scroll down, you say:
"Alright; now, when the two of them were back in did you notice anything about say the condition or appearance of either of them?

A Well, Dave looked cold, that's about all."

And $I$ think in her statement she had indicated
otherwise when Dave got back to the car, didn't she, something a bit more incriminating? I think so.

And then:
"Q And what happened when they were both back in?

A Then we started driving."
And go to the next page, and then you ask the question:
"Q Alright now; how did you get unstuck for that purpose?

A I don't know.
Q From being stuck on that incline you went straight ahead?"

And then you asked again:
"Q And I'd like you to think carefully how did you get your car going or the boys or how did you get unstuck?

A I don't recall that."
And I take it at this time, Mr. Caldwell, you had already had Ron Wilson's evidence that those two fellows in a cream-coloured Dodge or Chrysler came by and pushed them out after they got back?

A I believe that would predate this evidence, Mr. Hodson.

Q

Well, one of the possibilities might be that she was building up to, in effect, refusing to give the incriminating evidence of five or six things that you spoke of a while ago, because she seemed to be going into don't remember, don't recall, quite frequently at this point. That was one of the things I thought might be happening. In other words, a build-up to say, hey, I don't know what happened.

Well, the parts that I've read you already asked the question what did you see next and she then
said they drove away?

A
$Q$

A
$Q$

A

Q

A
Q

A
Yeah.
So in the time period she said I saw Dave grab a
girl, drag her down the alley and stab her?
Yeah.
She said she didn't -- you couldn't -- you
couldn't specifically lead her and say didn't you
see David Milgaard grab a girl?
That's correct, I couldn't lead her because she
was my witness and that time period would have
included where $I$ expected her to give the evidence
we've --
And in fact the preamble that $I$ went through, I
think, were four different occasions where you
invited her to tell the court and the jury about
being stuck, and I stand to be corrected, but I'm
not sure that those four instances were all set
out in an earlier statement.
I can't say that, sir, without looking at it.
And maybe not being stuck, but being stopped, and
so it looks as though you continued to press the
point and gave her a number of opportunities to
say what happened when David Milgaard left the
car; is that fair?
That's right.

And again as far as the reason, let's assume from these questions, Mr. Caldwell, that you had concluded she was not going to give you the incriminating evidence, and $I$ think $I$ look here, shortly you are done your examination-in-chief, so at some point $I$ suggest that you -- maybe gave up is the wrong word, but you realized that she was not going to repeat those unless you tried to cross-examine her on her previous statement; is that fair?

A

Q

A
$Q$
A

Q
I would think $I$ must have come to that conclusion because $I$ wasn't getting anywhere with conventional questioning as to things I thought she knew about, sir.

And I think you told us last sitting that you believed her May 24 th statement to be the truth, truthful version?

That's correct. That's the so-called second statement $I$ believe?

Right.
After the -- not her, but the polygraph of Wilson,
I believe that to be her truthful statement.
And so is it fair to infer from that that when she is testifying here about not recalling some of the incriminating things, that you were not believing
her?
Right.
Now if there had not been a May 24 th statement from Nichol John, in other words her March 11th statement had been her statement or, for example, her evidence in chief here about what happened, if that had been her version of events, would you have accepted that as the truth?

I don't believe so. The -- I believe her first statement was to Inspector Riddell --

Yes.
-- and they included, very briefly, things like "we were not in Saskatoon", it included things that $I$ knew from independent facts that couldn't be true. The second one, the one we've just been speaking of now, you are asking me, if she had not given that, what $I$ would have --

Yes?
I may have lost your question there, sir.
Let me just go back.
Yeah.
Let's say on May $24 t h$, May $23 r d$ and May $24 t h$, Nichol John does not give incriminating -- any incriminating statement to the police about the morning of January 31.

A
Q

A
$Q$

A

Q

A

Q
A
Q

A

Okay.
So that she, she either says "I don't recall seeing anything, $I$ don't recall" -- much like she's doing here in examination-in-chief.

Uh-huh.
So there is no statement from her with the incriminating things that were in her statement.

Right.
And my question is, then, $I$ take it you would have still called her as a witness at the trial?

Yeah, I would have. I think I would have looked and see how the rest of the case had looked this far. I would have had to call her as a witness at the trial, and one of the things that might well have happened is that she may have given what $I$ deemed -- thought was the truthful account of it, which is what we were just getting out to here. But appreciate, in your question, that's not included.

Well let's just take a step back.
Yeah.
If Nichol John had not given an incriminating statement to the police, $I$ take it step 1 would be when you are looking at the case before trial, -Yeah, that's correct.

Q

A

A

Q
-- that would have factored in?
Absolutely.
And the fact that one of the travelling companions
in the car didn't see anything incriminating might
cause you concern; is that fair?
That being her in this question, sir?
Yes?
Yes, it would have.
So that, if what Ron Wilson said happened, then
you might expect Nichol John must have seen
something or heard something; is that fair?
Yes, yeah.
And so the fact that she would not repeat that, I
guess, would be one of two approaches; one, she's
telling you the truth, --
Uh-huh.
-- and that might contradict Mr. Wilson's
evidence; or secondly, she's holding back?
Yeah, I think those are two, two of the
possibilities, maybe all the possibilities.
And if you had concluded that let's say she says
nothing to Roberts, nothing to Mackie on the $23 r d$
and $24 t h$, --
Uh-huh.
-- you have the other evidence of Mr. Cadrain, Mr.

Wilson, and Melnyk and Lapchuk later on; would you have still called her and said "lookit, she was there, we don't think she's telling everything even though she's never given a previous statement"?

A
$Q$

A
Q

A
$Q$

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Another way would be that she's not telling the truth and the others are?

That's correct. And the possibility that she may, if you will, tell the truth if called at the trial.
Well I wouldn't have -- I wouldn't be armed, then, with the sort of incriminating statement with the five or six points that we've just been talking about. It's possible that she could have got up and said that anyway but $I$ don't -- I'd find that, you know --

Yeah. But would it be fair to say that you would have to find a way to reconcile her version of events with the version of events of other witnesses?

I would think so.
And one way to reconcile would be to say that she's telling the truth and the others aren't; that would be one?

That's one way.

Q Right. Okay. I may come back to that --
A Very good.
$Q$
-- issue a bit later. If we can go to the next page. So, again, we've gone through your efforts to try and get her to talk about getting stuck, and $I$ just want to read -- this is a part from Chief Justice Bence, and this is after you ask her about how they got out from being stuck and whether they were pushed?

COMMISSIONER MacCALLUM: Which page is that, I'm sorry?

MR. HODSON: This is at page 003085, and it's page 399 of the transcript, it's the very next page from what $I$ just read but the doc. ID is 003085 .

BY MR. HODSON:
Q
And Chief Justice Bence says:
"Surely you must have known whether somebody was pushing you. You were sitting in the car in the front seat you must have known whether someone was pushing you to get you out of there, don't you?

A I don't remember.
Q Well, I take it you were a bit perturbed
about being stuck in the snow concerned about it?

A Yes.

Q And you must have felt the motion of your car being moved?

A I don't remember that, no.

Q So you in fact don't remember at all what was done to extricate you out of this position - to get you out of this position?

A No.

Q You can't remember it?

A No."

And before you got into the Section 9(2)
application, would it be fair to say, Mr.
Caldwell, that you had, based on Nichol John's
answers to your questions, concluded that she was being untruthful and evasive?

A
I think that's -- that's fair to say, sir, because

I tried to lead up to it gradually and take other approaches, and certainly not in any sense leading the witness, but $I$ made those attempts and the Court, I think it's clear, was becoming somewhat impatient with the --

That was my next question.

A Yeah.
And, again, $I$ will go through in detail what Chief Justice Bence asks her when you get into the Section 9(2).

Very good.
But your impression then, and only your impression of Chief Justice Bence, was he, in your view, becoming upset with Ms. John in this area, about her failure to remember these events, such as how they got unstuck?

A
I -- I think he was and he, he hadn't been, if you will, impatient with other civilian witnesses.

And there are, I think Mr. Hodson, two or three brief samples of that earlier in this same piece of transcript. But $I$ was, $I$ was under the impression that he was, you know, running out of patience with her because of the way she was, you know, "I don't remember this, don't know that", etcetera.

Q
And would that describe your, and maybe
'impatience' is the wrong word, but frustrated; were you becoming frustrated with her --

A Well the one. I'm sorry go ahead?

Well the one thing is that $I$ knew what was in her
so-called second statement. I, as you can understand, believed it to be correct. Chief Justice Bence did not know of that, of course, and I think he was -- he couldn't know about it, he was simply getting impatient with the difficulties with what ought to have been reasonably easy answers, is the way $I$ assessed it.

So things that one would expect her to remember?
Yup.
Yeah.

And possibly so "no, I absolutely don't know", on to the next question, but it was an unsatisfactory process at this point.

And would it be fair to say that -- now you had the benefit of this previous sworn statement -That's right.
-- that had information in it, but apart from that, would you have formed the impression that she was not being completely forthcoming about matters in the evidence?

Yeah, I would have.

If we can then go, I don't -- the next couple of pages, Mr. Commissioner, just deal with the Danchuks and the Trav-a-leer Motel, I don't think I need to go through that, but what I've just
covered is the examination-in-chief and the questions where Mr. Caldwell tried to get Ms. John to recount the incriminating information about Mr . Milgaard. And the Danchuk/Rasmussen I think is important because that's, that's subsequent; correct, Mr. Caldwell?

A
$Q$

And would that be your notes as to the process you were going to use for 9(2)?

Would it be fair to say, though, that going in it was your view that the cross-examination of Nichol John, at least the first of part of it should be done in the absence of the jury, is that your view of the law?

That's right, and we -- there -- we must have had a "page 2 at end of notes from law course", I assume this was one $I$ had attended in which this new $9(2)$ was gone over concerning Nichol John. "Kick out jury", clearly $I$ felt they must not be in the room, and as you know Mr. Tallis at that point took the same view. "Apply to cross-examine witness on statement to police, "cross-examine her", and then "ask for ruling if she's adverse" is very much boiled down to the basics there.

And I think we have seen this referred to before,
and we may hear a bit more from Mr. Tallis that Section 9(2) was a new section, a new provision; is that correct?

A

Q

A
Q

A

Q

A

Q

The argument. I guess the question of having the jury removed when you make the application and cross-examine her on the giving of the statement; freer to say "lookit, judge, here's how we think this ought to be interpreted, this is the right way to apply it"; is that fair?

That's right. And of course all that, Mr. Hodson, was done in the absence of the jury, the argument of course.
correct?

A
$Q$

A

Q

A

Q
Yeah.
Let's just talk about --
Yeah.
-- you are saying the jury should be out when you ask her about how she gave this statement, who she gave it to, and the circumstances; correct? The -- yes, including, in my view, the 9(2) aspect of it.

Yes. So that certainly, and I'll go through in a moment the steps that the Court of Appeal outlined, but certainly that part where you would ask her "did you give this statement, what were the circumstances of who you gave it to, is it your statement", --

Yeah.
-- and that would be in the absence of the jury?
Yeah, well if it were part of the 9(2) exercise. Yes.

I wouldn't be -- I would have thought initially, obviously, $I$ must have had her sworn in and got some information with the jury present, as you would with any conventional witness, with the judge there, of course.

2 Right.
up right now with all my reasoning for that. It seemed to me that if they were out, whatever ruling was made couldn't harm anything, she's adverse, then we go through the procedure; if His Lordship ruled that she was not then I'd be reverting to conventional examination-in-chief, which I think, Mr. Hodson, I had virtually over for her by me at that point, but that's another question.

And $I$ take it one of the risks would be that if you put the statement to her, the making of the statement, and in the course of cross-examination or otherwise the Court concluded that it wasn't her statement or the circumstances were such that she ought not to be cross-examined on it -That would.
-- the jury would hear what's in the statement; is that --

Well $I$-- inevitably, if they were in the room, they would. But I'm not sure that $I$, you know, pondered that as a possibility.

Yes. And certainly one of the outcomes that could happen when you engaged in this process was that Chief Justice Bence could have ruled that you could not cross-examine her on that statement?

A
Q
A

Q

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$Q$
A
Q
A

Q

A

Q And I think, based on what's in the transcript, would it be your position to the Court "lookit, this, let's get the right process before $I$ get this statement before the Court"?

A
Well, that's right, and it happened that both Mr. Tallis and $I$ thought that was the way to do it, I don't think that was the result of any discussion ahead of time, we simply both took that position. It would appear at the time to be, if you will, the safest one Mr. Hodson.

Right. If we could go to 003126, this is just back to the transcript, and so I had gone through your examination-in-chief and you finished up with her talking about the Danchuks and the Rasmussens, and then in -- the jury is out and you ask to make an application, and $I$ think this confirms what you said:
"First of all, My Lord, that would be all the questions $I$ have in ordinary examination-in-chief.

My Lord, I'd like to say that
this is a matter under Section 9 of the Canada Evidence Act $I$ am raising at this time and as Your Lordship knows the Act as amended, which now includes the new subsection (2) ..."

And then $I$ think you asked for the witness -- the witness is then excused. Scroll down. And then you touch on the section, and then at the bottom
you say:
"I think it's common ground, My Lord, and it should be before Your Lordship, that this girl did make two statements that were reduced to writing dated March the 11th and May 24th. A copy of that material - I did supply these to My Learned Friend August the 15th 1969 and on my quick check of the preliminary inquiry - I stand to be corrected - I believe she testified September 4th and 5th".

Why did you tell the judge about her first statement of March 11th, the one that did not incriminate Mr. Milgaard?

Well I didn't go into the contents of it. I thought she, in fact, made two statements, they were both reduced to writing, which was a prerequisite of the 9(2) procedure, at least gave the dates of them, and $I$ should have, of course, supplied those to Mr. Tallis, which I did, and I wanted that, you know, to be recorded there. And that, of course, was in advance of, $I$ think of the prelim, or during it at worst. You -- there was ethical problems to be had if you -- if you, in
respect to some Crown witness, only gave one of two or one of three or two of three witness statements that person had given to the defence. That would be one thing. And this was a, with the dates, was a way of nailing that down accurately, Mr. Hodson.

All right. And so I take it the first statement, the March lith statement, might be viewed as a bit more consistent with her evidence-in-chief than the May 24 th statement; is that fair?

Well is the -- I think the March 11th is the Inspector Riddell?

Yes, it is.
And my view of it was it was, with being unable to recite it now, was that it was -- had very glaring inaccuracies in it. One of them, if I'm not mistaken, was "we didn't go to Saskatoon", but things that $I$ have -- had been satisfied by other known evidence couldn't be correct. If we could then just scroll down, so down to the bottom, if we could just pause there. You then go through, and $I$ won't read it out, but you go through about the process and then Chief Justice Bence says:

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"I won't hold a voir dire on it, if
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that's what you mean."
And it appears that that's his first reaction to your application, that he is not going to have a voir dire; --

A Uh-huh.
-- is that right?
That's right. And of course that voir dire, in most times, applies to a confession by an accused person to persons in authority, that's one of the ways you get there, and $I$ can't see any way in which we could have a voir dire on this, Mr. Hodson.

Right. So that the -- you describe, or what Chief Justice Bence is talking here, the process under 9(2) outside of the jury would be similar to a voir dire but not a voir dire; is that -Well, he may have felt that that whole process was a voir dire, it applies to various different procedures.
$Q$
A
Right.
In my experience at that time it was usually used to describe the going through an admission to a person in authority by an accused person. Right. And then $I$ think at the bottom he says: ".. I'll hear it separate and apart -
certainly it must be a type of voir dire if it's in the absence of the jury and you would have to have it under oath."

And then he says:
"There's nothing in the section to say it should be in the absence of the jury and I haven't - the point hasn't come up before me, it's been discussed amongst my colleagues and it was felt that $I$ should be or the presiding judge should inquire with respect to the application that it is inconsistent with the present testimony, and then if leave is given to cross-examine it is restricted to
cross-examining on the statement alone
... But all those matters should be done in the presence of the jury."

So that's his first reaction; correct?
That's right, and $I$ believe that remained his view on it, Mr. Hodson.

And then, if we can just scroll down, you then say:
"With respect, My Lord, I haven't had occasion to deal with this ...", and you say:
"... I may be entirely wrong - that that initial step be taken in the absence of the jury, the initial step being for

Your Lordship to of course first of all allow or disallow my application to cross-examine ...",
and then we'll carry -- I don't propose to go through the argument

Very good.

So you would have been telling -- you would have been disagreeing with Chief Justice Bence, I take it, at this point?

Yes, that's right.

And then, the next page, Chief Justice Bence says:
"... all examinations prior to the
enactment of this section for the
purpose of determining whether a witness was adverse or not, was always in the presence of the jury. I didn't know this was coming up and $I$ would like to have a few minutes further to consider this - I had thought originally when we were considering this section that if it did come up and $I$ knew it would come up in due course that $I$ should examine the
statement to determine whether in my
opinion there is a basis for your
application."

And then $I$ think you must have given him the statement or both statements?

A
$Q$

I believe the second one, sir, but that might be evident from the transcript.

And then, if we can scroll down, he does ask to see the statement. Actually, scroll down a bit further, he says, the judge says:
"Then let me have a look at the statement."

And then Mr. Tallis sets forth his position. Go to the next page. Mr. Justice Tallis tries as well, and he says to Chief Justice Bence:
"I must say and I say this with
deference that $I$ find myself in
disagreement with Your Lordship's observations ...
is so plain."
And carries on. And the Court says:
"... if the legislature had intended
anything otherwise then it should have been in the section."

Then it looks as though the next page, I won't go through it, and here's where I think Mr. Justice Tallis outlines his argument, the point that $I$ think you talked about earlier that it would be improper to permit cross-examination on a statement in the presence of the jury and then, having so permitted that, make a ruling that the witness is adverse, that whatever observations you then make to the jury, etcetera. And I take it that you and Mr. Tallis then put argument in before the Court on this issue, both in agreement as to how it should be done?

I -- we both felt the same way about it, but I don't think it was based on any consultation between us, Mr. Hodson. That might become clear later, but we both seemed to think this was the way to do it.

Okay. If we could then go to page 134, and I think this is the judge summarizing Mr. Tallis' position, that is:
"... I should first of all allow Mr. Caldwell to cross-examine this witness in the absence of the jury with respect to this statement which he alleges is inconsistent ..."
"And secondly that on this issue of whether or not she is a hostile or adverse witness - adverse to use the language of the section - that $I$ also should be able to ask her some questions on that issue in the absence of the jury."

So I think Mr. Tallis is saying the same thing as you, that you should both get a chance to cross-examine -- or to examine her in the absence of the jury; is that correct?

A That's how I read that, sir.
Q And maybe to the next page. I'll just point out for the record, at the bottom, $I$ think this is where you put your position:
"... I submit Your Lordship should read to himself the statement and that could be the end of such an application."

So:
"That's number one."
And then actually, the next page, there is two page 449 s in our version of the transcript, if we just go to the next page, please, 450:
"If Your Lordship gets past that hurdle
I must say that again possibly as My

Learned Friend, I cannot quote law on this but it does seem to me that the initial step would be to do this in the absence of the jury, the reason being that, you see, if it's done in the presence of the jury and then Your Lordship in due course ...",
and then he says:
".. I understand the implication of it but $I$ didn't pass the law and it's there."

Then you say:
"I must say my understanding on that phase of it would be in agreement with my learned friend."

So, again, that's where you agree with Mr. Tallis on the point?

That's right.
And then if we can go ahead to 003140 , pardon me, 141 -- 140 , if we can go to the top of the page. And this is the next day and the judge is going to rule on it, if you can go to the next page, just touch on the ruling. He says:
"At this stage Mr. Caldwell has not
asked to have the witness declared
adverse. He has merely asked for permission to cross-examine under the amendment. Presumably he will after such has been done ask that the witness be declared adverse if he thinks such has been demonstrated.

There is nothing in the section
to state that such cross-examination is for the purpose of determining
adversity. If Parliament had intended otherwise it should and $I$ believe would have said so."

And then goes on to rule that that should be done with the jury in. And then go to the next page, right here:
"I have determined that the
cross-examination under the section shall take place in the presence of the jury.

Call the jury back and the witness."

And then $I$ think you will agree, Mr. Caldwell, that later the Court of Appeal indicated that that procedure was wrong; --

That --

Q
A
Q
A

Q

A
Q

2

A
Q
BY MR. HODSON:
Just before the break, Mr. Caldwell, I think we finished off with Chief Justice Bence making his ruling. If we can go to the next page, and this is your questioning of her regarding the statement, and just so that we are clear, I think this is the part that you and Mr. Tallis thought ought to be done in the absence of the jury; is that correct?

Yes, sir.
And $I$ think we'll see when we look to the court of Appeal decision that followed, that that was the correct view of the law at the time; is that fair?

A Yes. I just wonder if $I$ missed something there.


Q

A
$Q$
A
Q

A

Q Sure.

The Court of Appeal in effect agreed with what we had suggested?

Yes.
I'm sorry, you are right, sir.
So what you and Mr. Tallis said is this should be done in the absence of the jury, Chief Justice Bence said no, the Court of Appeal later said he was wrong but it didn't affect the verdict?

That's correct, sir, thank you.
So then if we can skip ahead, I won't go through the questions where you are establishing the statement, but if we can go to page 003148 , and so this is $I$ guess a cross-examination of her and you ask her on the previous pages, as $I$ said $I$ won't go through them, about the taking of the statement, where it was, sort of some general information, and then here you show her:
"Q I'd like to show you a statement just for yourself to look at first, Miss John - if you could have a look through it . . ."

And then the judge says:
"THE COURT: May I suggest that you ask
about the signatures."

And you say:
"MR. CALDWELL: Yes, My Lord -
Q Now, if you'll just follow this thing,
there's a Page 1 --"
And there's an "mmhm."
"THE COURT: Does that mean "Yes"?"
And then the next page, it looks as though, at the request of Chief Justice Bence, you asked her about every page bearing her signature; is that fair?

A That's right.
Q And down at the bottom you say:
"Q Now, would you please read that silently
to yourself at this time; just take your
time and read it all over."
So I take it one of the things that you thought might come out of this is that it might refresh her memory and she might say $I$ now remember those things?

That would be a possibility. That seemed to be the next logical step.

Q
And then if we can scroll down, you ask:
"Q And $I$ ask you now whether or not you made that statement."

Her answer:
"A I did.

Q Now, I'm going to ask you again to read to yourself silently the third, fourth and fifth .."

Pages, and then the judge interprets for a moment. And just for the record,

Mr. Commissioner, $I$ don't think we need to bring up Nichol John's statement, the pages, the third, fourth and fifth pages contain $I$ think most, if not all of the incriminating statements, and so, Mr. Caldwell, it appears you are asking to read silently those pages?

Yes, sir.

Again, and then down at the bottom, you then say:
"MR. CALDWELL: My Lord, I propose to ask the witness next whether those three pages are true."

And the judge says yes. You say:
"Q Are pages 3, 4 and 5 true?
A I don't know."

And again, pages 3, 4 and 5 are where she describes David grabbing the girl, dragging her down the alley and stabbing her and a few other incriminating statements. So after you ask her
if those pages are true, if we can scroll down, Chief Justice Bence then interjects and says:
"Q What do you mean you don't know? You signed them.

A Yeah, $I$ know $I$ did but $I$ don't know I don't remember saying that.

Q You signed the pages each one at the bottom of the page?

A Yes.
Q And you gave a detailed statement with respect to what you said had taken place, didn't you?

A Yes.
Q Now, having read it - having read it,
does that refresh your memory
sufficiently that you can now tell this
court what happened on January 31st?
A No it doesn't; $I$ don't remember saying that."

Again, and $I$ know it's difficult to comment, Mr . Caldwell, on what judges do and sort of the interjections in your examination, but it appears from this transcript that Chief Justice Bence interjected, for lack of a better word, on a number of occasions in your examination of Miss

John under 9(2)?
A
$Q$

A

Q

A

Q And then after he's done you say:
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And again did it cause you concern at the time that these questions would be asked sort of in -I presume you had a plan going in as to how you were going to ask these questions?

I did, and $I$ simply had to be careful once he had asked his question, got whatever answer he did or didn't get, that $I$ stayed on track with my plan, sir.
"MR. CALDWELL: Now, My Lord, if your Lordship pleases, with that question $I$ am ending my cross-examination of this witness and $I$ 'm going to next ask Your Lordship for the ruling as to adversity. I suppose, My Lord, ought this statement she read just be marked for
identification?
THE COURT: Yes."
So as I understand the process, let me go through that, under 9(2) you were entitled to cross-examine her as to that previous inconsistent statement first of all?

Yes.
And that only applies to the statement and that's what you did; correct?

A
Yes, yes.
Secondly, 9(1) says you can apply to have a witness declared adverse or hostile and if that ruling is made, you can then cross-examine the witness on anything; is that fair?

A
That's my understanding.
Q
So step 1 is to use the statement, the prior inconsistent statement to get evidence to have her declared hostile; is that fair?
$Q$

That's my understanding of the sequence.
Right. And in the process of having her -- that process alone, the 9(2), just putting the previous statement to her, I mean, at this point the jury hasn't heard anything about what's in the statement; correct?

That's right too.
And so step 1 under $9(2)$ is to give you the opening to cross-examine her?

That's correct.
And then under 9(1), once she's hostile, you can then put some of the things in her statement to try and discredit her?

That's my understanding, sir.
And if we can just back up, if $9(2)$ had not been in there, you said it was a new section, the challenge you would have, sir, is to try and get her declared adverse or hostile?

That's right. The very -- kind of briefly stated, before this 9(2) a witness, in effect, could say what they want as long as they continued to smile or look pleasant, in effect you were defeated in terms of getting them declared adverse or hostile. This gave a different approach to it.

And again, just to go back, and $I$ read this and

I'm going to read it again, you had gone through, and $I$ went through with you, Mr. Caldwell, Nichol John's evidence about the morning of January 31 and in particular the time prior to their vehicle, the Ron Wilson vehicle going to the Trav-a-leer, so the critical time from, let's say, 6:30 until 7:20, or after seven, whatever time it was, that time period when they were stuck and Mr. Milgaard left the car, $I$ went through that in detail with you, your examination of Nichol John --

A
$Q$

Q


And this question here from the Chief Justice is, he says to Nichol John:
"Q Now, having read it - having read it, does that refresh your memory
sufficiently that you can now tell this court what happened on January the 31st?"

And I'm wondering, Mr. Caldwell, again there is the judge's question, but does that not imply that what she said earlier was not what happened on January 31st?

Well, I would put it that the -- yeah, what she said earlier in the, to the extent that she did not adopt the things that $I$, we believed to be correct, the incriminating things, like, this gave her the -- the Chief Justice may have felt now that you've read this, does this refresh your memory sufficiently you can now tell this court what happened; in other words, implicit in that would be the truthful account of what happened. Or possibly, and again $I$ appreciate we're talking about trying to ascertain what the judge meant, one other possibility is that she had earlier said she didn't recall a bunch of things and $I$ guess one other option is to say does this assist you now in remembering?

A
That -- you could very well read it that way as well, Mr. Hodson, she may have felt now that you've done that, can you not tell us what
happened on January 31st, and that would, you know, imply the act, the aversion that was in her most recent statement to me.

And did you have an impression as to whether the Chief Justice, when he was questioning Nichol John at the time, whether he -- and again just your impression, whether he was of the view that she was not being forthcoming about the events of that morning?

Yeah, I had that impression exactly.
And was that based on what you observed in Nichol John and what you observed in him?

Well, $I$ guess my knowledge of the evidence in the trial leading up to this point, the Chief Justice had been present when all that was, the evidence was given and you could sense that he was running out of patience with her continual evasions and not settling down to say okay, it did happen this way and I'll go through it, or (b), it never happened at all, to over simplify. And at this time he would have now had a chance to read the May 24 th statement?

That's right, sir, he was given the -- as was Mr. Tallis, copies of the one $I$ was working from. Okay. And then if we can just go on, I had left
here, and you are asking to have the statement marked for identification, $I$ think you said I'm done my cross-examination under 9(2), mark it for identification, and then you are going to ask for your ruling on adversity, and it looks as though Chief Justice Bence then asks some questions here, he says:
"Q You recall giving the statement to Detective Sergeant Mackie; you've already admitted that?

A Yes I did."

And then the next page, he goes on to talk about:
"Q You remember it quite clearly?

A But $I$ don't remember ..

Q .. just a minute please.
A Okay.

Q You remember quite clearly where you were?

A Uh-huh.

Q You remember quite clearly that the statement was taken down in narrative form?

A Yes.

Q And you remember quite clearly that it was read over to you?

A Yes.
Q You remember quite clearly that you signed every page?

A Yes.

Q Well, can you tell me why you can't remember what you said on that occasion?

A I don't know.
Q Did you have any discussions about this statement with anybody outside of the police officers afterwards?

A No."

And then carrying on:
"Q Afterwards?
A Afterwards with what?
Q With anybody afterwards as to what you had said?

A Are you talking about Mr. Caldwell including Mr. Caldwell?

Q No, no; I mean anybody else?
A No."
Xx if $I$ can just pause there, is it a correct -or let me just back up. The question that the judge asked Nichol is after giving this statement he asked her then why she can't remember what she said and then says did you discuss this statement
with anybody other than the police and the Crown. Is that fair?

A

Q

A

Q

A

Q 2

That's how I read it.
And is the inference or the implication there, Mr. Caldwell, that Chief Justice Bence was probing to see whether someone may have influenced Nichol John to not repeat the contents of the statement? That could very well be an inference. He excludes the police officers who we would assume would be proper persons to talk to if anyone and the prosecutor in that one category and she goes -- he asks her about every one but those, which could very well lead to that conclusion or assumption. He doesn't ask her about the discussion she had with the police and you ask her; correct?

No, and presumably, Mr. Hodson, because one would expect those things could have been legitimate if certainly my case and/or the police, if they happened at all, interviews with her, what have you.

Did you have any impression whether, and again just your impression, Mr. Caldwell, at the time, about whether the judge may have had concerns or suspicions that Nichol John had talked to someone or been influenced by someone outside the police
or the Crown?
A
Yeah, that's all $I$ can read into this line of questioning. He asks any discussions about this with anybody outside the police and then goes on to mention the Crown, and then he ends up no, no, I mean anybody else, so that's -- that would leave everyone else open that he would like to know whether --

And I think you told us last sittings that your belief at the time at trial as to why Nichol John did not repeat the incriminating information was that she was scared of Mr. Milgaard?

I believe $I$ said that and that is the truth in my opinion.

And that's what you thought at the time?
Yes, sir.
And what about -- did you ever consider whether one explanation might be that she was trying to help Mr. Milgaard who was a friend of hers, did that cross your mind at the time?

I think the -- I suppose you could regard that as trying to help him. I felt the main factors were the fear and the desire not to have to give that incriminating evidence.

I see. Then at the bottom, the judge then
declares her to be adverse, and we can go to the next page, the statement is marked for identification, and just to clarify, I don't believe the actual statement, the May 24 th statement, the physical document was never shown to the jury; is that correct?

I wouldn't think so, and this enables you to see later if it's the one we were talking about in this --

Yes, it is, and $I$ can tell you, $I$ don't believe anywhere in the transcript that the May 24 th statement didn't become evidence for its contents. No, I'm sure that's right.

Now, I take it if you could have got that statement in as an exhibit and before the jury, that would have helped the Crown's case? Well, I don't know, Mr. Hodson, that you could -I don't envision how you could do that, you can't make rulings saying go ahead and show the jury the statement, let them read it one after the other, I can't -- I don't know if I'm understanding your question.
$Q$
Well, for example, if the defence may have tried to put in the March 11 th statement as an exhibit, her non-incriminating statement, would you have
then asked for the second statement to go in?

A

Q
A
Q

A

Q

A
Q

A

Well, $I$ honestly can't see how, with my knowledge of the law at that time, how that would be possible. The point of marking for identification is that we all know which statement we're talking about.

But let's just back up.
Okay.
If there was a way to get that statement in as a full exhibit, in other words, in front of the jury, the May 24 th statement, regardless of whether it's truthful, its contents, if you could get the physical document in the jury room, I take it that that would be something favourable to the Crown?

Well, it would be, but $I$ would have to be convinced how one could do that procedurally.

Putting aside the procedural issue, I appreciate that --

Okay.
-- and you may be right on that, Mr. Caldwell, but I'm just saying from the Crown's perspective you believe that statement to be the truth at the time?

That's right.

Q

A

Q
Well, I would have, because the operative part
being lawful.
Yes.

A

Q

A

Q

A

Q

A
Q

And the part where, $I$ think pages 3,4 and 5 of the statement where she did not adopt the incriminating evidence, on that part of it you were going to attack her credibility, try and that, some parts of her evidence-in-chief you were fine with; is that fair?

Certainly, yeah.
impeach it and say jury, don't believe her when she says $I$ don't remember what happened?

A

Q That's right, sir.

And again we touched on this before, and if the jury did not believe that Nichol John was telling the truth when she says I don't recall what happened in the alley, the only logical or rational other recollection would be that in her statement; is that fair? In other words, that don't believe her when she says I don't recall, the only other option for the jury would be what she put in her earlier statement?

Earlier in that statement?
The May $24 t h$ statement.
That's the one we're speaking of?
Yes.
Yes, I think that's right.
And then again you ask her to direct her attention to the second page:
"Q And I'm asking you about the statement which you've identified as being the one you gave to Mackie."

Go to the next page, and $I$ won't go through all of these, but it looks as though, maybe just -the approach that you took, and I think this is
borne out in the transcript, Mr. Caldwell --
A Yes, sir.
Q

A
That's correct, on that initial thing she answered
yes to both of those.

Right, and then if we could just go to the next page, and then you ask the question about the part of the statement where she says they talked to the girl and asked the girl for directions and you say:
"Q Did you tell him that?
A Yes.
Q Do you remember telling him that?
A Yes I do.
Q And was that true?
A Yes."
And then here's where the judge steps in and says:
"Q You distinctly remember saying that?

A Yes, I remember saying that."

I take it that is to Mackie in her statement?

A
$Q$ Yes.

And then if we could scroll down, you then say, and $I$ think we're getting into page 3:
"Q Did you tell Sergeant Mackie:
"He offered to give her a ride to wherever she was going. She refused the ride. Dave closed the door and said,
'the stupid bitch'."

Did you tell Sergeant Mackie that?

A Not all of it. I don't remember saying part of it."

And then the judge says:
"Q You said you didn't say it - did you say it?

A The first part $I$ said but $I$ don't remember saying the last part here.

Q Well just a minute - that's the kind of thing $I$ suggest that you might not easily forget - the expression the
"Stupid Bitch"?
A I don't remember him saying anything.

Q Well, do you remember telling Sergeant Mackie that?

A No.
Q You're suggesting that he wrote it in then?

A I don't remember saying it."
So I take it here the judge is saying to Nichol John that she's suggesting that Mackie wrote it in the statement without her saying it; is that a fair --

Well, he's saying she wouldn't --
"A I don't remember him saying anything.
Q Well, do you remember telling Sergeant Mackie that?

A No.
Q You're suggesting that he wrote it in then?"

And the judge, I assume, saw that to be highly improbable is the way $I$ put it, and her answer was:
"A I don't remember saying it."
Q Right. He's saying, well, if you didn't say it to him, then he just wrote it in and made it up?

And which I implicitly, $I$ think, the judge would find that difficult to accept, at this stage of that exchange, Mr. Hodson.

Okay. And then you carrying on:
"Q Well, on that point, that's on one of the pages of course that you say already you read over and signed, isn't it?

A Yes.

Q And your position now is you don't remember Dave saying it?

A No."
And the Court jumps in again:
"Q And you don't remember telling Sergeant Mackie that?

A No.

Q Might you have told Sergeant Mackie that?

A I might have, yes.
Q And Dave might have said it?
A He might have, yes."
And so then carrying on back about getting stuck, we'll go to the next page, and he agrees with that, about:
"Q "Ron and Dave got out and they tried to push the car. They couldn't get it out."

Did you tell him that?
A Yes.

Q Do you remember telling him that?

A Yah, I did.
Q And was that true?
A Yes."

So again that's sort of the format of your cross-examination on the statement?

A
Q
"Q
O.K. Did you tell Sergeant Mackie:
"I recall Dave going back in the
direction we had spoke to the girl. Ron
went the other way past the funeral home."

And again scroll down, the three questions, and you say yes. The court says:
"Q So he did go back in the direction of the girl?

A Yes."
And then the judge says:
"Q Yesterday you told us you couldn't remember.

A I said that ..
Q You said that one went left and the other ..

A .. one went right. And the girl was coming from ..

THE COURT: .. Alright. Go on."
Mr. Caldwell, and then again the next question:
"Q Did you tell Sergeant Mackie this:
"The next thing $I$ recall seeing Dave in the alley on the right side of the car. He had ahold of the same girl he spoke to a minute before. I saw him grab her purse. I saw her grab for her purse again."

And I take it that is a fairly incriminating piece of information?

A

Q

A
Q

A
Q But would you agree, sir, that it was -- part of the process, you knew that the contents of Nichol John's May $24 t h$ statement would at least be heard by the jury?
"Q Did you tell Sergeant Mackie those things?"

She answers:
"A I don't remember."
And again the court then asks some questions here. Was it your intent, would you accept her answer "I don't remember", was that -- had you made your point? In other words, here's what you put in your statement, did you tell Mackie, is it true, and if she says no, I don't remember, would that be enough for you to sort of advance your point to the jury that she's holding back or was not truthful?

Now, Mr. Hodson, the top half of that is, that's still the judge making, doing that questioning. No, that's you.

Okay.
And again, it looks from the pattern in the questions that your intent was to say here's what's in the statement.

A
Yes, that's right.
And then again when you ask her about, I think that's the first piece of incriminating information in the statement:

Q
A
Q
A

Q

A

Q answer out of her.

Okay. So then we'll carry on, if we can scroll down, so she then says $I$ don't remember and the judge says:
"Q Do you remember any part of it?
A No.
Q Are you saying you didn't tell Sergeant Mackie that?

A I'm saying I don't remember if $I$ did or if $I$ didn't.

Q Well, if you did see the accused grab
the purse it's something you would have remembered, isn't it? Isn't it?

Witness?
A I don't know.
Q Take a drink of water and stop crying.
A If I could tell you what happened I'd
tell you. I don't know. I can't
remember."
I take it that Miss John was crying through parts of this?

A
$Q$

A

Q

A
Q
I take it that that's right.
Do you have a recollection of her being upset or crying at the time or --

Well, I guess with this wording I accept that it happened. I can't say. I know she was upset, Mr. Hodson, as this process kept going.

And was the judge upset with her based on your answer?

Oh, absolutely.
And then the judge says:
"Q The point is this. You told Sergeant
Mackie on March the 22 nd according to
this statement."
I think the judge has got the date wrong, I think that should be May 24 th.
"Q Now are you saying you did tell Sergeant Mackie or you didn't tell him?

A I don't know if $I$ did.
Q Did you see Dave have ahold of the girl? Did you see Dave have ahold of the girl?

A I don't remember anything. My mind is a blank. Nobody understands. Nobody wants to believe me."

And the judge:
"Q You remember the other things, don't you?

A Yes, I do."
And then:
"THE COURT: Go ahead."
And then you carry on questions along the same lines and you say:
"Q "Alright, Miss John, if you will try and just follow along with this and we'll get through it - you have told His Lordship now that you don't remember whether you told Sergeant Mackie that last group of statements?

A Yes.
Q Do you remember whether that's what happened or not?

A I don't remember anything."
So again it looks like again on the first incriminating statement about grabbing the purse, now I appreciate Chief Justice Bence asks some questions in the middle, but it appears that your line of questioning is simply to say do you remember whether that happened or not?

I think it followed that same pattern.
But then you move on to the next statement and it doesn't appear that, apart from asking her memory of it, it doesn't look as though you challenged it?

A
Do you wish to -- is that the question 20 there, Mr. Hodson?

Yes. This is the question before. Let's go through the next question and maybe I'll ask after that. I think this is probably a more incriminating statement.
"Q Did you tell Sergeant Mackie this:
"Dave reached into one of his pockets
and pulled out the knife. I don't know which pocket he got the knife from. The knife was in his right hand."

Did you tell Mackie that?"
Let me just pause there. You would agree, sir,
that the jury hearing this, regardless of what direction a judge may give, that this might have some effect on the jury favourable to the Crown; is that fair?

A

Q

A

Q
Yes, I would.
And so to have before them that Nichol John had previously said that she saw Dave get a knife while he grabbed this girl, that would be favourable to the Crown's position?

I would say so.
And then, when you ask her that, you say:
"I don't remember."
And then you say:
"Alright; and did that happen in fact whether or not you told Mackie?"

So in other words she says "I don't remember telling Mackie that", you say, "okay, but did this happen", and she answers "I don't know". And then you move on to the next incriminating statement?

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { "Did you tell Mackie this: } \\
& \text { "I don't know if Dave had } \\
& \text { ahold of this girl or not at this time, } \\
& \text { all I recall is seeing him stabbing her } \\
& \text { with the knife." }
\end{aligned}
$$

And let me just pause there. And you will agree with me, Mr. Caldwell, that that is very prejudicial evidence against the accused regardless of what direction a judge might give to the jury about that?

A

Q

A
2
Yes, it is, in the same sense as the last one, only in this sense more so, I would suggest.

And, at the time, you believed this to be truthful?

I did indeed.

And, again, you say:
"Did you tell Mackie that?
A I don't remember.
Q And whether or not you remember teling him, did that happen? Did you see that?

A I don't know.
THE COURT:

Q You don't know whether it did or it didn't?

A No, I don't."
And then you go on:
"Q Now, Miss John, I put it to you that that is something you absolutely would never forget if you saw that happen?

A As far as I'm concerned $I$ don't know
what happened. I don't even know if I was on that trip or not."

So if $I$ can pause there. It looks here that you are challenging her a bit, saying "lookit, if you witnessed one of your friends stabbing a girl or killing a girl, that's something you would never forget". So you are challenging her credibility when she says "I don't remember saying it"; is that fair?

That's -- that's correct.
And then Chief Justice Bence says:
"Well, you've already given evidence
that you were on the trip ...",
let me just back up. She says here:
"I don't even know if $I$ was on that trip
or not."
And, again, it's hard to tell from the transcript; was that said sarcastically, do you know Mr. Caldwell, or --

No, I think that meant "I, at this point $I$ don't know whether $I$ in effect ever came to Saskatoon, was here, any of this stuff happened". I don't think it referred to "trip" in the drug inducement sense at all.

Oh, I'm sorry, no no, I'm just -- let me rephrase
that.

A
$Q$

A
$Q$

A

Q

A
$Q$

A
Q

Okay.
She had given evidence about being in Saskatoon already, I mean, that morning?

Yeah.
And then she says here:
"As far as I'm concerned $I$ don't know what happened. I don't even know if I was on that trip or not."

And let's assume $I$ thought "trip" meant the trip to Saskatoon?

Well, I assume the same. At this point I think she is saying "I don't even know whether I came to Saskatoon", you could read that into she doesn't know whether she is on that trip or not.

Are you able to help us as to whether or not that was said sarcastically by her or whether she was really doubting whether she was in Saskatoon?

No, I think it was she was retreating from things that -- what little she did agree to knowing to this sort of final fall-back position. You see what the Court says, Mr. Hodson, in the next line? Yeah, I'll maybe read that -Okay.
-- and then $I$ will come back.

A Okay.
Q
The Court then says:
"Well, you've already given evidence
that you were on the trip - very
extensively yesterday. Have you
forgotten since yesterday that you told
us you were on the trip?
A If you just stop and think how much
this bothered me - I'm beginning to
wonder if $I$ even did it or not."
Am I correct that she's referring to the murder?
No, I can't think that that could be interpreted,
"if I even did it or not" would not be a
suggestion that she may have committed the murder.
I'm not just sure what she was trying to convey there, but only shrinking memory, it seems to me.

And $I$ take it, as far as her credibility then, this -- that was your objective, to challenge her credibility when she said that?

Well, yeah, it would be at that -- and as you've pointed out, or I agree, more so in these last three or four questions.
$Q$
All right. And if we can go bottom of the page, $I$ don't think $I$ need to go through these, you continue to ask some other parts of the statements
that are similar. She says "I don't" -- go to the next page -- "I don't know", and again asked whether she told Mackie, she says "I don't know", and then she talks about running down the street, she says "I don't remember saying that, $I$ don't know if it happened". Then again scroll down, you put to her the part of her statement about the purse in the garbage can and "did you" -- you asked her:
"Did you tell Mackie those things?
A I don't remember.
Q And whether you remember telling him or not, did you see those things happening or not?

A I don't know."
And then at the bottom, I'll read through this, you say:
"Alright; did you tell Mackie:
"The next $I$ remember sitting
in the car. I don't remember Ron being in the car or coming back. I remember

Dave coming back and getting into the
front seat of the car. I remember
moving over towards the driver's side
because $I$ didn't want.." ".. to be near
him."
Did you tell Mackie those things?
A Yes I did.
Q And did those things happen?
A Yes."
So this is the first, you've gone through a number of parts of the statement where she does not remember, now this one she does remember telling Mackie. And then the Court says:
"You remember that?
A Yes, I remember that. Oh God!" And, again, are you able to tell us whether -what that reference to -- do you recall her being upset throughout this whole --

Yeah, I'm sure she was, and I think that was just a, you know, a release of tension via that language, if you will.

And then down to the bottom of the page, again you put the part of the statement about the compact, the cosmetic case being thrown out. And then the next page, at the top, you ask:
"Did you tell Mackie those things?
A Yes I did.
Q And do you remember telling Sergeant
Mackie those things?

A Yes.
Q And are those things true?
A Yes.

THE COURT:

Q How is it you can remember that?
A I don't know. If $I$ had a solution for
it --
THE COURT: Alright - go ahead.
MR. CALDWELL: My Lord, I'd like to deal with one thing out of page 1 of the statement."

The Court, go ahead, you can cross-examine on it.
And then over to the next page, and I think this is you summarizing:
"So that your position today is, as I understand you, that you don't know whether you saw Dave in the alley with the same girl that he had spoken to shortly before for directions?

A No I don't.
Q Alright; and you don't know whether you saw him grab her purse ..?"

And then the Court says:
"Excuse me a minute, just a minute -
(to the witness) It's very easy for you
to stop crying because you've done it several times when you were asked a question with which you would agree - so would you please stop crying." And it looks as though this is in the middle of your questioning, Mr. Caldwell. Do you recall this event specifically, or $I$ think you said generally you were aware that she was upset? Well yeah, I'm sure it happened, Mr. Hodson, because it's -- it's narrated there by the judge. If $I$ can call up 039133 , please. This is a newspaper article from January $22 n d$, 1970 , I think it's a StarPhoenix report, and the report of the events in Court, I think it's the same day of the transcript, and it says:
"When the Crown prosecutor pressed for an answer again on whether the witness saw Dave reach into his pocket and pull out a knife, Miss John again started to sob loudly."

And, again, are you able to tell us whether that's accurate of not?

A
$Q$

I can't say, sir. I wouldn't challenge it though. And then at the top of the next column. And then:
"At this point, Mr. Justice Bence

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ordered her to stop crying. He said,
"You have shown that you are able to
stop crying, so stop crying now."
She stopped."
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Again, you are not able to tell us whether that's accurate or not?

A
Q
No, I'm not.
Okay. Again, go back to the transcript, please. Page 003165 . And, again, $I$ just read you the part at the top where the judge asked you to stop crying, and then down at the bottom here you've finished with your questions, and then -- then go to page 003167. And, again, it looks as though you had contemplated calling Sergeant Mackie to give evidence about the circumstances of Nichol John giving this statement to him?

A
Q
A
Q
A
Q

A
Was this previous to what we've just been looking at?

Q No.

A Oh, okay.
$Q$

A

Q

Maybe I'll just go through it with you. Okay.

So you are done your cross-examination, the judge asks you "are you finished", and actually just go back to the previous page. So right at the top you say you have ended up your examination-in-chief, finished the questioning, "finished questioning the witness completely", "that's right", and then the Court asks "when you returned to the car", this is Nichol John, some questions about crying, hysterical, and go down to the bottom. And then the judge is going to say:
"Members of the jury, I intend to give you these instructions at the conclusion of the addresses of counsel ..", and you say:
".. My Lord, I don't know if this is an appropriate time but there is one more item under that Section 9 that I want to raise with Your Lordship."
"And that is, having made the ruling, My Lord, to ask Your Lordship to prove that the witness made at another time a statement inconsistent with her present
testimony; and what $I$ propose of course is calling Sergeant Mackie to deal with parts of that document which is P. 31 for identification. That's what $I$ would ask Your Lordship and of course will abide by your ruling."

And he says:
"No."

So I take it from that you either thought of or asked to call Mackie, who took the statement, to prove the giving of the statement; is that --

A

Q

A
$Q$

A

Q

A

Q

A
That's right. And from the "no" I would infer,
Mr. Hodson, the judge felt that was already
proven.
Right. And I think that's correct, --
Okay.
-- and that was my question, --
Okay.
-- that -- and again, if we take a step back under
the $9(2)$ process, you knew that one part of the
process was you had to prove the giving of the
statement?
That's right.
And the circumstances?
That's right, sir.

And we'll see, when we touch on the Court of Appeal ruling a bit later, that when the Court of Appeal set out the procedure they said that one part of the inquiry which should be in the absence of the jury was to inquire into the giving of the statements?

Uh-huh.
And that both sides have a chance to cross-examine or examine the witness; correct?

Yes.
And so is it fair to say that, here, you were offering to call Sergeant Mackie to be examined by you and Mr. Tallis about Nichol John's giving of the statement to him?

A
Umm, I would read it that $I$ wanted to have him identify the statement as being one made at another time inconsistent with her present testimony, he -- and the fact that the judge rejected that $I$ could only take as meaning that he felt that it had already been proven, Mr. Hodson. Correct.

A
Q
But just back before, the purpose of you calling him, you were --

A
Yeah.

Q
$Q$

A

Q

A

Q

A
$Q$

A
Q
things may have happened and what the Crown's position was, and $I$ just want your comment on a couple of these points that Chief Justice Bence parts of that, that's 006175 . And $I$ want to go through parts of this, Mr. Caldwell. I had, when we were sitting two weeks ago, I went through with you your opening address to the jury and the Crown theory -Right.
-- about where things may have happened and how
comments on. If you could go to 006190-- and I take it just for the record the judge is giving the charge to the jury summarizing some of the evidence and giving the jury some direction; is that a fair --

That's my understanding.

And he says:
"The evidence of Wilson was and $I$ think
it was also the evidence of John that it was in the process of endeavoring to make a U-turn. Now from that time on it would appear from the evidence that the accused, Wilson and John were all in that neighbourhood, around 20 th and "O" and "N" and the location of the church and of the funeral chapel and of the motel and of the service station. It seems from all the collective evidence that their time was occupied in moving around that area, principally for the purpose of endeavoring to locate the Cadrain household."

And $I$ think that again, without getting into too much detail about where around $O$ and $N$, that that was generally the Crown position?

And then, down at the bottom, the judge talks about, again going through the evidence, and he says:
"The motel man ...", and that is Rasmussen, the fellow at the Trav-a-leer Motel who David Milgaard asks for a map:
"The motel man said as $I$ recollect it
that he opens up about seven o'clock and
this was shortly after - approximately
seven ten that the car arrived at the
motel for the purpose of obtaining the
map and the directions."
And so it looks, and I'll come to a reference later, it looks as though 7:10 is the time that the trial judge indicated was when the -- Mr. Milgaard's vehicle got to the Trav-a-leer?

That's what -- he evidently concluded that.
And would it be fair, $I$ think this is obvious, but that, from and after Mr. Milgaard's attendance at the Trav-a-leer Motel, that he would effectively have an alibi or an explanation that he could not have -- if he were to have committed the murder he would have to have done it before he went to the

Trav-a-leer Motel; is that --
A That's -- my recall of the facts --
Q Right.
A -- would be the same as that.
Because from the Trav-a-leer they went to the Danchuks, and the Danchuks gave evidence about the time they got there, etcetera?

Yes, sir.
And Wilson and John certainly said, either in their statements or their evidence, to the extent that they did say Mr. Milgaard was involved in the murder, that it was before the Trav-a-leer Motel; that's --

That would be my memory of it, sir.
If we can go to the next page and $I$ want to touch on the bus route, because much has been made of that in subsequent years, Mr. Caldwell. And the judge says:
"There is of course some speculation as to which route she took on her way in all likelihood to catch a bus. If you look at the sketch P. you will see that she had probably three alternative routes. I think Mr. Caldwell suggested two. His theory was that she came down

Avenue "N". The house in question, which was 130 Avenue "O", is situated at the corner of 21 st Street and Avenue "O". She could have come down Avenue "O", she could have come down Avenue $N$, she could have skirted through this alleyway and out at the blind end, the "T" end; it wouldn't have saved her any time, it wouldn't have saved her any distance to go down the alley, as $I$ see it. According to the evidence she could have picked up a bus on $20 t h$ at either "O" or "N". Now, if she was the girl who was walking along the street when the car with Wilson and the accused and John stopped to make an inquiry - if she was the girl and if you accept the evidence of John and Wilson that it was on a street, then you would conclude I suggest that it was either Avenue "N" or Avenue "O" that she was walking on. But of course there is nothing conclusive to demonstrate that in fact she Gail Miller was the one who walking down the street. The girl who was stopped had a coat on
which apparently was similar to the one worn by the deceased - a black coat. I know nothing about women's clothing of course except occasionally have to pay for it, but it was described by one of the witnesses - I think it was John - as something $I$ think she called an $A$ cape or something to that effect, whatever it was anyway you will recollect it and certainly the lady in the jury will; and I don't know whether this particular coat was as described by John or not, that is whether it was this particular A cape or A line as she described it. However, that's a matter that you will consider. As I said there is nothing at all to show positively that the person who was walking down the street was Gail Miller. The only thing that you have is the time that she likely left the house and the time that they likely were driving along the particular road ..." If $I$ can just pause there, so it appears the judge is saying first of all it may not have been Gail Miller who they stopped for directions; is
that fair?
That, yeah, that's how $I$ read it.
And the Crown theory was, $I$ think, that it was Gail Miller who they stopped and asked for directions?

Absolutely.
And Chief Justice, I think, is saying here it might not have been and it might still have been Gail Miller who was murdered that morning?

That's how $I$ read it now, sir.
In other words, that if the woman they asked for directions was not Gail Miller, would the Crown theory still be, well, that David Milgaard still killed her; do you follow?

Umm, --
Let me rephrase it.
Okay.
The Crown's theory that David Milgaard was responsible for the death of Gail Miller depends upon establishing with the jury that it was Gail Miller who they stopped for directions?

I would say so, sir.
And so that if it was someone else, for example that they stopped someone else and asked for directions in the same vicinity where Gail Miller
was killed, went up, got stuck, and then left the car, I'm trying to understand whether -- the significance of it being Gail Miller that -- being stopped for directions; do you follow?

A
$Q$
I believe so. I think the judge here was, you know, attempting to avoid telling the jury what to decide in terms of facts, saying "these things are open". Clearly, the Crown's theory was that indeed it was Gail Miller and the only female, if you will, involved in this episode was her. I don't know, Mr. Hodson, if that --

I'm trying to understand why that had to be the case, Mr. Caldwell, --

Yeah.
-- and it may well have been -- for example, if it had been another woman they asked for directions, but Gail Miller came two minutes after?

Well, that is feasible, that never occurred to me as a factual situation.

And again, I'm sorry, just back to my question. Yeah.

And because the judge seems to be saying here is that there is no -- I don't know what his words are, but it's not positively proven that it was her --

A

Q

A

Q

I see.
-- being asked for directions. And my question about the Crown theory, was it possible that maybe it wasn't Gail Miller, but that it was still Gail Miller who David Milgaard grabbed?

Well, I suppose that would be possible, I -- I guess there, viewed in that way, there was what -arguably evidence of a second female walking there, as I read this, Mr. Hodson.

And the judge also says that it may or may not have been Gail Miller --

Okay.
-- and, secondly, it may or may not have been on $N$ or O?

Yeah, he made that clear further on, I think, in the --

Well, the part that $I$ read, --
Yeah.
-- he says -- if you want to just scroll up to the top. After saying about:
"... if she was the girl and if you accept the evidence of John and Wilson that it was on a street, then you would conclude $I$ suggest that it was either Avenue "N" or Avenue "O" ..."

A Yeah.

Q
"... that she was walking on."
And so I take it that that was put to the jury that it was one of those two streets?

Yeah. He is saying "you would conclude I suggest", he's leaving it open to them, but suggesting that's all the evidence would support is --

And if in fact Gail Miller was walking down Avenue O to catch the bus, and not Avenue $N$, again did the Crown's theory depend upon that fact being accepted by the jury?

I wouldn't think so, although the Crown's theory was very emphatically that it was Avenue N.

And why was that?
Well, umm, I'll try to -- the Wilson car -- the evidence $I$ recall, sir, and $I$ hope I'm right, is that it was going at one point south on Avenue $N$, that they caught up to a girl walking along the street, the car stopped, the window rolled down and David Milgaard was alleged to have asked her about where Peace Hill was, she was alleged to have said she didn't know and that remark was made, window was rolled up. The car then went further south on Avenue N to at or about 20 th

Street, attempted a U-turn, came back in effect the same way they had been coming, according to John I believe got to the entrance of an alley, as I recall there was some evidence that the car got stuck on what amounted to an inclined approach into that alley. Those were the -- I don't know if I've missed anything but I felt that those were all, you know, believable bits of evidence from wherever they came from.

Might $I$ also suggest Henry Diewold from the church viewing the headlights --

A
That would --
-- in the alley?

Yeah, that would have -- if -- Henry looking east, yeah, thank you, from, from his Avenue O location, the headlights in the alley could very well have been that car.

So if $I$ can paraphrase, and please correct me if I'm wrong, the known facts, if $I$ can call it that, at the time, being as you've outlined --Uh-huh.
-- fit better with Gail Miller walking down Avenue N than Avenue $O$ ?

A
Yeah, that's correct sir, and $I$ or you may have missed one or two but that was the basic outline.

And so that, first of all, that David Milgaard was on the passenger's side when they pulled over to the curb?

That's right.
And, if she was on Avenue O, I suppose that's possible; right?

Oh yeah, that wouldn't change anything, because she'd still be on the right-hand side of the car presumably.

Secondly, when they pull up to the intersection and do a U-turn and then get stuck, now Ron Wilson put them stuck near the intersection, Nichol John said it was an inclined alley behind the funeral home?

And if it was on Avenue $N$ that Gail Miller was walking, then that would fit with at least Nichol John's version, being by the funeral home in the alley?

I would think so.
And if that was on Avenue O that they pulled around and got stuck --

A
There was --
-- that might not fit as good with Nichol John saying they were behind a funeral home?

A

Q

A
Q

A
$Q$

A
$Q$
Right. If -- and let me just try and test it this way, Mr. Caldwell. I'm trying to understand whether the Crown's case that Mr. Milgaard had committed the murder rested on Gail Miller being -- going down Avenue $N$. And let me ask it this way. If the evidence had been uncontroverted that way. Irene @ 1-800-667-6777 or go to www.compucourt.tv
she was walking down Avenue O that morning would the Crown still have put forward the position that Mr. Milgaard had committed the murder?

A

Q
A
$Q$

A
Q

A
$Q$


I would think so. I don't think -- I think all of
the evidence that we had, we've just gone over most of it that pointed at $N$, but if there was credible evidence that she was on $O$ it wouldn't have meant the thing couldn't have happened -Yeah.
-- I wouldn't think.
Right. And the Chief Justice Bence is saying to the jury "it could be $N$, it could be $O$, that's your decision"; correct?

That's correct, yeah.
Right. And, again, we don't know what the jury -we know the jury's result but we don't know what the jury concluded, do we, as to whether or not -Absolutely not. And he was following the, I think, conventional wisdom of reminding them often that it was up to them to decide these facts which might be (a), (b), (c), or what have you. That's how I read his -- that's what $I$ would have expected any trial judge to do.

And so again, just so that we're clear, the Crown's theory was that Avenue $N$, I think you said
you were in -- fairly emphatic on that --

A
Q

A

Q

A

Q

A
Q

Yeah.
-- because the facts that you recited fit it, but if she was walking down Avenue 0 , that didn't change the Crown position that Mr. Milgaard had committed the murder; is that fair?

It wouldn't in view of my understanding of the facts at that time, sir.

You might have to explain a few more things as far as the evidence; is that fair?

Yeah, that -- there'd be a question of how the car got from Avenue $O$ and the $T$ alley, if you will, around to the funeral home. I think I got my directions wrong and it would have to go slightly south, a block what $I$ would call east, turn again to go north to get it behind the funeral home, and one more time to go west, but --

Well why don't we just maybe call up the map. We have the map $B$, maybe we can just -Okay. We can just turn that around, please. If we could just enlarge that area. Let me just go through, if $I$ may, $I$ think the Crown theory was that the vehicle was travelling south on Avenue $N$, Gail Miller was approached where I've got the $X$ on the
west side of the street, and then the car did a U-turn there.

A
Q

A
Q
A

Q
A

Q

A
$Q$

A
Q
And, in order to get the Wilson vehicle in the east-west alley facing west, Avenue $N$ was the logical way to do that; is that correct?

A
$Q$

A
$Q$
A
$Q$

And then again $I$ think Nichol John had the vehicle in the --

A
$Q$
Well, that's right, you wouldn't expect him to back up, as it were, from O to the $T$ alley. Right. And if in fact Gail Miller was travelling south on Avenue 0 , and that's where they asked her for directions, she'd have to be on this side of the street, the west side; wouldn't she? That would be something $I$ meant to mention is that I would still expect her to be on that side of the street.

Because the bus stop's on the west side?
Yes.
And so that would fit pulling over to the west side of the curb to ask for directions?

Yes.
And then, $I$ guess according to Mr. Wilson, doing a
U-turn and getting stuck, unless it's a big
U-turn, wouldn't really fit; would it?
Well I didn't think so, Mr. Hodson, because the known facts are $I$ believe that the car ended up behind the funeral home, or right at the $T$ alley, facing west.

In the entrance.
The east side of the entrance behind the funeral
home?

A
$Q$
this, Chief Justice Bence says:
"What are the pieces of evidence which

If we can go back to the charge to the jury, and next page, please, I'll just go through parts of
Mr. Caldwell, that assists you, or are we done with it?

I think that's all from my point of view.
Yeah.

Okay. Is there anything else on the map there,

tend to inculpate the accused, tend to show that the accused might have been the one who caused the death? First of all, there is evidence which you will consider to show that he was in that locality at or about the time the murder was probably committed; and although the body was not discovered until about eight twenty-five by the Marcoux girl, the fact that the deceased was found in the alley so close to home, the fact that there is evidence which indicated the time that she likely left there, then you might conclude that the death took place shortly after she left the house. That's entirely for you to decide, however. I will deal in a few minutes with the suggestion or possible suggestion that she might have been taken there after she was killed."

And then scroll down:
"There is the evidence that he was in the vicinity. Wilson of course was also in the vicinity; so was John. There is the evidence which you may consider,
which you may accept or reject with respect to the blood stain on the trousers of the accused and the rip in his pants. Both Wilson and Cadrain testified that there was blood. Wilson

I believe confined it to the pants; he said that there was no blood on the shirt or sweater. Cadrain on the other hand said there was blood on the shirt and on the pants. Cadrain said that there was a rip in the pants when he changed his pants; Wilson didn't know whether he saw the rip at the time the pants were changed or whether he saw a rip when the accused was in Regina prior to embarking on this trip. John as I recollect it said that she saw no blood on the clothing."

That is a summary of the blood evidence. Just go down to the bottom, I want to touch on, and we went through this evidence in detail with Ron Wilson about how many blocks he went when he and Mr. Milgaard left the vehicle, and here's what the judge says:
"And then he said that he walked not
more than five blocks, he was certain that he walked four blocks, that he was gone somewhere in the neighbourhood of fifteen minutes and that it was five or six minutes after he returned that the accused returned to the car. But you will recollect the questions that were put to him in cross-examination when he admitted that he had said at the preliminary inquiry that it was only two and a half blocks and he cut down the entire time $I$ think it was to some five minutes or so. He said that that was wrong, that he had said those things but that now he had given more time to think it out - I think he used the words "in depth" he was certain that he had gone four blocks and that he was more certain that the time was longer than he had indicated before. And he said that the accused returned to the car and that the accused said "I fixed her - or something to that effect."

And I take it the judge would have gone through Mr. Wilson's various lengths that he went or
walked that morning?
That's my recollection, sir.
If we can go to the next page -- actually, sorry, just to the bottom of that page, $I$ won't read it, but go to the top of that paragraph, scroll up, please, he then goes on to talk about the evidence of Nichol John and then if we can go to the next page, the top, he says -- and this is right after a summary of Nichol John's evidence:
"I want to deal at this time specifically with the evidence of this girl Nichol John. You heard her in the witness box. You must have got some impression of the type of character she is, the kind of a person who would go on this particular kind of a trip in the first place, the kind of a girl who would admittedly do the things that she did in and around Regina, the fact that she was a user of drugs - those are the kind of things I referred to before which you will take into consideration in assessing a person's evidence. What kind of a person are they? Are they likely to be telling the truth? Are
they likely to be lying? But I want to deal with it specifically and for the purpose of trying to avoid making any errors I have had a large portion of her evidence typed out by the court reporter, because as you will recollect I gave permission to Mr . Caldwell to cross-examine her on a statement that she allegedly gave to the police and I told you at the conclusion of that evidence that anything that she did not adopt at the time she gave the evidence in the witness box in that statement was not evidence against the accused. Even though she might be asked a statement did you say this, did you say that, did you say something else - unless she in the witness box adopted that, admitted she said it and admitted it was true, it cannot be considered as evidence against the accused and I repeat that to you now, so that there will be more no question at all in your minds about it." So that would be the warning, I guess if $I$ can call it that, about the use of her statements?

That's correct, sir.
And then if we can go just to the bottom of the page, and just for the record, I won't go through all this, but then the judge goes through those parts of the statement where she admitted she had told Mackie those parts and that they were true. All right.

And then if we can go to page 006202 , down at the bottom, so again he finished reading I think, straight from the transcript, her evidence about what she adopted, and then he says: "I repeat again that those things which she did not admit must be completely disregarded; and also with respect to those things that she did admit as being true that they are only the evidence of this girl and they may be true or they may not be true; it's entirely up to you to determine whether she was telling the truth when she admitted that she had said those things and that they were true."

And just pause there. When the judge says that the part she didn't adopt should be completely disregarded by the jury, let's assume that for
the moment, Mr. Caldwell, your position before the jury was when Nichol John says I don't recall what happened that morning at critical parts and you are saying to the jury don't believe her when she says that, you didn't put anything -- you didn't directly put anything forward to her, to the jury as to what it is she did?

I think that's correct.
And so the judge says two things, one -- or let me just back up. Number 1, your position is don't believe her when she says she can't recall anything that morning?

That would be my position, sir, yes.
Yes. Don't believe her, she's lying, she's not telling you everything?

Right.
And the judge is saying that part of the sworn statement that's not evidence where she said certain things and didn't adopt them, completely disregard them, jury?

Yeah, that's -- that's a pretty sweeping characterization of them $I$ would think, but $I$ don't know whether he should have done it any different way, sir.

No, and I appreciate -- and I guess what I'm
trying to understand, sort of what impression it might have had on the jury, and I guess the trouble I'm having, Mr. Caldwell, in that if the jury is there saying, okay, I can't -- let's say the jury says $I$ accept the Crown's position, I don't believe Nichol John, I think she's being untruthful based on her demeanour and everything else, I think she's lying when she says she doesn't remember, what is it, what's left open for the jury to think happened?

A

Q

A

Well, I wouldn't -- even if a juror took that position, it doesn't mean they have to disbelieve all her evidence. Like, $I$ think a good bit of her evidence wasn't very, you know, controversial or challenged, the things that -- I don't think they would have to take the position I disbelieve everything and most witnesses are, I'm told juries may believe part, all or none of what they say. Does that -- I'm not sure if I'm on the same -Well, I'm just -- I'm trying to -- and I think you had told us last sittings that certainly in putting the information in her statement, the May $24 t h$ statement, you believed that to be truthful evidence?

Absolutely.

Q

A
$Q$

A

Q

A
Q

A

Q

A

And that was in the minds of the jury and $I$ think you said that you wanted that in the minds of the jury?

Yeah, that's what $I$ understood to be the truthful situation.

And yet here Chief Justice Bence is saying to the jury she didn't adopt it, completely disregard it? Well, I don't know, what would you like me to say about that?

Well, I'm just -- I'm trying to understand what it was that -- your position, and I think your position to the jury, or your position at the time of putting the evidence forward was that she was not being truthful when she said she couldn't recall?

That's right.
So therefore let's assume you are correct and the jury believes you, then she can recall; right, that's the opposite of --

I would think so.
So that she can recall, and the only piece of evidence before the jury or the court about another recollection would be the May $24 t h$ statement?

That's right.

And I'm not suggesting anything inappropriate at all, Mr. Caldwell, I'm just trying to understand the -- what's left for the jury is to say don't believe her when she says $I$ don't recall. If the only other recollection that's alive that they've heard is the recollection in the sworn statement, which the judge then says completely disregard it, and I guess my question maybe is this, if I'm a juror and come back and say, okay, I accept your position, Crown, I don't believe her when she says I don't recall anything, what is it you would like me to believe her evidence to be?

But the -- that factual scenario never happens. In other words, a jury very seldom will come back and say -- perhaps they ask for some more advice in this case, but please sort that out for us. That's something they would have to struggle with themselves $I$ would think.

But as far as a juror is concerned, if they accept the Crown's position that Nichol John is not credible when she says $I$ don't recall, then she must -- the flip side is, well then, okay, she must recall something; right?

A
I would assume so.
And the only other version of events that was put
forward about being another recollection would be that of the statement, the May 24 th statement?

Now, is that the original --
No, that's the incriminating statement.
Okay. That's right, but she -- that's the one she was not adopting in this exercise --

Right.
-- if I'm not mistaken. That's the one that I
felt was truthful and we went through the 9(2) exercise about it; is that not right, sir?

Yeah, no, I appreciate that, Mr. Caldwell.
COMMISSIONER MacCALLUM: Mr. Hodson, I
wonder if we can, it has been a rather long
afternoon and $I$ think the witness is not really
following the substance of your question.
Perhaps we could adjourn now and go at it again in the morning.

MR. HODSON: That would be fine.
Thanks, Mr. Hodson. I'll try and improve.
MR. HODSON: I'll try on my side first, how's that.
(Adjourned at 4:18 p.m.)

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$\qquad$ , RPR, CSR

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