Chapter 6
Canada’s Conviction Review Process
1. Introduction

David Milgaard was investigated by the Saskatoon Police and the RCMP for the murder of Gail Miller. He was prosecuted by a representative of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan, and convicted on January 31, 1970. His appeals were exhausted in 1971.

The Attorney General of Saskatchewan could not set aside Milgaard’s conviction after his appeals were exhausted. The only way for Milgaard to challenge his 1970 murder conviction was to apply to the federal Minister of Justice pursuant to s. 690 of the Criminal Code and seek the mercy of the Minister. The federal Minister had the power to return Milgaard’s case to the judicial system.

Milgaard applied in 1988 and again in 1991. Ultimately, in 1992, after two s. 690 applications to the federal Minister, a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada and 23 years in prison, his murder conviction was set aside and he was released from prison. The Attorney General of Saskatchewan did not proceed with a new trial against Milgaard, choosing instead to follow the advice of the Supreme Court of Canada and enter a stay of proceedings.

On July 18, 1997, DNA testing identified Larry Fisher as the donor of semen found on Gail Miller’s clothing. Both the Saskatchewan Minister of Justice and the federal Minister of Justice apologized to Milgaard for his wrongful conviction. Saskatchewan Justice and the police reopened the Gail Miller murder investigation. Larry Fisher was arrested and charged with the murder of Gail Miller on July 25, 1997 and convicted on November 22, 1999. In 1999, Milgaard was compensated for his wrongful conviction. On February 18, 2004, the Government of Saskatchewan ordered an inquiry into Milgaard's wrongful conviction.
Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings are relevant to the Commission’s Terms of Reference. The Commission has been asked to determine not only why Milgaard was wrongfully convicted, but why it took so long for his wrongful conviction to be detected and for the murder investigation to be reopened. The Commission has also been asked to make recommendations relating to the administration of criminal justice in the province of Saskatchewan.

In order for the Commission to perform its work and fulfill its mandate, it was necessary to obtain a complete factual record. A significant part of the record in Milgaard’s case relates to the two applications for mercy filed with the federal Minister. The s. 690 proceedings figured prominently in decisions made by the police and Saskatchewan Justice on whether, and when, to reopen the murder investigation. The federal Minister’s handling of the s. 690 applications, and the subsequent decisions of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan and the police on reopening the investigation into Gail Miller’s death were inextricably linked.

Furthermore, having investigated and prosecuted Milgaard, Saskatchewan Justice has a valid interest in the detection and remedying of his wrongful conviction as a matter relating to the administration of criminal justice. His wrongful conviction cast a shadow over the administration of criminal justice in the province for many years. Recommendations relating to the administration of criminal justice in the province can only be made in the context of a full factual record.

Following Milgaard’s case, the federal Minister of Justice acknowledged the need to reform the conviction review process in Canada. In 1998, the federal Minister published a Consultation Paper entitled “Addressing Miscarriages of Justice: Reform Possibilities for Section 690 of the Criminal Code”.1 Input was sought from interested parties, and different options for reform were considered. The Consultation Paper noted that critics of the s. 690 process suggested it should be replaced with an independent review mechanism, but the federal Minister chose amending the existing process instead.

In 2002, the Criminal Code was amended and s. 690 was replaced with ss. 696.1 to 696.62. The amendments did not fundamentally alter the conviction review process. Today, an individual seeking a review of his or her conviction, having exhausted all avenues of appeal, can make an application to the federal Minister for review on the grounds of miscarriage of justice. The discretion to either reject the application or grant a remedy still lies with the federal Minister.

The Commission has always been mindful that its reach is constitutionally limited to matters within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislature. Only the federal Minister has the power to grant remedies under the provisions of the Criminal Code dealing with conviction review. However, this does not supplant the province’s valid interest in the detection and remedying of wrongful convictions in which it may have played a role. In MacKeigan v. Hickman, a case arising out of the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall prosecution, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that a provincially appointed commission can validly inquire into the conviction review process as a matter pertaining to the administration of criminal justice in the province.3 The province’s ability to inquire is not, however, unfettered, but subject to the limitations expressed in A.G. of Que. and Keable v. A.G. of Can et al (“Keable”).4

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2 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2001, S.C. 2003, Ch. 13. See also Appendix S to this Report.
The constitutional limitations on the Commission’s ability to inquire into Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings, as set out in *Keable*, were defined in the course of the Commission’s proceedings. In anticipation of hearing testimony from federal Justice witnesses, the Commission was asked by the federal Minister to set limits on the questioning of its witnesses regarding Milgaard’s s. 690 applications. I issued a ruling which became the subject of a judicial review application brought by the federal Minister before Chief Justice Laing of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench. He held that the Supreme Court of Canada decision in *Keable* precluded the Commission from asking federal Justice lawyers questions seeking to probe reasons behind actions, including questions about advice given or received in connection with Milgaard’s s. 690 applications.5

Following Laing C.J.’s decision, the Commission heard extensive evidence from two federal Justice lawyers about the investigation and consideration of Milgaard’s s. 690 applications. Legal counsel for the federal Minister was present throughout the hearings and the Commission’s record shows that the constitutional limitation identified by Laing C.J. was respected.

As I will outline in this chapter, the Commission has the statutory and constitutional authority to inquire into certain aspects of Canada’s conviction review process, and to make recommendations relating to the administration of criminal justice in Saskatchewan.

2. Jurisdiction of the Commission

(a) Statutory Jurisdiction

The Commission is a provincial commission of inquiry constituted pursuant to the *Public Inquiries Act* and derives its statutory jurisdiction from the Terms of Reference.6 The Terms of Reference, set by the Government of Saskatchewan, define and guide the work of the Commission. They read, in part, as follows:

The Commission of Inquiry appointed pursuant to this Order will have the responsibility to inquire into and report on any and all aspects of the conduct of the investigation into the death of Gail Miller and the subsequent criminal proceedings resulting in the wrongful conviction of David Edgar Milgaard on the charge that he murdered Gail Miller. The Commission of Inquiry will also have the responsibility to seek to determine whether the investigation should have been re-opened based on information subsequently received by the police and the Department of Justice. The Commission shall report its findings and make such recommendations as it considers advisable relating to the administration of criminal justice in the province of Saskatchewan.7

It is the role of the Commission to interpret the Terms of Reference. They are important because they set out the Commission’s specific duties and responsibilities, while setting the legal boundaries and scope of the Commission’s inquiry. It is my role to determine the relevance of evidence and issues to the Commission’s mandate.

The answers to what might have gone wrong in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of Milgaard resulting in his wrongful conviction and incarceration for 23 years could only be found in the context of a

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6 Public Inquiries Act, R.S.S. 1978, C.P-38.
full and complete factual record. Milgaard’s efforts to have his murder conviction overturned comprised an important part of that record.

It has long been recognized that the primary purpose of a public inquiry is to investigate, educate and inform the public, and provide advice to government. Justice Cory in *Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System) (“Krever”)* described commissions of inquiry and their purpose:

Commissions of inquiry have a long history in Canada, and have become a significant and useful part of our tradition. They have frequently played a key role in the investigation of tragedies and made a great many helpful recommendations aimed at rectifying dangerous situations.

... 

Undoubtedly, the ability of an inquiry to investigate, educate and inform Canadians benefits our society. A public inquiry before an impartial and independent commissioner which investigates the cause of tragedy and makes recommendations for change can help to prevent a recurrence of such tragedies in the future, and to restore public confidence in the industry or process being reviewed.\(^8\)

In *Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry Into the Westray Mine Tragedy (“Westray”)),* Justice Cory discussed the fact-finding function of public inquiries:

One of the primary functions of public inquiries is fact-finding. They are often convened, in the wake of public shock, horror, disillusionment, or skepticism, in order to uncover “the truth”. Inquiries are, like the judiciary, independent; unlike the judiciary, they are often endowed with wide-ranging investigative powers. In following their mandates, commissions of inquiry are, ideally, free from partisan loyalties and better able than Parliament or the legislatures to take a long-term view of the problem presented. Cynics decry public inquiries as a means used by the government to postpone acting in circumstances which often call for speedy action. Yet, these inquiries can and do fulfil an important function in Canadian society. In times of public questioning, stress and concern they provide the means for Canadians to be apprised of the conditions pertaining to a worrisome community problem and to be a part of the recommendations that are aimed at resolving the problem. Both the status and high public respect for the commissioner and the open and public nature of the hearing help to restore public confidence not only in the institution or situation investigated but also in the process of government as a whole. They are an excellent means of informing and educating concerned members of the public.\(^9\)

The importance of a full factual record in the investigation of wrongful convictions was noted by former Justice Marshall in his paper entitled “The Bounds of Redress and the Need of Full and Credible Inquiries in Wrongful Convictions” delivered to the AIDWYC conference in 2005.\(^10\) On the issue of the necessary scope of inquiries into wrongful convictions, Marshall stated the following:

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It is extremely difficult to comprehend how an inquiry into how a wrongful conviction occurred can be held in the absence of examination of the conduct of every stage of the process.

This would engage the conduct of the investigation that led to prosecution of the wrongly convicted and the entire judicial process that led to the faulty verdict and all affirmations of it. It would entail scrutiny of the manner in which police, prosecutors, defence counsel and judges acquitted their responsibilities.

This paper argues that redress for the wrongly convicted should extend beyond the confines of factual innocence to at least instances where the miscarriage of justice has been materially influenced by egregious error or conduct by officers or agents of the state. The inquiries must extend to every stage of the entire process in which the wrongly convicted individual was involved.

The stakes of wrongful convictions are too high for the wrongly convicted, their families and society as a whole to countenance any less.\footnote{Ibid at 3, 6.}

An understanding of Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings is essential to the Commission’s ability to make findings and recommendations in fulfillment of its mandate. Information was gathered in the course of the s. 690 proceedings that is helpful to the Commission in evaluating the propriety of the original police investigation and prosecution of David Milgaard. As well, information gathered through the s. 690 proceedings is important in assessing whether the Miller murder investigation should have been reopened by police or Saskatchewan Justice prior to July 1997.

The decision to reopen the investigation into the death of Gail Miller and proceed with any prosecution of another individual for that crime was the constitutional responsibility of Saskatchewan Justice. However, as long as Milgaard’s conviction remained in place, the Attorney General of Saskatchewan would not initiate proceedings against another individual for that same crime.

The remedy for Milgaard’s wrongful conviction rested in the hands of the federal Minister. Pursuant to s. 690, the federal Minister could order a new trial or hearing by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. After rejecting the first application, the Minister chose, on the second application, to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for its consideration and advice pursuant to s. 53 of the\footnote{Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.S-26} Supreme Court Act.\footnote{Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.S-26} Saskatchewan Justice was an active participant in the Supreme Court Reference Case.

The federal Minister’s review of Milgaard’s conviction under s. 690, and the decision of the Supreme Court, affected the Attorney General of Saskatchewan. Once Milgaard’s conviction was set aside by the federal Minister, decisions on the conduct of further proceedings fell to the Attorney General of Saskatchewan, as part of its responsibility over matters pertaining to the administration of criminal justice. In his testimony before the Commission, Brown said that the investigation of Milgaard’s s. 690 applications by the federal Minister, the federal Minister’s responses to those applications and the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada were relied upon by Saskatchewan Justice in deciding not to proceed.
with a new trial of Milgaard, or reopen the murder investigation before DNA test results were received in 1997.

(b) Constitutional Jurisdiction

The Constitution Act, 1867 sets out the distribution of legislative powers between the Parliament of Canada and the Provincial Legislatures. Pursuant to s. 91(27), the Parliament of Canada enjoys exclusive legislative authority over the subject of the criminal law, including procedure in criminal matters. Pursuant to s. 92(14), each provincial legislature is granted exclusive legislative jurisdiction over “The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.”

As a provincial commission of inquiry, the Commission’s reach is constitutionally limited to matters within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislature. The administration of justice falls within provincial jurisdiction. In Di Iorio v. Warden of the Montreal Jail the Supreme Court of Canada held that the words “administration of justice in the province” are to be given a fair, large and liberal construction such that they encompass the administration of criminal justice:

Both the federal and provincial governments have accepted for over a century the status of the provincial governments to administer criminal justice within their respective boundaries. The provincial mandate in that field has consistently been recognized as part and parcel of the responsibility of a provincial government for public order within the province.

Under head 92(14) of our Constitution, as I understand it, law enforcement is primarily the responsibility of the Province and in all provinces the Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the Crown. He has broad responsibilities for most aspects of the Administration of Justice. Among these within the field of criminal justice, are the court system, the police, criminal investigation and prosecutions, and corrections. The provincial police are answerable only to the Attorney General as are the provincial Crown Attorneys who conduct the great majority of criminal prosecutions in Canada.

Notwithstanding the division of legislative powers, it was acknowledged in Di Iorio by the Supreme Court that implicit in the grant to the provinces of exclusive legislative authority in respect of administration of justice and in the grant to the federal government of exclusive legislative authority in respect of criminal law and procedure, is an acceptance of a certain degree of overlapping.

The constitutional ability of this Commission to inquire into Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings was settled by McLachlin J. in MacKeigan v. Hickman. The very issue considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in MacKeigan was whether a provincially appointed commission, namely the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution, could inquire into a reference by the federal Minister of Justice under (then) s. 617(b) of the Criminal Code. After 11 years in prison, Marshall was released following a successful resolution of a reference made by the federal Minister of Justice to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Appeal Division. The failure of the justice system in Marshall’s case led the Attorney General of Nova Scotia to establish a provincial commission of inquiry into his case. It was argued that the inquiry was invalid because it trenched on the exclusive federal power with respect to the criminal law.

14 Ibid.
McLachlin J. considered the question of “whether the inquiry is into the administration of justice”, in which case it falls within the Province’s powers under s. 92(14), or into the “criminal law” or “criminal procedure”, in which case it infringes the federal criminal law power:

The answer to this question depends on how the phrase “administration of justice” is construed in relation to the federal power over criminal law and procedure. In Di Iorio v. Warden of Montreal Jail, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 152, this court held that “administration of justice” should be interpreted broadly as including criminal justice. …

…

Di Iorio v. Warden of Montreal Jail establishes, at page 205, that the police, criminal investigations, prosecutions, corrections and the court system, all comprise part of the “administration of justice”. These are all matters under investigation by the Commission. The term “criminal procedure”, reserved exclusively to the federal government, should not be confused with the larger concept of “criminal justice”…

…

I am satisfied that the Province has constitutional jurisdiction to inquire into the investigation, charging, prosecution, conviction and subsequent release of Donald Marshall, Jr. These are matters pertaining to the administration of justice within the Province, and, subject to the caveat expressed by Pigeon J. in Attorney General (Que.) and Keable v. Attorney General (Can.), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 218, that no provincially constituted commission of inquiry can inquire into the actual management or operation of the federal activity or entity in question (there the R.C.M.P.), they do not constitute an attempt to interfere with the valid federal interest in the enactment of and provision for a uniform system of procedures and rules governing criminal justice in the country: Di Iorio v. Warden of Montreal Jail, supra; O’Hara v. British Columbia, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 591, at p. 610.16

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in MacKeigan establishes that Saskatchewan has constitutional jurisdiction to inquire into the investigation, charging, prosecution, conviction and subsequent release of David Milgaard, as matters pertaining to the administration of justice within the province, subject to the caveat expressed in Keable. Just as the Marshall Commission could inquire into a reference of Marshall’s case to the Court of Appeal by the federal Minister under s. 617(b), this Commission can inquire into Milgaard’s s. 690 applications and the reference of his case by the federal Minister to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Marshall Commission inquired into the facts surrounding the federal Minister’s reference of Marshall’s case to the Court of Appeal under s. 617(b) of the Criminal Code. Douglas Rutherford of the federal Department of Justice testified before the Marshall Commission about his involvement in the Marshall case.17 At the relevant time he was Assistant Deputy Attorney General for criminal law in the federal Department of Justice. Prior to hearing from Rutherford, commission counsel noted for the record that his giving evidence was not to be taken as a waiver by the federal Justice Department of its right at a subsequent date to question the jurisdiction of the commission in particular areas. Rutherford did give fairly extensive evidence. In particular, he freely discussed the process involved in the federal Department
of Justice’s determination to refer the Marshall matter to the Court of Appeal under s. 617(b), instead of s. 617(c) of the Criminal Code. He discussed with candor his advice to and discussions with the then Minister of Justice, Jean Chrétien. He discussed the steps that were taken in the case, the department’s handling of it, and also answered general questions about the application process.

As noted in MacKeigan, the Commission’s ability to inquire into Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings is limited by the caveat expressed in Keable that no provincially constituted commission of inquiry can inquire into the administration and management of a federal institution. In Keable, the Province of Quebec established a commission of inquiry to investigate and report on various allegedly illegal or reprehensible incidents or acts in which various police forces were involved, including the RCMP. The terms of reference set by the provincial order-in-council were very broad. In an attempt to fulfill his mandate, Commissioner Keable issued comprehensive subpoenas directed to the Solicitor General of Canada demanding that he produce a substantial number of documents pertaining to the internal administration of the RCMP. The constitutional validity of the provincial inquiry was challenged. In ruling on the validity of the commission’s mandate, Pigeon, J. said:

I thus must hold that an inquiry into criminal acts allegedly committed by members of the R.C.M.P. was validly ordered, but that consideration must be given to the extent to which such inquiry may be carried into the administration of this police force. It is operating under the authority of a federal statute, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, (R.S.C. 1970, c.R-9). It is a branch of the Department of the Solicitor General, (Department of the Solicitor General Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.S-12, s.4). Parliament’s authority for the establishment of this force and its management as part of the Government of Canada is unquestioned. It is therefore clear that no provincial authority may intrude into its management. While members of the force enjoy no immunity from the criminal law and the jurisdiction of the proper provincial authorities to investigate and prosecute criminal acts committed by any of them as by any other person, these authorities cannot, under the guise of carrying on such investigations, pursue the inquiry into the administration and management of the force. The doctrine of colourability is just as applicable in adjudicating on the validity of a commission’s term of reference or decisions as in deciding on the constitutional validity of legislation....

In the result, the Supreme Court deemed inapplicable to the RCMP certain portions of the inquiry’s terms of reference. Insofar as the provincial commission’s mandate entitled it to look at the conduct of individual members of the RCMP and the methods they used in the specific instances described in the terms of reference, the Commissioner’s powers were acknowledged. However, to the extent that the terms of reference authorized a systemic inquiry into the RCMP’s policies and regulations for the purpose of making recommendations, they were invalid and inapplicable to the RCMP.

The thrust of the decision in Keable is that a provincial commission of inquiry can inquire into what a federal entity did in particular circumstances, but it cannot embark upon a direct and concerted investigation into how that entity conducts its business generally. In other words, a systemic investigation into the internal workings of a federal entity is constitutionally prohibited.

It is accepted that a provincial inquiry may touch upon matters within federal jurisdiction provided it does so only incidentally. The Supreme Court of Canada reinforced this principal in Starr v. Houlden, when it stated that:

18 Supra note 4 at 243.
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... At the outset, it is worth noting that this Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of provincial commissions of inquiry and has sanctioned the granting of fairly broad powers of investigation which may incidentally have an impact upon the federal criminal law and criminal procedure powers.19

In Consortium Developments (Clearwater) Ltd. v. Sarnia (City), the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the general constitutional rule that permits provincial inquiries that are in “pith and substance” directed to provincial matters to proceed despite possible incidental effects on the criminal law power.20 In other words, an inquiry established pursuant to provincial legislation is constitutional provided that its primary purpose is to inquire into matters within the constitutional jurisdiction of the province.

It is permissible for a provincial commission of inquiry to comment on federal law. In Diorio, Dickson, J. of the Supreme Court stated that a provincial commission of inquiry, inquiring into any subject, might submit a report in which it appeared that changes in federal laws would be desirable.21 The meaning of this statement was discussed by Pigeon, J. in Keable:

The intended meaning of the sentence quoted is not that a provincial commission may validly inquire into any subject, but that any inquiry into a matter within provincial competence may reveal the desirability of changes in federal laws. The Commission might therefore, whatever may be the subject into which it is validly inquiring, submit a report in which it appeared that changes in federal laws would be desirable. This does not mean that the gathering of information for the purpose of making such a report may be a proper subject of inquiry by a provincial commission.22

The primary purpose of this Commission was to inquire into the circumstances relating to Milgaard’s wrongful conviction in the hope that future tragedies could be prevented. As noted by the Government of Saskatchewan, Milgaard’s wrongful conviction cast a shadow over the administration of criminal justice in the province. Comment on the desirability of changes to the Criminal Code arising from these circumstances is merely incidental to our main purpose.

(c) Commission Proceedings and Judicial Review Application

Before public hearings commenced, the Commission prepared a Position Paper on the scope and meaning of its Terms of Reference. It was sent to all parties with standing on June 1, 2004 for review and comment. The purpose of the Position Paper was to set out the Commission’s preliminary interpretation of its Terms of Reference and the scope of its statutory and constitutional jurisdiction.

The relevance of Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings to the Terms of Reference was considered by the Commission in the Position Paper. Milgaard’s applications to the federal Minister under s. 690 of the Criminal Code, the investigation of those applications by federal Justice officials, the reporting by those officials to the federal Minister, the federal Minister’s decisions in response to the applications and the Supreme Court of Canada Reference Case are all part of the “s. 690 proceedings”.

As noted in the Position Paper, the Commission determined that it had statutory jurisdiction (authorized by its Terms of Reference) to inquire into the s. 690 proceedings. The Commission also determined that

21 Supra note 15 at 209.
22 Supra note 4 at 243.
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it had constitutional jurisdiction to inquire into the s. 690 proceedings, subject to the limitation prohibiting
inquiry into the administration and management of a federal institution (here the federal Department of
Justice) identified by the Supreme Court in Keable.

Although the federal Minister was not a party with standing when the Position Paper was initially
distributed, counsel with the federal Department of Justice requested and was allowed an opportunity to
provide a response to the Commission’s Position Paper. The response was provided by Kerry Scullion,
counsel with the Criminal Conviction Review Group of the federal Department of Justice. In his June
23, 2004 letter to the Commission, counsel for the federal Minister took no issue with the Commission’s
statutory jurisdiction to inquire into Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings. He also acknowledged that the
Commission had constitutional jurisdiction to inquire into Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings subject to some
limitations:

We are in complete agreement that a provincially appointed commission can inquire
into some aspects of Mr. Milgaard’s application to the Minister pursuant to s. 690 (now
s. 696.1 and formerly s. 617) of the Criminal Code. We are also in agreement that there
are constitutional limitations on any such inquiry, and as you have stated, at this stage it is
difficult to ascertain the scope of these limitations without more information as to what area
you as Commission Counsel or any other interested party may wish to pursue.

The Position Paper was amended following receipt of submissions from parties with standing. The parties
acknowledged that the Commission had authority to inquire into the s. 690 proceedings subject to any
constitutional limitations that might apply. There was also consensus with all parties that a ruling on the
precise constitutional limitations would be made at a later date of the Inquiry after evidence had been
heard.

Public hearings commenced in January 2005, and the Commission’s Position Paper was used as a
guideline for determining witnesses and the scope of their evidence. On March 4, 2005, the Attorney
General of Canada, on behalf of the federal Minister, applied for standing on the basis that the federal
Minister was directly and substantially affected by the Inquiry. Standing was granted on March 7, 2005.23

The federal Minister actively participated in the Commission’s proceedings. The Commission heard
considerable evidence from a number of witnesses regarding Milgaard’s two s. 690 applications to the
federal Minister, the investigation of those applications by the federal Justice department, the Minister’s
decisions and the Supreme Court Reference. In November, 2005, the Commission heard extensive
evidence over a span of eight days from Rick Pearson, a retired RCMP officer. Pearson assisted the
federal Justice department in its investigation of Milgaard’s s. 690 applications. The RCMP was a party
with standing before the Commission and raised no objections to the constitutional jurisdiction of the
Commission.

In advance of testimony from federal Justice witnesses involved in Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings, the
federal Minister raised concerns about the questioning of its witnesses in areas that were beyond the
constitutional scope of a provincial commission of inquiry. The federal Minister suggested that a ruling on
the constitutional limits of the Commission should be obtained in advance of the scheduled testimony of
its witnesses.

On May 18, 2006, Commission counsel circulated a memorandum to counsel for all parties with standing outlining the procedure for determination of the constitutional limits. Attached to the memorandum was an outline of areas to be covered in examination of federal Justice witnesses. The outline was drafted to include any potential subject areas of examination of federal Justice witnesses in order to assist counsel for the federal Minister in identifying those areas which the federal Minister believed were outside the constitutional scope of a provincial commission of inquiry.

On May 23, 2006, the Commission received a written submission from the federal Minister. The federal Minister stated that it did not object to federal Justice witnesses testifying, subject to appropriate constitutional boundaries. It was submitted that those boundaries, set by the Supreme Court in Keable, prevented the Commission from inquiring into communications which were appropriately characterized as advice. While noting that the legislation governing conviction review had changed, the federal Minister acknowledged that “the s. 690 process as it existed at the time of Mr. Milgaard’s applications” was relevant to the Commission’s mandate. The federal Minister stated the following:

Commission counsel has used the terms “gather”, “assess” and “analyze” a number of times to describe the Federal Government’s role in dealing with Mr. Milgaard’s s. 690 applications. The Minister respectfully submits that the appropriate distinction to be made is between which activities were investigative or fact finding in nature and those which constituted advice, legal or otherwise.

The Minister respectfully submits that those communications which are more appropriately characterized as advice, either written or oral, are at the very core of that which is proscribed by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Keable.

The Minister concedes that a Provincial Inquiry can inquire into those aspects of the handling of the s. 690 applications filed by Mr. Milgaard, subject to the constitutional limitations, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in McKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796.

However, the mandate of this Commission is only concerned with the s. 690 process as it existed at the time of Mr. Milgaard’s applications. The Commission should be conscious of not only the constitutional limitations on its mandate in this regard, but the practical reality that the mercy process is much different now than it was at the time of Mr. Milgaard’s applications. The relevant Criminal Code provisions have been significantly amended and the administration of mercy applications has been altered.

On May 30, 2006, the Commission received a written submission from the Government of Saskatchewan. While acknowledging that Keable prohibited a provincial commission from undertaking a systemic inquiry into the conviction review process, it was submitted that Keable did not prohibit the Commission from inquiring into actions and decisions taken in respect of Milgaard’s s. 690 applications. Saskatchewan made it clear that the Terms of Reference were generous and that it intended for the Commission to inquire into Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings:

6. When establishing this Commission and formulating its terms of reference, Saskatchewan sought to imbue it with a scope of inquiry as generous as possible within accepted constitutional constraints. Saskatchewan wants the Commissioner to inquire into, and make recommendations about, all aspects of the administration of criminal justice in Saskatchewan which may have contributed to the wrongful conviction of David Milgaard. This would include actions taken by the Department of Justice (Canada) that might have affected decisions made by police, prosecutors and other justice officials in Saskatchewan about this matter. It is precisely for this reason that subject to the comments below, Saskatchewan submits the Commission has the constitutional authority to inquire into the operation of section 690 of the Criminal Code in the context of Mr. Milgaard’s two applications.

10. The principles which emerge from Keable and subsequent authorities which applied it, demonstrate that this Commission does not lack authority to penetrate the walls of the Department of Justice (Canada), as it were. Saskatchewan submits that this Commission can investigate the various actions undertaken, and decisions taken by officials in the Department of Justice (Canada) subject to valid claims of solicitor/client or Crown privilege, in respect of the two applications under section 690 of the Criminal Code brought on behalf of Mr. Milgaard.

11. Saskatchewan does concede that following Keable, this Commission lacks the constitutional authority to embark upon a general systemic inquiry into the Department of Justice (Canada)’s policies, procedures and protocols respecting the operation of section 690 applications either at the time of Mr. Milgaard’s two applications or at present.

Following oral submissions, I issued my ruling on June 1, 2006. No evidence had yet been heard from federal Justice witnesses. My ruling was a preliminary one and was intended simply to provide guidance to the parties. I addressed the narrow issue of whether questioning federal Justice witnesses on advice relating to Milgaard’s s. 690 applications violated the Keable prohibition against inquiring into the administration and management of a federal institution. I did not attempt to set guidelines that would answer all possible future objections. I held that the proscribed areas of administration and management listed in Keable had nothing to do with advice concerning Milgaard’s s. 690 applications or the Reference Case.

Starting on June 5, 2006, the Commission heard extensive evidence from federal Justice witness Eugene Williams. Williams was the lawyer primarily responsible for the investigation of Milgaard’s two s. 690 applications. He discussed the information he obtained in the course of his investigation along with his assessment of its credibility. He also answered questions about his reasons for undertaking various steps in the investigation. Williams testified for seven days with legal counsel for the federal Minister present at all times and without any objection.

By Notice of Motion dated July 4, 2006, the Attorney General of Canada applied for judicial review of my June 1, 2006 ruling on the basis that I had exceeded my constitutional jurisdiction. It was also argued that I had exceeded my statutory jurisdiction, notwithstanding the previous acknowledgement by the
federal Minister of the relevance of Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings to the Commission’s mandate. The only issue argued before me and addressed in my June 1, 2006 ruling related to the limits on the questioning of federal Justice witnesses arising from constitutional limitations on a provincial inquiry. Before the Commission, and on the judicial review application, the federal Minister was represented by different legal counsel.

On August 18, 2006, Laing, C.J. issued his decision on the judicial review application. He declined to rule on the issue of statutory jurisdiction, finding that it was my role in the first instance to interpret the Terms of Reference and determine issues of relevance. He noted that the federal Minister had not raised the Terms of Reference as an issue until the judicial review application.

On the issue of constitutional jurisdiction, Laing, C.J. held that the constitutional limitation identified by the Supreme Court in *Keable* precluded the Commission from asking federal Justice witnesses “questions which seek to probe the reasons behind actions, including questions about advice given or received” in the course of Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings. My ruling was set aside. The application of Laing’s ruling to the questioning of federal Justice witnesses was addressed by the Commission, with the input of legal counsel for the federal Minister, during testimony provided by witnesses Williams and Fainstein. The constitutional limitation was followed in the questioning of these witnesses to the satisfaction of legal counsel for the federal Minister.

The Commission heard extensive evidence regarding Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings from federal Justice lawyers Williams and Fainstein. Williams continued his testimony regarding the investigation of Milgaard’s s. 690 applications. Fainstein testified about his involvement as legal counsel for the federal Minister in the Supreme Court Reference Case and in subsequent efforts to have DNA testing done on Gail Miller’s clothing.

Legal counsel for the federal Minister was present throughout the hearings and during the testimony of its witnesses. In addition, Williams applied for standing before the Commission and retained his own legal counsel. His August 18, 2006 application for standing was made on the basis of his expertise in connection with Milgaard’s s. 690 applications, and his “genuine commitment to ensuring that the Commission can properly meet its Terms of Reference by receiving as complete as possible a picture of the section 690 process”. It was also prompted by a concern that his position and the federal Minister’s position on certain legal and factual issues may not coincide in all respects.

The questioning of federal Justice witnesses on advice given in connection with Milgaard’s two s. 690 applications was not permitted. Williams and Fainstein testified to their involvement in Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings, including the reasons for their actions, without objection by legal counsel for the federal Minister. The record reflects that the Commission was careful to respect the constitutional limitations affecting the scope of its inquiry.

(d) Position of the Federal Minister

In written and oral submissions made by the federal Minister at the conclusion of the public hearings, the Commission’s ability to inquire into Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings was challenged. On the issue of statutory jurisdiction, the federal Minister submitted that:

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27 Supra note 5. See also http://www.milgaardinquiry.ca/pdf/Judgment_August_18_2006.pdf.
28 Ibid at 224.
The Terms of Reference at the Milgaard Inquiry provide no express authority to inquire into Mr. Milgaard’s s. 617/s. 690 process, the Supreme Court reference or the release of David Milgaard.\(^{30}\)

The federal Minister also asserted that the Commission should not comment on the current process for conviction review as “the Mercy provisions have changed substantially” since Milgaard’s applications were considered and “the evidence about the current process was not comprehensive enough to effectively make informed recommendations”.\(^{31}\)

The position taken by the federal Minister in its final submissions on the limited statutory jurisdiction of the Commission was at odds with both the role played by the federal Minister in the Inquiry process as a party with standing, and with earlier acknowledgements by the federal Minister of the relevance of Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings to the Commission’s mandate.

The Terms of Reference granted to the Commission are broad in scope and clearly encompass an inquiry into all aspects of Milgaard’s wrongful conviction, including the process by which his conviction was ultimately overturned. Saskatchewan played a significant role in that process, as it was asked to take an active role in defending the conviction before the Supreme Court of Canada in 1992. On the scope of the Terms of Reference, Saskatchewan stated:

> ... The Milgaard Inquiry was established by the Government of Saskatchewan through Order-in-Council 84/2004 to ascertain what went wrong in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of David Milgaard that resulted in his wrongful conviction for the murder of Gail Miller, and subsequent incarceration for approximately 23 years. This case cast a shadow over the administration of criminal justice in this province. As Wilson J. stated in *MacKeigan v. Hickman*, when the justice system “in some way went awry” by convicting an innocent person of a heinous crime, “it is obviously a matter of great public concern”. The Government of Saskatchewan determined that a public commission of inquiry should be established to inquire into any and all matters relevant to the wrongful conviction of Mr. Milgaard and his subsequent incarceration.\(^{32}\)

In final submissions, the federal Minister conceded that the Supreme Court decision in *MacKeigan* appears “to permit recommendations about the s. 617/s. 690 process” but asserted that the *MacKeigan* decision was inapplicable because the terms of reference for the Marshall Commission were much broader.\(^{33}\) This argument fails to recognize that the terms of reference for the Marshall Commission, given their widest interpretation, could only encompass matters within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislature. The Terms of Reference given to this Commission could not be more generous. They clearly indicate that the Government of Saskatchewan sought to imbue the Commission with the full scope of its jurisdiction in relation to criminal justice.

The Commission acknowledges that its inquiry was not unlimited in scope. The only case it was empowered to review was Milgaard’s. The Commission is aware that the process of conviction review in Canada has changed. The Commission is also aware that it was not permitted to embark on a general systemic inquiry into the Department of Justice (Canada) policies, procedures and protocols respecting

\(^{30}\) See http://www.milgaardinquiry.ca/finalsubmissions/341135.pdf at para. 239.

\(^{31}\) Ibid at para. 245-246.


\(^{33}\) Supra note 30 at para 237.
the operation of s. 690 (now ss. 696.1 to 696.6), either at the time of Milgaard’s two applications or at present. No witnesses were called for the specific purpose of providing evidence on the current conviction review process set out in ss. 696.1 to 696.6 of the *Criminal Code*.

Despite these limitations, the Commission is able to provide insight on how the conviction review process operated in Milgaard’s case, and to comment on the desirability of changes to the process in Canada. The Commission heard extensive evidence on Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings as part of its valid provincial inquiry into the circumstances surrounding his wrongful conviction. No other public inquiry has examined a case in such detail, a case which was groundbreaking in many respects. It involved two applications for mercy and a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada. It also prompted the federal Minister to acknowledge the need for reform of the conviction review process.

It appeared from the testimony of Justice Canada lawyer Williams and from a reading of the current legislation, that changes made since review of Milgaard’s case have not fundamentally altered the process or addressed all of the problems he faced.

The federal Minister, as a party with standing, participated fully in the Commission’s proceedings. A Justice Canada witness provided extensive testimony relating to Milgaard’s s. 690 proceedings. Counsel for the federal Minister expressed a desire to assist the Commission with its work and pledged cooperation. With respect, for the federal Minister to now say that the Commission is not able to inquire into Milgaard’s s. 690 process, and is not qualified to comment on the conviction review process because only his case was examined, is not only inconsistent but ignores the wide scope of this Public Inquiry.

In making recommendations for the better administration of criminal justice in the province, I would be remiss if I failed to address the conviction review process in Canada.

### 3. The Canadian System of Conviction Review

#### (a) Historical Review

Historically, the only power to revisit a criminal conviction after appeal was found in the Royal Prerogative of Mercy which enabled the Crown to pardon offenders, reduce the severity of criminal punishments, and correct miscarriages of justice.\(^{34}\)

As explained by Gary Trotter in “Justice, Politics and the Royal Prerogative of Mercy: Examining the Self-Defence Review”, the Royal Prerogative of Mercy has been used to achieve different objectives: first, to show compassion by relieving an individual of the full weight of his or her sentence and second, to correct errors in the judicial process such as wrongful convictions.\(^{35}\) The power to dispense the Royal Prerogative of Mercy was transmitted into Canadian law through the office of the Governor General. In *The Attorney General (Canada) v. The Attorney General of the Province of Ontario*, the Supreme Court of Canada said:

> By the law of the constitution, or in other words, by the common law of England, the prerogative of mercy is vested in the crown, not merely as regards the territorial limits of the United Kingdom, but throughout the whole of Her Majesty’s Dominions. The authority to

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exercise this prerogative may be delegated to viceroys and colonial governors representing the crown.36

When Canada’s first Criminal Code was enacted in 1892, it recognized the potential for miscarriages of justice and provided a legislative remedy by codifying one aspect of the prerogative.37 The power to revisit a criminal conviction was codified in s. 748 which read as follows:

748. If upon any application for the mercy of the Crown on behalf of any person convicted of an indictable offence, the Minister of Justice entertains a doubt whether such person ought to have been convicted, he may, instead of advising Her Majesty to remit or commute the sentence, after such inquiry as he thinks proper, by an order in writing direct a new trial at such time and before such court as he may think proper.

Since 1892, the statutory power of the federal Minister to review criminal convictions after all appeals have been exhausted has gone through a number of revisions. By 1927, s. 748 had become s. 1022:

1022. Nothing in the ten last preceding sections of this Act shall in any manner limit or affect His Majesty’s royal prerogative of mercy.

2. Upon any application for the mercy of the Crown on behalf of any person convicted on indictment, the Minister of Justice,

(a) if he entertains a doubt whether such person ought to have been convicted, may, after such inquiry as he thinks proper, instead of advising His Majesty to remit or to commute the sentence, direct by an order in writing a new trial at such time and before such court as the Minister of Justice thinks proper; or

(b) may, at any time, refer the whole case to the court of appeal, and the case shall then be heard and determined by that court as in the case of an appeal by a person convicted; and

(c) at any time, if the Minister of Justice desires the assistance of the court of appeal on any point arising in the case with a view to the determination of the petition, he may refer that point to the court of appeal for its opinion thereon, and that court shall consider the point so referred and furnish the Minister of Justice its opinion thereon accordingly.38

The original “entertains a doubt” standard for granting a remedy remained in this section. However, the Minister’s powers were broadened to include the power to refer cases to the Court of Appeal for hearing and determination, or for determinations on points arising in the case.

By 1955, the provision governing conviction review began to take on a modern form. Section 1022 of the Criminal Code became s. 596, and the “entertains a doubt” standard was removed and replaced with more ambiguous language that granted authority to the Minister of Justice to “direct, by order in writing, a new trial before any court that he thinks proper, if after inquiry he is satisfied that in the circumstances a new trial should be directed”:

36 (1894) 23 S.C.R. 458 at 469.
37 The Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29.
38 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1927, c. 36.
596. The Minister of Justice may, upon an application for the mercy of the Crown by or on behalf of a person who has been convicted in proceedings by indictment,

(a) direct, by order in writing, a new trial before any court that he thinks proper, if after inquiry he is satisfied that in the circumstances a new trial should be directed;

(b) refer the matter at any time to the court of appeal for hearing and determination by that court as if it were an appeal by the convicted person; or

(c) refer to the court of appeal at any time, for its opinion, any question upon which he desires the assistance of that court, and the court shall furnish its opinion accordingly.39

By 1970, s. 596 was amended and re-enacted as s. 617 of the Criminal Code:

617. The Minister of Justice may, upon an application for the mercy of the Crown by or on behalf of a person who has been convicted in proceedings by indictment or who has been sentenced to preventive detention under Part XXI,

(a) direct, by order in writing, a new trial or, in the case of a person under sentence of preventive detention, a new hearing, before any court that he thinks proper, if after inquiry he is satisfied that in the circumstances a new trial or hearing, as the case may be, should be directed;

(b) refer the matter at any time to the court of appeal for hearing and determination by that court as if it were an appeal by the convicted person or the person under sentence of preventive detention, as the case may be; or

(c) refer to the court of appeal at any time, for its opinion, any question upon which he desires the assistance of that court, and the court shall furnish its opinion accordingly.40

(b) Section 690 of the Criminal Code as it Applied to David Milgaard

As part of broad revisions to the Criminal Code in 1985, s. 617 was re-enacted as s. 690.41 With the exception of a reference to “Part XXIV” instead of “Part XXI”, s. 690 was virtually identical to its predecessor. Section 690 came into force on December 12, 1988. Both of Milgaard’s applications to the federal Minister of Justice for review of his conviction were made under s. 690 of the Criminal Code. Section 690 remained in effect until it was revised and replaced in 2002 with ss. 696.1 to 696.6 of the Criminal Code.42

690. The Minister of Justice may, on an application for the mercy of the Crown by or on behalf of a person who has been convicted in proceedings by indictment or who has been sentenced to preventive detention under Part XXIV,
(a) direct, by order in writing, a new trial or, in the case of a person under sentence of preventive detention, a new hearing, before any court that he thinks proper, if after inquiry he is satisfied that in the circumstances a new trial or hearing, as the case may be, should be directed;

(b) refer the matter at any time to the court of appeal for hearing and determination by that court as if it were an appeal by the convicted person or the person under sentence of preventive detention, as the case may be; or

(c) refer to the court of appeal at any time, for its opinion, any question on which he desires the assistance of that court, and the court shall furnish its opinion accordingly.

Milgaard first applied to the federal Minister for a review of his 1970 murder conviction on December 28, 1988. His application was denied by the Minister on February 27, 1991. His second application was made on August 14, 1991. Subparagraphs 690 (b) and (c) allowed the federal Minister to refer the matter to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal for a new appeal or for the opinion of the court on any question. Milgaard’s trial counsel, Tallis, was a member of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, effectively precluding a reference to that court. On November 28, 1991, the Governor General, on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, referred Milgaard’s case to the Supreme Court of Canada for a hearing pursuant to s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act. The Court was asked to provide its opinion on whether Milgaard’s continued conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice and if it did, what was the appropriate remedy.

On April 14, 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in the Reference Case. The Court held that Milgaard had not proven his innocence. However, the Court concluded that fresh evidence, particularly in relation to the Fisher rapes, might affect the verdict. The Court recommended to the Minister of Justice that she set aside the conviction and direct that a new trial be held. The federal Minister complied.

On April 16, 1992, the Attorney General of Saskatchewan filed an indictment, charging Milgaard with second degree murder. However, the province elected not to proceed with a new trial. Instead, on the same day, a stay of proceedings was entered by the provincial crown in Her Majesty The Queen v. David Milgaard. David Milgaard was released from jail. The provincial Justice Minister stated that an inquiry would not be ordered, nor would compensation be offered to David Milgaard as his innocence had not been established.

Three significant features of the s. 690 process emerged from the Commission’s review of Milgaard’s case:

1. Milgaard had the onus of investigating his own wrongful conviction, identifying credible grounds and providing those grounds to the federal Minister together with supporting evidence. The federal Minister’s role was limited to reviewing the grounds advanced. The federal Minister played no role in identifying potential grounds for a miscarriage of justice.

2. Although not expressly stated in s. 690, in order to obtain a remedy from the federal Minister, Milgaard had to establish a reasonable likelihood of a miscarriage of justice on the basis of new information or evidence that was not available at trial. This onus was very similar to the one Milgaard would have to meet if his case was allowed to be heard by the Court of Appeal.
3. Although the ultimate decision was made by the federal Minister, she relied heavily on the advice of federal Justice lawyers who investigated Milgaard’s application on her behalf and on the advice of the Honourable William McIntyre Q.C., who she retained to advise her. The Minister never publicly disclosed the information given to McIntyre to review, nor the nature of the legal opinion sought and provided. The case was highly politicized and concerns were expressed at the time that political pressures might have influenced the Minister’s decision.

Although Milgaard’s second s. 690 application led to his release from prison in 1992, success owed more to publicity than to process.

It is my view that the publicity harmed the administration of justice, and that the process proved too daunting for the applicant and should be improved. The onus on the applicant is too heavy. He should not be expected to show factual innocence, and an independent and more transparent agency should investigate.

(i) Investigative Onus on Applicant/ Reactive Role of Federal Minister

On January 28, 1986, Milgaard wrote to Justice Minister John Crosbie from Stony Mountain Institution. His letter said that he had been in prison for 17 years for a crime that he did not commit. He also told the Justice Minister that he had decided not to eat or drink until he was a free man. He asked the Justice Minister to look at his case and end his ordeal. On March 11, 1986, Milgaard received a reply from the office of the Minister of Justice. He was informed that he could make an application for mercy to the Minister of Justice, who had the power to order a new trial or appeal proceeding:

If you have not exhausted the court process, you should do so. If you have and feel that yours is a compelling case, you may make an application to the Minister for relief. The following must be sent to the Minister: a brief fully detailing why you say that there was an injustice; copies of transcripts of the preliminary hearing and trial; copies of any judgments and reasons for judgment that were issued in your case; copies of any written arguments filed by the Crown and defence. On receipt of this material, your application will be duly considered.

If you wish the assistance of a lawyer and are unable to afford one, I would suggest you contact Legal Aid Manitoba, 402 – 294 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3C 0B9.43

As the letter from the Minister’s office reveals, an applicant under s. 690 was required to provide extensive documentation to the Minister including the grounds for the alleged miscarriage of justice and supporting evidence. Milgaard’s application was not submitted to the federal Minister until December 28, 1988, almost 19 years after his original murder conviction, and eight years after he and his mother first retained legal counsel and began their efforts to have the conviction set aside.

Milgaard was likely more fortunate than most applicants, in that his family provided him with financial support enabling him to retain counsel. Hersh Wolch was retained in January of 1986 and both s. 690 applications submitted on behalf of Milgaard were prepared by legal counsel. Despite requests to both Manitoba and Saskatchewan Legal Aid programs, neither provided financial assistance for conviction review applications.
The federal Minister’s role under s. 690 was reactive as opposed to proactive. The federal Minister responded only to what was contained in the application, and did not proactively investigate Milgaard’s conviction to identify any possible miscarriage of justice. The task of identifying possible grounds of miscarriage of justice was left to the applicant and his or her counsel.

As explained by Williams:

Q … A convicted person can’t come to you and say “lookit, I’d like you to investigate, I’m innocent, I don’t know what went wrong but would you people please go and investigate this and find out why I was wrongfully convicted”?

A We would say to that person “that is not the role of the department or of the Minister”. Certainly, if you’ve been through the process, sat in on your trial, heard the evidence, you’re in the best position to identify to us what it is you say constitutes wrongful – or what the errors were and why they constitute a miscarriage of justice.

Q And what you are telling us, then, it would be incumbent upon Mr. Milgaard and/or his counsel to identify significant grounds that might provide a basis for a remedy under Section 690?

A Yes.

…..

Q Is there anything else – and we’ll touch on this later, I don’t want to limit you – but is there anything else, again in just trying to get an understanding of the nature and purpose of the investigation, that you would undertake on behalf of the Minister?

A Our job is to test or to examine the facts that were advanced; one, to ensure that it was accurate, and two, if there are any matters that required clarification, to clarify them. Next our job was to summarize that and based on a summary and on the information collected, to provide advice to the minister with respect to whether the grounds advanced and whether the information collected either signaled support for or not for the granting of a remedy. We took the role very, very seriously and we endeavoured to do it as quickly as we could, but as thoroughly as we could, because we recognize the importance of this particular procedure to someone who is sitting in a jail convicted of an offence.44

(ii) Threshold for the Granting of a Remedy

Once over the threshold of getting the Minister to investigate the stated grounds, the investigation begins and the question arises as to what test is to be applied by the Minister in determining whether to grant a remedy to an applicant. The test was not set out in s. 690, so it was left to the Minister’s discretion.

In his reasons for decision in the s. 690 application of W. Colin Thatcher, the Honourable Allan Rock said:

In creating the role of the Minister of Justice under section 690 of the Code, Parliament used very broad language, and the discretion of the Minister has been cast in the widest

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44 T32309-T32310; and T32321-T32322.
possible terms. Indeed, the section does not contain a statutory test, other than the
general reference in clause (a) to the Minister being “satisfied that in the circumstances a
new trial or hearing…should be directed.”

In her February 27, 1991 letter denying Milgaard’s first s. 690 application, the federal Minister commented
on the test that had been employed “in the past” in evaluating an application for conviction review:

Section 690 of the Criminal Code provides that the Minister of Justice may direct a new
trial if after inquiry the Minister is satisfied that in the circumstances a new trial is justified;
similarly, the Minister of Justice may refer the case to an appellate court for hearing.
The purpose of this procedure is to permit a review of cases where new evidence
or information raising doubts concerning the correctness of a conviction has
arisen after the full judicial process, including appeals, has been exhausted. I
wish to emphasize that it is not the function of the Minister of Justice to retry the case.
The remedy is an extraordinary one, as the normal judicial process is designed to
ensure that no miscarriage of justice has occurred. Ministers of Justice traditionally
have declined to act where the basis upon which the application has been brought
relates to matters or issues which were considered by the jury at trial. For instance, relief
is commonly declined where the applicant points to the unsavoury character of a witness
when that issue was placed squarely before the jury. Ministers of Justice have in the
past intervened and referred the case to the courts where it can be demonstrated
that a reasonable basis exists to conclude that a miscarriage of justice has likely
occurred.

Williams stated that the test set out in the federal Minister’s letter was the one applied to Milgaard’s
application. Proof of innocence was not the criterion although the Milgaards at times believed that they
needed to show that.

Williams testified:

A At the time the ministers were prepared to grant a remedy where the evidence
brought forward established a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage
of justice likely occurred. That was, let’s say, the word or the attempt to articulate
what the standard was. Certainly as you pointed out in your, in your outline, if there
were doubts concerning the correctness of the conviction, those doubts had to
reach a certain threshold and it was that if you had a factual foundation where
it was probably, more probable than not that there was a miscarriage of
justice, you didn’t have to prove that you were innocent or probably innocent, but
you had to establish that there was something that was significant that could have
affected the outcome had it been known; for example, fresh evidence, new scientific
advances that may now cause a court to look at evidence from a completely different
depth and which might signal either that the evidence didn’t have the strength
that it was given at trial or may be now exculpatory or inculpatory. DNA is a huge

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45 Reasons for Decision of the Minister of Justice on Application by W. Colin Thatcher, released April 14, 1994, Dept. of
Justice.
46 Docid 001529.
example of advancement in science which could be the basis for a successful return of a case back to the courts.\textsuperscript{47}

According to the Minister’s letter and to the evidence of Williams, Milgaard had to establish that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred in order for the Minister to act. This test is very similar to that which would be applied by an appellate court hearing Milgaard’s case on a reference by the federal Minister. In other words, before being granted the opportunity to have his conviction reviewed by the appeal court on the basis of fresh evidence, Milgaard effectively had to satisfy the Minister that he would succeed before the appeal court.

In written submissions filed with the Supreme Court on the Reference Case, the federal Minister described the standard governing the Minister’s decision to send a matter back for further adjudication by the courts pursuant to s. 690:

\begin{quote}
It is respectfully submitted that the threshold standard he must meet is proof on a balance of probabilities that a miscarriage has occurred. Anything less would not comport with the foregoing principles – the presumption of validity; respect for the integrity of the conventional process of trial and appeals; and the extraordinary nature of the prerogative process. Common sense commends the view that the Applicant can only secure relief where it can be demonstrated that a miscarriage of justice has, more likely than not, occurred. If it is not probable that what he asserts is correct, there is no basis for the special intervention that he seeks.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

The federal Minister also stated in written submissions before the Supreme Court that the prerogative power under s. 690 must be exercised with great caution. Otherwise, public confidence in the system would be undermined if the process were allowed to become just another level of appeal.

\textit{(iii) Political Decision Maker}

The decision whether Milgaard would be allowed to go back to Court to challenge his conviction was made by the federal Minister of Justice, Kim Campbell. Her decision was based on advice from federal Justice lawyers, and in particular, Eugene Williams. She also sought the advice of outside counsel, retired Supreme Court Justice William R. McIntyre, Q.C.

Through the s. 690 process, the federal Minister of Justice became involved in individual cases through the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy. This involvement invited accusations of political influence from parties unhappy with a decision.

Section 690 provided that Milgaard had to apply to the federal Minister for “the mercy of the Crown”. Commentators criticized the link between the conviction review process and the notion of mercy evident in the language of s. 690. In his article “Justice, Politics and the Royal Prerogative of Mercy: Examining the Self-Defence Review”, Gary Trotter said:

\begin{quote}
…while it is tenable to suggest that one cannot claim an \textit{entitlement} to mercy to ameliorate punishment for reasons of compassion, that suggestion is objectionable when the basis is lack of legal guilt. We have meaningful standards of fault because they are foundational
\end{quote}
to our modern conceptions of a fair criminal justice system. They do not operate as a charity...\footnote{Supra note 35 at 346-347.}

It is one thing to ask the sovereign for mercy, having committed a crime, but quite another to ask a Minister of the Crown to involve herself in an individual case where proof of the crime is still in question.

**C** Changes to the Section 690 Process Between 1992 and 2002

Following the 1992 Supreme Court Reference in Milgaard’s case, and prior to the replacement of s. 690 with ss. 696.1 to 696.6 in 2002, several non-legislative changes were made to the s. 690 process. Those changes were outlined in detail by the federal Minister in a 1998 Consultation Paper entitled “Addressing Miscarriages of Justice: Reform Possibilities for s. 690 of the Criminal Code”.\footnote{Supra note 1.} The stated purpose of the 1998 Consultation Paper was to examine the Canadian conviction review process and explore ways to improve it.

The 1998 Consultation Paper indicated that in 1993 the Department of Justice conducted an internal review, in an attempt to enhance the efficiency of the s. 690 process. As a result, the following steps were initiated: a case management system was implemented, additional lawyers were hired, the Criminal Conviction Review Group (whose sole function was to investigate s. 690 applications and report to the Minister) was established, timelines were instituted, the CCRG was transferred to the policy sector, and a booklet was published outlining the required documents, guidelines and process by which one could apply for an s. 690 review.

In 1994 the Honourable Allan Rock released his decision in the s. 690 application of W. Colin Thatcher.\footnote{Supra note 45.} This decision articulated, for the first time, the principles which would guide the Minister’s exercise of the discretionary power found in s. 690. Although the test was still not enunciated in legislation, the decision expressly stated that in order to succeed under s. 690 an applicant would need to demonstrate that there was a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of justice had likely occurred. The Thatcher case marked the first time that the federal Minister provided an s. 690 applicant with a copy of the investigative summary containing information gathered by departmental counsel in assessing the s. 690 application.

The Consultation Paper explained that a standard procedure had been in place, since 1994, to assist the Minister of Justice in the review of s. 690 applications. Once an applicant had provided the necessary documents to the Minister of Justice, the review process would begin. The review process was divided into the following four stages:

**Preliminary Assessment:** At this initial stage, a member of the CCRG examines the information in the application and compares it with the trial and appellate records. There must be an “air of reality” to the allegations raised by the applicant. As a threshold, the applicant must disclose grounds that could lead to the conclusion that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred.

If the application reveals new and significant information that was not available at trial or on appeal that could have affected the outcome of the case, the application will go on to a full investigation. If not, the applicant is informed and provided with reasons why the intervention of the Minister is not warranted.
**Investigation:** During the investigation or evaluation of the application, the function of CCRG counsel is three-fold. First, counsel must verify all the information and evidence submitted in the application. Second, counsel may obtain any additional facts deemed necessary for a full investigation. This may involve interviewing witnesses and obtaining scientific tests or other assessments from forensic and social science specialists. Police agencies, prosecutors, defence and appellate counsel involved in the case may be consulted. In addition, the information obtained may raise issues other than those identified by the applicant. When this happens, the applicant will be asked to provide additional submissions to ensure that the matter is fully considered. Third, this process allows counsel to formulate a recommendation as to whether there is a basis to conclude that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred.

**Investigative Summary:** Counsel reviewing the application then organizes the results of the investigation into an investigative summary. This summary serves as the framework for informing the applicant, his or her counsel, and the Minister of the facts gathered during the investigation. The investigative summary is disclosed to the applicant for comments.

**Recommendation and Ministerial Decision:** Once the applicant’s final submissions have been received and CCRG counsel have arrived at an informed conclusion regarding the applicant’s eligibility for a section 690 remedy, legal advice is prepared for the Minister. The application, all submissions by or on behalf of the applicant, the investigative summary, and the CCRG’s advice are then forwarded to the Minister for review and decision.

A number of options for reform of the conviction review system were considered and discussed in the 1998 Consultation Paper. In the result, the federal Minister decided to proceed with legislative amendments to the s. 690 process.

**Section 696.4**

The Minister’s power to review convictions is set out in ss. 696.1 to 696.6 of the *Criminal Code*. The 2002 amendments did not fundamentally change the conviction review process from that applied to Milgaard’s applications.

The reference to the notion of mercy as a basis for a remedy in s. 690 was removed. Section 696.1 now refers to applications for ministerial review on the grounds of miscarriage of justice, as opposed to applications for the mercy of the Crown.

The test is expressly stated in s. 696.3(3). The federal Minister may exercise his or her powers and grant a remedy if “satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred”.

Section 696.4 sets out the considerations to be taken into account by the federal Minister. The federal Minister shall consider (a) whether the application is supported by new matters of significance, (b) the
relevance and reliability of information that is presented in connection with the application, and (c) the fact that an application is not intended to serve as a further level of appeal and that any remedy granted is an extraordinary one.

Williams testified before the Commission that these amendments simply codified the considerations and the test he applied when he investigated the Milgaard applications.

The federal Minister was given the powers of a Commissioner under Part 1 of the *Inquiries Act*, providing investigative powers to those individuals investigating cases on the Minister’s behalf, including powers such as issuing subpoenas, forcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling them to give evidence and to produce documents. Williams did not have these powers when he investigated Milgaard’s application.

The amendments also require the Minister to provide the applicant with a copy of the investigation report prepared by federal Justice lawyers. The applicant has an opportunity to submit further information in support of the application within one year from the date the investigation report is sent. Although Williams did not share his investigation report with Milgaard’s counsel, he met with them, shared the documentary record of his investigation and invited further submissions.

The Regulations provide details regarding the investigation and review process. An application form is now contained in the Regulations. The form requires the applicant to set out the grounds for the application and describe new matters of significance that support the application. There continue to be fairly onerous requirements placed upon the applicant regarding the provision of documents. An exhaustive list of required documents is set out in the Regulations. Only on provision of a completed application form and all documents listed in the Regulations will the review process begin.

Following the legislative changes in 2002, some non-legislative changes were implemented as well. The Minister’s 2007 Annual Report states the following:

> Following the legislative changes in 2002, a number of structural changes were made to enhance the arm’s-length relationship between the CCRG and the Department of Justice.

> The CCRG office is located outside of the Department of Justice Headquarters in a downtown Ottawa office building which has both government and private sector tenants.

> Rather than formally passing through another branch of the Department, advice passes from the CCRG to the Minister through the Associate Deputy Minister’s office. Administration and support services are provided to the CCRG by this same office.54

The position of Special Advisor was also created to oversee the conviction review process and give the Minister advice on applications for ministerial review which would be independent of that given by the CCRG. The 2007 Annual Report states the following:

> The Special Advisor’s position is an independent one. He is neither a member of the Public Service of Canada nor an employee of the Department of Justice. The Special Advisor is appointed by order-in-council from outside the Department and public service.

> While the Special Advisor’s main role is to make recommendations to the Minister once an investigation is complete, it is equally important that he provide independent advice at

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other stages of the review process where applications may be screened out. The Special Advisor’s involvement ensures that the review of all applications is complete, fair, and transparent.55

While the changes have improved the conviction review process since Milgaard, the fundamental aspects have not changed. The process remains reactive. The federal Minister does not conduct a proactive investigation on receipt of an application, but rather relies on the applicant, lacking in investigative expertise, to identify the grounds for an alleged miscarriage of justice. The test for the exercise by the Minister of his or her discretion to refer a matter to the Court system has not changed. Finally, the decision as to whether a convicted person can have access to the Court to challenge a conviction still lies with the federal Minister, an elected politician.

4. Improvements to the Conviction Review Process in Canada

While it is true that the Commission has only examined the case of Milgaard, his is one of the most well known cases of wrongful conviction in Canada, engaging virtually every aspect of the s. 690 process and involving two separate applications and a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Commission heard significant evidence about his struggles through the conviction review process to obtain a remedy, and also about the role of the province in those proceedings. Although a number of public inquiries examining wrongful convictions have commented on the conviction review process, it can be said that none has examined a case in the same detail. The federal Minister of Justice was a party with standing before the Commission and participated fully in the inquiry process.

There is the potential for much to be learned from Milgaard’s case, as it presented significant challenges to the justice system in this country. The conviction review process has been changed since the Milgaard case, but the Criminal Code amendments in 2002 did not fundamentally alter it because, for the most part, the amendments simply codified practices and policies in place during the time of Milgaard’s s. 690 applications. There remains much to be learned from his experience.

The weaknesses in the criminal justice system which failed Milgaard still exist and can never be entirely eliminated. What is possible however, is an improved response to claims of wrongful conviction. While my recommendations do not bind the federal government, I still am able to comment on the desirability of changes to the law and to the manner in which criminal justice is administered. The conviction review system in Canada is premised on the belief that wrongful convictions are rare and that any remedy granted by the federal Minister is extraordinary. Change is needed to reflect the current understanding of the inevitability of wrongful convictions and the responsibility of the criminal justice system to correct its own errors as I will fully explain later. It is my recommendation that the investigation of claims of wrongful conviction be handled by a review agency independent of government and that the independent review agency, not the federal Minister, act as the gate-keeper. Four public inquiries in this country have already identified the need for substantial change. This will be the fifth.

The Commission’s review of David Milgaard’s case identified a number of important issues related to Canada’s conviction review process:

(a) What is the definition of “wrongful conviction” and what role should factual innocence play in conviction review proceedings?

55 Ibid.
(b) What role should compensation for wrongfully convicted persons play in conviction review proceedings?

(c) What is the appropriate role of the appellate courts in conviction review proceedings?

(d) Is the present system of conviction review responsive enough for the early detection of wrongful convictions? Should the onus be on the convicted person to identify new information that would support a return to the appellate court, or should there be an agency or institution to undertake this task?

(e) Is the federal Minister the appropriate gatekeeper to decide whether a conviction should be returned to the Court of Appeal for review and what is the threshold that should be met to return a case to the court?

(a) Wrongful Conviction, Miscarriage of Justice and Factual Innocence

There is presently no settled definition of the term wrongful conviction. A wrongful conviction is sometimes equated with a miscarriage of justice. However, a wrongful conviction has also been described as a “sub-category of the broader concept of a miscarriage of justice”.56

The term wrongful conviction is not used in the Criminal Code. The term that is generally used in Canadian criminal law is “miscarriage of justice” which is both a ground for allowing an accused’s appeal from a conviction under s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code and a ground for the federal Minister to grant a remedy on conviction review. In the federal Minister’s 2007 Annual Report on Applications for Ministerial Review – Miscarriages of Justice, we read:

When an innocent person is found guilty of a criminal offence, there has clearly been a miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice may also be suspected where new information surfaces which casts serious doubt on whether the applicant received a fair trial. Thus, the Minister’s decision that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred in a case does not amount to a declaration that the convicted person is innocent. Rather, such a decision leads to a case being returned to the judicial system, where the relevant legal issues are determined by the courts according to law.57

I do not favor a definition of wrongful conviction limited to those who are factually innocent of the crime with which they were convicted. The circumstances in which a conviction can be said to be wrongful are much wider than this. In this regard, I prefer the view expressed by David Kyle, formerly of the CCRC, that wrongful conviction refers to circumstances in which a conviction has been found to be unsafe and has therefore been set aside. He provided the following testimony at the Inquiry:

Q. Can I ask your comment, or your understanding or your description of two terms that we see in the literature and in the cases, and they are the term wrongful conviction and miscarriage of justice.

A. Uh-huh.


57 Supra note 54.
Q. And what do those terms mean to you?

A. Well, I think that the term miscarriage of justice is used quite loosely by people who are considering matters in this area. It’s quite interesting I think that the term miscarriage of justice no longer appears anywhere in the 1995 Criminal Appeal Act and indeed the one reference in the 1968 act I think to miscarriage of justice, which was the old proviso test which the Court of Appeal applied, has gone, and from the Commission’s point of view, I think that’s an extremely good thing because what we’re concerned about is not debating the meaning of miscarriage of justice, but considering, on an objective-evidence based, on a – from an objective-evidence based point of view whether or not a person has been rightly or wrongly convicted, so to me, expressing myself from the point of view as a former member of the Commission, wrongful conviction means either somebody who has been convicted of an offence which that person didn’t commit at all, which is what I would describe as someone being innocent in the absolute sense, but equally I regard as a wrongful conviction a situation where somebody who has been convicted of an offence in relation to that person either significant relevant new evidence comes to light subsequently which had it been known to and taken into account by the jury at the trial may have altered their decision as to being sure of the Defendant’s guilt or, alternatively, that the process by which the person was convicted was flawed in some significant respect such that it can be said that that person was not fairly convicted in the sense of the proper application of the burden and standard of proof and the proper application of the rules and evidence of procedure which the prosecution is obliged to adhere to in seeking a conviction.

Q. And again, in your view, then, does a person have to demonstrate or establish factual innocence or innocence in the absolute sense to establish that he has been wrongly convicted?

A. Not from the point of view of the application to the Commission’s test in deciding whether there is a real possibility that the Court of Appeal might find that conviction to be unsafe. I mean, I would make the general observation that whilst, if you do have a situation and you may not ever know whether you do or don’t have a situation, but if you do have a situation where someone is innocent in the absolute sense, it would, of course, be very desirable and very gratifying if that could actually be established, but the reality is that that rarely can be established, it’s very rare indeed when carrying out investigations into a conviction which is alleged to be a wrongful one to find wholly-exonerating evidence. In the great majority of instances where the Commission has referred cases to the Court of Appeal it has been on the basis of that other category of wrongful conviction which I’ve just described.\(^58\)

Courts do not concern themselves with factual innocence. As stated in “The Lamer Commission of Inquiry Pertaining to the Cases of: Ronald Dalton, Gregory Parsons, Randy Druken”:

\(^{58}\) T40043-40046.
[A] criminal trial does not address “factual innocence”. The criminal trial is to determine whether the Crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. If so, the accused is guilty. If not, the accused is found not guilty. There is no finding of factual innocence since it would not fall within the ambit or purpose of the criminal law.59

In two recent decisions, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that it had no jurisdiction to declare factual innocence as a remedy. Both cases involved appeals referred to the court by the federal Minister under s. 696 of the Criminal Code. In R. v. Truscott, the Court allowed Truscott’s appeal, set aside the conviction against him and entered an acquittal.60 The subject of factual innocence was discussed by the Court as Truscott’s legal counsel asked that the Court not only acquit him but declare him innocent. The Ontario Court of Appeal noted the lack of a statutory basis in Part XXI of the Criminal Code for making such a declaration, and commented that establishing factual innocence can be a most daunting task absent definitive forensic evidence such as DNA.

The concept of factual innocence was also considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the case of Her Majesty the Queen v. William Mullins-Johnson.61 Mullins-Johnson was convicted of the first degree murder of his four year old niece. He spent 12 years in jail from the time of his arrest until he was released on bail. He protested his innocence throughout. On July 6, 1997, the federal Minister directed a reference to the Ontario Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 696.3(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, to determine Mr. Mullins-Johnson’s case as if it were an appeal on the issue of fresh evidence. Legal counsel for Mullins-Johnson suggested that this was an appropriate case for the Court to make an order tantamount to a declaration of factual innocence. In declining to do so, the court stated:

The fresh evidence shows that the appellant’s conviction was the result of a rush to judgment based on flawed scientific opinion. With the entering of an acquittal, the appellant’s legal innocence has been re-established. The fresh evidence is compelling in demonstrating that no crime was committed against Valin Johnson and that the appellant did not commit any crime. For that reason an acquittal is the proper result.

There are not in Canadian law two kinds of acquittals: those based on the Crown having failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and those where the accused has been shown to be factually innocent. We adopt the comments of the former Chief Justice of Canada in The Lamer Commission of Inquiry Pertaining to the Cases of: Ronald Dalton, Gregory Parsons, Randy Druken, Annex 3, pp. 342:

[A] criminal trial does not address “factual innocence”. The criminal trial is to determine whether the Crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. If so, the accused is guilty. If not, the accused is found not guilty. There is no finding of factual innocence since it would not fall within the ambit or purpose of criminal law.

Just as the criminal trial is not a vehicle for declarations of factual innocence, so an appeal court, which obtains its jurisdiction from statute, has no jurisdiction to make a formal legal declaration of factual innocence. The fact that we are hearing this case as a Reference

61 2007 ONCA 720, 228 C.C.C. (3d) 505.
under s. 696.3(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code does not expand that jurisdiction. The terms of the Reference to this court are clear: we are hearing this case “as if it were an appeal”. While we are entitled to express our reasons for the result in clear and strong terms, as we have done, we cannot make a formal legal declaration of the appellant’s factual innocence.

In addition to the jurisdictional issue, there are important policy reason for not, in effect, recognizing a third verdict, other than “guilty” or “not guilty”, of “factually innocent”. The most compelling, and, in our view, conclusive reason is the impact it would have on other persons found not guilty by criminal courts. As Professor Kent Roach observed in a report he prepared for the Commission into Certain Aspects of the Trial and Conviction of James Driskell, “there is a genuine concern that determinations and declarations of wrongful convictions could degrade the meaning of the not guilty verdict” (p. 39).
To recognize a third verdict in the criminal trial process would, in effect, create two classes of people: those found to be factually innocent and those who benefited from the presumption of innocence and the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Factual innocence, although obviously the best reason for remedying a wrongful conviction, should have no necessary role in the conviction review process. It needlessly complicates the detection and remedying of wrongful convictions and sets the bar too high for obtaining a remedy. The focus on factual innocence in the conviction review process ultimately hurt David Milgaard and prolonged his incarceration, which ended only following the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1992.

(b) Compensation

Following the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1992, Milgaard was released from prison. He was not compensated at that time, his innocence not having been established.

On September 19, 1992, Joyce Milgaard, David Milgaard and Hersh Wolch held a news conference alleging wrongdoing and cover-up by police and Saskatchewan Justice officials. In response to those allegations, the RCMP commenced the Flicker investigation in November 1992. In 1993, Milgaard sought compensation through a civil action against various members of the police and prosecution service, alleging breach of the duty of disclosure, negligence, and wrongdoing. In 1995, he filed a defamation claim against Saskatchewan Justice Minister Bob Mitchell. As reported in a Globe and Mail article, Mitchell allegedly stated in relation to Milgaard: “I think he was properly convicted. I think he did it.”

On July 18, 1997, DNA test results were released. The Saskatchewan Minister of Justice publicly stated that Milgaard had been wrongfully convicted of the murder of Gail Miller and that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. An apology was made to Milgaard and to his family. On May 17, 1999, the Saskatchewan Minister of Justice announced that a settlement on compensation had been reached, the total value of which was $10 million. The federal government contributed the sum of $4 million to the compensation package.

The issue of compensation for Milgaard has been resolved. It is not within my Terms of Reference to inquire into the questions of when or in what amounts compensation should be paid to the wrongfully convicted. However, in the course of inquiring into Milgaard's case, two matters related to the issue of compensation came to my attention that require comment.

62 Ibid at 511-512.
63 Docid 164842.
Firstly, it became clear to me that it is essential to keep concerns relating to compensation out of the conviction review process. It is a mistake to attempt to use the criminal process as a vehicle for obtaining declarations of factual innocence in order to lay the groundwork for a compensation claim. The conviction review process must not be hampered by either the wrongfully convicted individual's desire to receive compensation, or, a desire on the part of the authorities to avoid payment. The only concern of participants in conviction review must be the safety of the conviction. Preoccupation with factual innocence makes it more difficult for the wrongly convicted to obtain a remedy and, ultimately, liberty. The fundamental concern of the conviction review process must be that those who are wrongly convicted and imprisoned regain their freedom.

At the Inquiry, David Kyle testified that the CCRC does not concern itself with questions of innocence or guilt. The only concern of the CCRC is to determine whether there is a real possibility that a conviction would not be upheld by an appeal court. If innocence was a consideration, the test for obtaining a remedy would ultimately be much harder to meet. Kyle expressed his view that issues of compensation and the safety of the conviction must be kept entirely separate:

...And I hope that if, sort of, one thing stands out from the evidence that I have been giving to this Commission, I think the two questions are entirely separate. Whether or not somebody has been wrongfully convicted, I think, is a matter of quite wide interpretation, as I was endeavoring to explain yesterday. Whether someone who has been wrongfully convicted is entitled to compensation is an entirely separate question, and that's a matter for which the criteria can be set as a wholly distinct exercise and, as it happens, the legislation in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, I think, is being treated by the Home Secretary as effectively saying 'compensation will be paid if I'm satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that this applicant is factually innocent, and not otherwise.'

...I think the question of whether – there is much – there is much more to being – having a record of a conviction against you, in terms of its impact on your life generally, than the question whether you should – whether you get any monetary compensation for having been prosecuted in the first place. And if you haven't been rightly convicted in the wider sense, as I was describing it yesterday, then you should not have that conviction recorded against you because of the impact it is likely to have on virtually the whole aspect of – virtually every aspect of your life.64

Secondly, in my view (contrary to the English position), proof of factual innocence should not be a sine qua non for entitlement to compensation. It is too hard to prove, and official wrongdoing or egregious error leading to wrongful conviction should in themselves be compensable.

A further aspect of compensation is public exoneration through a declaration of factual innocence. This should be left to the Executive and not the courts, for reasons explained above. Neither should it be expected of commissioners conducting public inquiries into wrongful convictions, unless their terms of reference call for consideration of such a finding.

64 T40234-T40239.
AIDWYC submits that an acknowledgment of factual innocence is important to the wrongly convicted for several reasons. Firstly, for the wrongly convicted, there is nothing as important as public recognition of factual innocence. In its submissions before Commissioner Lamer in Newfoundland, AIDWYC stated:

The harder truth, however, is that, in the public eye, there is a terrible disconnect, a moral chasm, between ‘legal’ and ‘factual’ innocence, between a finding of ‘not guilty’ and a declaration of ‘wrongly convicted’.65

Secondly, AIDWYC notes that factual innocence is important in the assessment of whether compensation should be payable, and in what amount. In Canada, it is often the case that compensation is not paid to individuals who have suffered as a result of a wrongful conviction, unless factual innocence can be established.

Given the need to establish factual innocence for compensation, courts have been asked to make declarations of factual innocence. So far, as the cases of Truscott and Mullins-Johnson demonstrate, they have been unwilling to do so for public policy reasons and lack of jurisdiction, declaring that the criminal process is “not a vehicle for declarations of factual innocence”.66

Many writers have criticized the idea of establishing factual innocence as a criterion for compensation because it detracts from the integrity of the presumption of innocence.

An often cited article on the topic of compensating the wrongly convicted is H. Archibald Kaiser’s article entitled “Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment: Towards an End to the Compensatory Obstacle Course”.67 Kaiser states that his article is focused on the special problems raised by the cases of individuals most grievously wronged in the Canadian criminal justice system: those who have been in prison following a criminal conviction (and an unsuccessful appeal), where the verdict later turns out to have been reached in error. His article deals with the question of how these individuals should be compensated, given that most people would view them as victims of a miscarriage of justice. His thesis is that a more liberal approach to compensation than has as yet been adopted by the federal and provincial governments should be implemented.

Kaiser discusses the Federal and Provincial Guidelines on Compensation for Wrongfully Convicted and Imprisoned Persons which were adopted by provincial and federal Ministers of Justice.68 These guidelines are not legislatively enacted by any level of government. It was recently noted by Commissioner LeSage in the Driskell Report that these guidelines are presently under review.69 The Guidelines state that “compensation should only be granted to those persons who did not commit the crime for which they were convicted (as opposed to persons who are found not guilty).” In arguing that a more liberal approach should be taken to compensation, Kaiser says:

It is argued that persons who have been wrongfully convicted and imprisoned are ipso facto victims of a miscarriage of justice and should be entitled to be compensated. To maintain otherwise introduces the third verdict of “not proved” or “still culpable” under

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65 Written submissions of the Association in Defence of the Wrongfully Convicted (AIDWYC) Re Commission’s Terms of Reference dated October 17, 2003, filed with the Lamer Commission of Inquiry Pertaining to the Cases of: Ronald Dalton, Gregory Parsons and Randy Druken.
66 Supra note 61 at 512.
68 Guidelines for Compensation for Wrongfully Convicted and Imprisoned Persons, undated.
69 Report of the Commission of Inquiry Into Certain Aspects of the Trial and Conviction of James Driskell (Manitoba, 2007) at 144. See also http://www.driskellinquiry.ca/.
the guise of a compensatory scheme, supposedly requiring higher threshold standards than are necessary for a mere acquittal. As Professor MacKinnon forcefully maintains:

…one who is acquitted or discharged is innocent in the eyes of the law and the sights of the rest of us should not be set any lower… There is a powerful social interest in seeing acquitted persons do no worse than to be restored to the lives they had before they were prosecuted.70

In a paper delivered in June 2005 to the AIDWYC conference, former Justice Marshall argued that while factual innocence would obviously bring an individual within the ambit of the wrongly convicted, it would be unfair and dangerous to so limit the definition:

This paper argues that redress for the wrongly convicted should extend beyond the confines of factual innocence to at least instances where the miscarriage of justice has been materially influenced by egregious error or conduct by officers or agents of the state.71

In his report on the Driskell Inquiry, Commissioner LeSage noted that the term wrongful conviction was used by Professor Roach “to describe actual/factual innocence, as opposed to legal innocence where the Crown merely fails to discharge its burden”, and stated his own view that the term wrongful conviction ought not to be equated exclusively with factual innocence.72

While I am of the view that compensation should remain within the purview of the Executive, a criterion of factual innocence as the basis for paying compensation seems unduly restrictive. At one end of the scale, a wrongful conviction can result from trial errors, investigative oversight, and a host of other reasons short of official wrongdoing, which have not traditionally been regarded as calling for compensation. At the other end, a wrongful conviction can mean that an innocent person was convicted and where this has been shown, compensation has followed in many cases. Between these extremes, wrongful convictions can result from a wide range of official misbehavior - from ethical breaches to criminal conduct. Where a miscarriage of justice has resulted from an obvious breach of good faith in the application of standards expected of police, prosecution, or the courts, the door to compensation should not be closed for lack of proof of factual innocence.

(c) Role of Appellate Courts in Conviction Review

The Criminal Code bestows power on provincial courts of appeal to overturn criminal convictions on a number of grounds including “a miscarriage of justice”.

686 (1) On the hearing of an appeal against a conviction or against a verdict that the appellant is unfit to stand trial or not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, the court of appeal

(a) may allow the appeal where it is of the opinion that

(i) the verdict should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence,

70 Supra note 67 at 139.
71 Supra note 10 at 6.
72 Supra note 69 at 139-142.
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(ii) the judgment of the trial court should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision on a question of law, or

(iii) on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice;

... 686(2) Where a court of appeal allows an appeal under paragraph (1)(a), it shall quash the conviction and

(a) direct a judgment or verdict of acquittal to be entered; or

(b) order a new trial.

Appeal courts also have the power to hear “fresh evidence” on an appeal from a conviction (s. 683(1)). The Supreme Court of Canada stated the principles in Palmer v. the Queen:

(1) The evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial provided this general principle will not be applied as strictly in a criminal case as in civil cases: see McMartin v. The Queen.

(2) The evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the trial.

(3) The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief, and

(4) It must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result.73

Provincial courts of appeal cannot declare factual innocence, but in setting aside a wrongful conviction they restore to the appellant the presumption of innocence, a legal concept relating to the maxim that every accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appeal courts usually deal with convictions soon after they are entered, but in most cases of wrongful conviction, new information providing a basis to challenge the conviction becomes known only after all appeals are exhausted. Such was Milgaard’s case.

He was convicted on January 31, 1970 and his appeal was argued on November 6, 1970. The Court of Appeal rendered its judgment on January 5, 1971. At the time Tallis argued before the Court of Appeal, Fisher had been apprehended and confessed to two of the four Saskatoon attacks and was being investigated for the other two. There is no evidence that any police or Crown officer connected Fisher to Miller’s murder at this time.

Twenty-two years later, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference Case concluded that evidence of the Fisher rapes might reasonably have affected the verdict of the jury, entitling Milgaard to have his conviction set aside and a new trial ordered.74 Presumably a similar result would have ensued in 1970, had Tallis known of the Fisher proceedings and raised them as fresh evidence before the Court of Appeal.

Our criminal justice system is already properly equipped with a procedure to provide appellate review of the safety of convictions entered by a Court or jury at trial. There appears to be no dispute that appellate courts in each province are the proper forums to consider and rule upon the safety of convictions, whether heard by way of appeal in first instance or by a return to the Court as part of the system of conviction review. The critical questions are to determine the circumstances in which a convicted person can have another opportunity to have a conviction reviewed by the appellate court, and who is best suited to properly make that decision.

(d) Who Should be Responsible to Detect Wrongful Convictions?

In the current system, the convicted person bears the sole onus of investigating his own wrongful conviction to identify grounds to support an application for review. Placing the onus on an applicant to identify error and to provide all possible grounds to establish a likely miscarriage of justice gives rise to the following problems:

1. The convicted person is not always able, and certainly not the best equipped, to identify grounds to support a wrongful conviction. He is usually incarcerated, has few if any resources, and lacks the expertise needed to analyze and detect what may give rise to a remedy. He will usually rely upon the skills and advice of family, friends and advocates, who, although well intentioned, typically are very emotional and focused on innocence and compensation rather than upon the identification of specific grounds supporting a claim of wrongful conviction.

2. Few are fortunate to have the assistance of legal counsel. The identification of grounds to support a remedy is a difficult task even for legal counsel. A remedy should not be dependent upon legal counsel’s skill and competence or the lack thereof.

3. The premise that a convicted person is in the best position to identify the grounds of a wrongful conviction is flawed. In many wrongful convictions, it is not what is known by the convicted person that will give rise to a remedy, but rather what is unknown. New information, not known at the time of trial, is needed to support the request for a remedy. Sitting through his own trial did not put Milgaard in a position to know that the Fisher information could have provided a basis to challenge his conviction. Nor did it help him to recognize procedural errors.

4. A convicted person does not have coercive power to gain access to documents such as police and crown files, nor does a convicted person have any right to compel witnesses to be interviewed.

5. Requiring the convicted person to investigate his case to detect his own wrongful conviction, can put the convicted person and his agents in contact with witnesses. This can be counter-productive. The valuable recollections of a witness may be influenced by positions taken by the convicted person, or by improperly conducted interviews.

6. By compelling the convicted person to investigate and detect his own case, it is inevitable that it will take far longer to detect and remedy a wrongful conviction. Joyce Milgaard spent eight years investigating and gathering information only to file an application which put forward two grounds that lacked substantial merit.

7. The role of federal Justice lawyers in reviewing and testing information put forward by an applicant invites an adversarial approach to the process. The process would be better served by a proactive and inquisitional approach on the part of legal counsel for the Minister.
A convicted person should not bear the heavy burden of reviewing his or her conviction to identify grounds to challenge the conviction. An independent agency with expertise and sufficient powers is better suited to the important task of exposing wrongful convictions, and identifying and investigating grounds that support a return of the conviction to the Courts for review.

(e) Is the Federal Minister the Appropriate Gatekeeper to Determine Whether Convictions Should be Returned to the Court for Review?

There is a difficulty in considering the handling of the s. 690 applications by Justice Canada investigators. It is a constitutional one which places the operation and management of a federal entity outside the purview of a provincially appointed public inquiry. Williams and Pearson, however, generated a great deal of information which came to the attention of Saskatchewan Justice and the police and which potentially might have justified an earlier reopening of the case. To answer the question of whether it did, we necessarily had to look into the quality of the information they generated while refraining from any criticism of the manner in which they conducted their affairs.

Justice Canada, relying on constitutional prerogative, stoutly resists any effort to inquire into the reasons for actions or advice between federal officials in connection with s. 690 applications. At the same time, Minister Campbell justified her decision to refuse the first application, by referring to advice she received from outside counsel, retired Supreme Court Justice William McIntyre, not specifying what the advice was.

This, in my view, amounts to a serious lack of transparency in the s. 690 process, as it then was. How is an applicant to know he was treated fairly when the decision maker relies on unspecified reasons which he/she refuses to divulge? This secrecy in itself is a strong argument for having wrongful conviction inquiries dealt with by a commission, independent of government. Some might argue that solicitor/client privilege could be involved in any case, so the advice would remain secret. So it might, but it could also be waived (in contrast to constitutional prerogative), and should be if it is relied upon for the decision. After all, Justice Canada routinely asks for waivers from applicants.

Brown, of Saskatchewan Justice in commenting upon the s. 690 process, observed that Justice Canada has sole jurisdiction, but the subject matter of its investigation originates in the province, and if a remedy is granted involving the courts it will usually find its way back to the province. Another difficulty is that this applicant saw federal investigators as just more “prosecutors” whose mindset favored the conviction. I am satisfied that that was not the case, but the perception could be removed by the use of an independent agency to review wrongful convictions. Such an agency would also be free of the constitutional prerogatives which Justice Canada feels compelled to invoke to restrict the flow of information. That said, any agency might feel the need to control information in the course of its investigation, which would not sit well with some people, but at least reasons for its decision could be more transparent.

With respect, Justice Canada officials devoted much care to this case, but in general it may be said that the s. 690 process under which they worked had a certain built in lack of transparency on the investigative side.

In their application for judicial review in the course of this inquiry, Justice Canada argued that what Williams and other federal officials did was irrelevant to us. The argument was found not to be within the context of the judicial review, but the fact that it was even made indicates a climate of secrecy and parochialism in Justice Canada. This is ill suited to the investigation of claims of wrongful conviction, which necessarily involve aspects of both provincial and federal jurisdiction.
Without question, some of the information gathered by Justice Canada investigators in the s. 690 process was being passed along to Saskatchewan Justice, and therefore became relevant to the reopening of the investigation into the death of Gail Miller.

Another problem with the use of Justice Canada as an investigative agency in matters of wrongful conviction arises from the public failure to distinguish between Justice Canada and the Provincial Crown. According to Brown, Saskatchewan had an interest in the public’s perception of how the s. 690 process was going. The media kept reporting a lack of response to its inquiries, which Justice Canada would not answer, and which Saskatchewan Justice felt constrained from answering.

As matters now stand, even if the Minister of Justice believed that, in order to reassure the public that the process had been fair, it was necessary to release an opinion she had sought, she could not. That, it seems to me, is an excellent reason to move the wrongful conviction business to another agency.

Milgaard’s case became highly politicized as his supporters actively sought the attention of the media. Joyce Milgaard’s confrontation with Justice Minister Kim Campbell in Winnipeg on May 14, 1990 was widely reported in the news media. Later, on September 6, 1991, she spoke to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, in an encounter that was also widely publicized. She asked that David be transferred to a minimum security institution. Milgaard’s request for a transfer to minimum security Rockwood Institution was approved at the end of October, 1991. During their September 6, 1991 meeting, the Prime Minister mentioned to Joyce Milgaard that he would be talking to the Justice Minister when he returned to Ottawa.

The Order-In-Council which referred the case to the Supreme Court of Canada on November 28, 1991 specifically mentioned widespread concern over whether there was a miscarriage of justice in the conviction of Milgaard, and that it was in the public interest for the matter to be inquired into.

Federal Justice Minister Campbell held a press conference on November 29, 1991, to announce that Milgaard’s case had been referred to the Supreme Court of Canada. She stated that in order for her to grant a remedy under s. 690 of the *Criminal Code*, she had to be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that there was likely a miscarriage of justice. She emphasized that in referring the matter to the Supreme Court of Canada she had not come to any conclusion on whether a miscarriage of justice had occurred. She had not formed an opinion because she was faced with evidence, the value of which she was unable to ascertain, without the advice of the Supreme Court of Canada. She acknowledged that given growing public interest and concern, the case deserved a judicial and public examination. However, she denied that the case had ever been dealt with in a political way or that she had been influenced by media discussion.

While neither testified at the Inquiry, both former Minister of Justice Kim Campbell and former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney have, in their memoirs, discussed the handling of Milgaard’s conviction review applications.

Campbell’s book entitled “Time and Chance: The Political Memoirs of Canada’s First Woman Prime Minister”, was published in 1996.75 In Chapter 10, “Doing the Right Thing”, she discussed her handling of Milgaard’s two s. 690 applications. On the subject of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s meeting with Joyce Milgaard on September 6, 1991, Campbell complained:

...The PM had blindsided me on one of my most difficult issues. In the eyes of the media, the meeting signalled that the PM was involved. Norman Spector, the PM’s chief of staff, called to assure me, somewhat sheepishly, that Mulroney had said nothing to Mrs. Milgaard about the section 690 application but had only agreed to look into her concerns about her son’s living conditions in prison. Several months later, we began to understand the thinking behind this inappropriate intervention. In a chat with the B.C. caucus, Hugh Segal, who replaced Spector in early 1992, talked about the upcoming election and efforts to improve the PM’s image. He then turned to the Joyce Milgaard incident in Winnipeg and said something like, “That’s the kind of thing he should be doing more of. It was brilliant and portrayed a side of him that the people haven’t seen before.”

As I told the press, Brian Mulroney was much too good a lawyer to intervene improperly in this matter. He never breathed a word to me about Milgaard, nor did anyone in his office ever attempt to influence my handling of the case. However, Joyce Milgaard is convinced he did, and the media accepted this view. This sort of thing made it very difficult to establish that the only motivation guiding me and my officials was a desire to make the right decision.76

In his book “Memoirs: 1939-1993”, Brian Mulroney indicates that he did intervene in the matter of Milgaard’s application for conviction review.77 He writes of being privately furious with Campbell over the manner in which she brushed off Joyce Milgaard during their public encounter on May 14, 1990, and relates:

“When I got back to Ottawa, I arranged for a fast review of David Milgaard’s medical condition. He was soon transferred to a minimum-security institution. In an exchange of letters with Mrs. Milgaard, I told her, “I too, hope the matter will soon be resolved.” I then had Hugh Segal summon Justice Minister Kim Campbell to my parliamentary office in Centre Block, where, because of the sensitivity of the matter, I met with her alone, although I debriefed Hugh Segal and Gilbert Lavoie immediately after.

“The matter had been reviewed by the department and I have conveyed our decision,” she told me.

“Kim,” I answered, “that is not acceptable to me. The law provides for a reference to the Supreme Court, and it is my intention to ensure that this case is in fact referred to the Supreme Court.”

My tone was firm and my words unequivocal. She understood and changed her tack quickly.

“Prime Minister,” she answered, “if this is the case, may I make the announcement myself?”78

While the recollections of Campbell and Mulroney differ, on either account the Prime Minister intervened (successfully, on his word) in a statutory process which only nominally engaged the prerogative of mercy.

76 Ibid at 195.
78 Ibid at 901.
Inevitably, the federal Minister’s decision was perceived as being political. The involvement of a federal politician in the review of individual cases of alleged wrongful conviction invites public advocacy in a media campaign, a war in which the truth is likely to be the first casualty. Although it can be said that the Milgaard case was unprecedented in the intensity of its media campaign, other wrongful conviction advocates have also relied upon public support to put pressure on the federal Minister.

The office of the federal Minister of Justice, identified, as it is by the public, with prosecutions, and being occupied by a political figure, does not lend itself well for the adjudication of issues which arise in the judicial system and are to be returned there. Parties unhappy with the Minister’s decision to either grant a remedy for conviction relief or to refuse it are able to accuse someone of political favoritism, or of having succumbed to political pressure. Conviction review should be carried out by an agency independent of the government of the day.

5. The British Model (Criminal Cases Review Commission)

One of the reform options considered by the federal Minister prior to the enactment of ss. 696.1 to 696.6 was the creation of an independent tribunal to facilitate the investigation of alleged cases of wrongful conviction. The Minister’s 1998 Consultation Paper pointed out the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), established in the United Kingdom in response to high profile cases of wrongful conviction, as an example of a system in which conviction review is handled by an independent body.79

The Commission heard evidence from David Kyle, one of the founding members of the CCRC, on how the CCRC conducts investigations into cases of alleged wrongful convictions. Kyle served as a Commissioner with the CCRC from 1997 until his retirement in August, 2005. He provided the Commission with valuable insight into the reasons for the creation of the CCRC and its operation.

Kyle traced the history of the Commission for us. He explained that initial member appointments were not drawn from amongst those championing the correction of miscarriages of justice. He himself had been a prosecutor for 23 years. This was a help and put him at no disadvantage. One of the Commission’s strengths is its wide profile – defence, prosecution and policing are represented.

Prior to the creation of the CCRC in 1997, the system for conviction review in the United Kingdom was very similar to the current Canadian system. Where appeals were exhausted, a convicted person could not challenge his conviction, unless the Home Secretary, an elected politician, referred his case back to the Court of Appeal. Applicants were responsible to investigate their own case to identify grounds to warrant a review by the Home Secretary, who had the discretionary power to refer a conviction back to the Court of Appeal if he saw fit.

Following widespread concern over several high profile cases of wrongful convictions in terrorist bombing cases, the Home Secretary, in 1991, established a Royal Commission on Criminal Justice which was given wide terms of reference to examine the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in England and Wales. The Runciman Report on the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was presented to Parliament in 1993.80 It recommended the establishment of an independent body to consider and investigate suspected miscarriages of justice, and the responsibility for conviction review was thereafter removed from the Home Secretary.

79 For information on the CCRC see the CCRC website at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/.
Chapter 6  Canada’s Conviction Review Process

The report leading to the establishment of the CCRC said:

The last part of our terms of reference requires us to consider whether changes are needed in the arrangements for considering and investigating allegations of miscarriages of justice when appeal rights have been exhausted. Almost all of those who gave us evidence argued that the arrangements should be changed, with the responsibility for reopening cases being removed from the Home Secretary and transferred to a body independent of the Government. We agree that there is a strong case for change. We therefore argue in this chapter for the establishment of a new independent body to consider allegations of miscarriages of justice, to arrange for their investigation where appropriate, where that investigation reveals matters that ought to be considered further by the courts, to refer the cases concerned to the Court of Appeal. We discuss in some detail the role of such a body, its relationship to the courts and to the Government, its composition and how it should be held accountable, the powers it may need to investigate cases, and how those cases should be selected.81

The motivating factors behind the creation of the CCRC were described by Kyle in “Correcting Miscarriages of Justice: The Role of the Criminal Cases Review Commission”:

The Royal Commission voiced two principal concerns about the Home Secretary’s role in relation to miscarriages of justice. First, examination of how the role was exercised revealed a restrictive and essentially reactive approach by the Home Office characterized by the absence of investigative initiative. Secondly, this role assigned to the Home Secretary was incompatible with the constitutional separation of powers between the courts and the executive; indeed, trying to keep them separate had contributed to the reluctance of the Home Office to enquire deeply enough into cases it was asked to consider. Put another way, it was undesirable for the Home Secretary to be directly responsible for reviewing suspected miscarriages of justice as well as being responsible for law and order and the police.82

It was recognized that the state should bear the responsibility to facilitate the investigation of wrongful convictions, and that it was neither appropriate nor expedient to leave this up to the convicted person. One of the mandates of the CCRC is to investigate an alleged wrongful conviction based solely upon an application by a convicted person. The convicted person no longer bears the heavy burden of reviewing his or her conviction to identify grounds to challenge the conviction. The CCRC consists of people with significant expertise and appropriate powers to review convictions and identify those grounds that may give rise to a remedy.

The CCRC is not a servant or agent of the Crown, but rather an independent commission. Commissioners are appointed on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and there are to be not fewer than 11 members. At least 1/3 of the Commissioners must be legally qualified and at least 2/3 must have experience or knowledge of some aspect of the criminal justice system. One of the strengths of the Commission is the diverse backgrounds of the various Commission members, including non-legal perspectives. In addition to the Commission members, the CCRC employs a staff of case managers and administrators. The Commissioners determine whether to refer cases to the appeal courts. Much of the

81 Ibid at 180. See also docid 340178.
investigative work is conducted by case review managers. Some case review managers are lawyers, but people from a wide variety of backgrounds fill this role.

Parliament also concluded that a member of government should not act as gatekeeper in deciding whether a case should be returned to the Court of Appeal. This function was transferred from the Home Secretary to the CCRC. By combining the investigation and the gatekeeper functions, the efficiency of the conviction process improved. The CCRC is knowledgeable about the grounds that have a chance of succeeding before the Court of Appeal, and can tailor its investigative efforts to identify meritorious grounds.

The CCRC has been in operation for 10 years and represents a significant improvement in the manner in which wrongful convictions are detected, investigated and remedied in the United Kingdom. The following is a more detailed review of its process.

(a) The Application and Investigation

Anyone convicted of a criminal offence in England, Wales or Northern Ireland can apply to the CCRC. Generally speaking, the CCRC will accept an application if (1) there has already been an appeal (or leave to appeal has been refused) and there is some new factor which the Courts have not considered before, or (2) there are exceptional circumstances.

The huge bulk of applications come from applicants directly, with no involvement from legal counsel. The CCRC has a comprehensive website and undertakes initiatives to ensure that it reaches its audience of potential applicants. The application form on the website is written in plain language and is designed to be completed, with relative ease, by an applicant. The application form states:

This form is for anyone who wants us to review a conviction or sentence that they think is wrong. We have written the form as though the person who was convicted is going to fill it in, but anyone can do this for them.

The applicant is asked to answer all of the questions if he or she possibly can, and is advised that if assistance is required, the CCRC should be contacted. The applicant is asked to tell the CCRC what he or she thinks went wrong and what is new about the case. The applicant is also asked to send the CCRC papers (if able to), and is advised that if the applicant does not have them the CCRC can obtain them. The form includes an authorization to be signed by the applicant allowing the CCRC to contact the applicant’s solicitor for the purpose of collecting information and documents about the case.

The applicant is not required to investigate his own case and in fact is encouraged not to, lest it impede the work of the CCRC. Most applications appear in the form of a letter from the complainant. The CCRC listens carefully, but also looks at the case as a whole. It is more proactive than reactive. This cannot be said for Justice Canada who sees its role as the careful examiner of the best case the applicant can put forward.

The CCRC is a non-departmental public body, internally governed, and as such can be perceived as independent. The Home Office has a legitimate interest in the resources of the CCRC but not in its casework. As to informing prisoners of their rights, Kyle acknowledged that potential applicants are typically poor, in prison, and suspicious. But he said that the CCRC’s literature is in every prison and they
have made a conscientious effort to inform prisoners. The CCRC encourages applicants to send what they have, but regards it as its own responsibility to get what it needs.

They have about 40 written policies, operational and legal. Their objective is consistency. Prodding from lawyers or Members of Parliament is not needed.

It is the policies and procedures which are transparent to the public, not the progress of individual cases.

Once an application is received, the CCRC decides how extensive the investigation should be, and what avenues should be pursued. The CCRC sees it as its responsibility to obtain the information necessary to conduct a proper review of the case. This usually includes the police, prosecution and defence files.

The CCRC takes a proactive role in the investigation of applications as Kyle described at the Inquiry:

Q. Is there an expectation or a requirement that an applicant himself or herself investigate and come to your Commission with the grounds for the application?

A. There is no requirement or expectation that they will do so. Generally speaking – the vast majority of applications received by the Commission appear in the form of a letter written by the applicant possibly from prison in which the applicant gives their understanding of why they think that they are the victim of a miscarriage of justice and quite often, as you might imagine, the reasons why they think things have gone wrong may actually bear no relationship at all to the actual reason why things have gone wrong, and if I tell you, for example, that one of the commonest expressions of grief in applicants who apply to the Commission is that their lawyers didn’t act for them properly, that again, as will come as no surprise to hear, is very rarely the basis for referring a case back for an appeal, so we certainly don’t expect them to have done any investigative work of their own.

Sometimes if they are represented for the purpose of making an application they may have done some investigative work, but our experience leads us to think that if the case is to be investigated by the Commission, we would actually much prefer it if we could identify the areas of investigation which we wish to undertake and how they should be structured rather than to have something which has been precooked sent to us.

Q. And so I take it from that that an applicant who may put forward a ground or two in his or her letter to the Commission, that that doesn’t limit the Commission in the grounds that they investigate; in fact, it may be that the Commission looks at what it thinks are more appropriate. Is that fair?

A. That’s absolutely fair. I mean, the Commission is very interested to consider very carefully what applicants have to say because they are quite likely to be in a better position than anybody else to know where things have gone wrong, but what the Commission does is look, having looked carefully at what the applicant has to say about the predicament he or she finds themselves in, that then to look carefully at the case as a whole an, as I say, this is why this early investigation into how things have
got to where they are is so important, to be able to identify where there are issues which could make a difference to the safety of the conviction.

Q. There are some writers that have described your Commission as being more proactive than reactive as far as the investigation, and would you agree with that description?

A. Yes.84

The CCRC has the expertise to investigate the cases of those who feel they have been wrongly convicted or unfairly sentenced. In fact, it is now the expectation, on the part of applicants and their legal counsel, that the CCRC will undertake the investigation of alleged miscarriages of justice. Kyle stated that the CCRC much prefers to do the investigation on its own as it, and not the applicant, has the expertise. He testified as follows:

Q. And can you tell us, what would you see as being the advantages of the Commission investigating possible wrongful conviction, miscarriages of justice, or reviewing information, as opposed to the applicant and/or the applicant's – people assisting the applicant?

A. Well I think the big, the greatest risk with leaving the investigation to the applicant or their representatives – and we’ve already identified one risk, which was articulated in the Royal Commission report – was that that encouraged the person who was going to make the decision whether to refer the case or not somewhat inactive and put in too – laying too much store by what the applicant was able to come up with by way of persuasion to refer the case back.

But when one looks, say, assuming the investigation is to be done, the strength, I think, of the Commission doing it rather than leaving it to the applicant is that the Commission, all things being equal, is likely to have a far better understanding of what it is about the case that needs investigating and to what end that investigation is best directed.

So if we take, for example, a situation where you have a case which was dealt with, in terms of trial, many years ago, and the applicant and his legal representatives are absolutely convinced that witnesses at the trial many years ago either didn’t tell the truth or could have said something different and they convince themselves that this is the case, so they run back to the witnesses and ask them to give them another statement telling them what happened 25 years ago, now I think the Commission’s view in such circumstances would be that it’s extremely unlikely that asking a witness to give a version of events from memory 25 years ago, even if it differed from the evidence which was given at trial, is actually likely to be given a great deal of weight either by the Commission or, indeed, by the Court of Appeal. Because all you’re doing is playing off the same witness, playing off the same witness’ recollection over a long period of time, but an applicant or representative may be very firmly of the view that that is the best way of doing the investigation whereas in fact the actual, the more effective investigation, might be on very different lines.
And I think, from the point of view of the investigation being an effective one and producing material which has a positive outcome so far as any decision to refer the case is concerned, it is better that if you have a body, as we do with the CCRC, who has both this investigatory and decisive role, that the advantages are very much in favour of the Commission identifying lines of inquiry and how they should be pursued and the objectives which those investigations are – seek to achieve.\textsuperscript{85}

The CCRC has wide ranging investigative powers and can obtain and preserve documentation held by any public body. It can also appoint an investigating officer from another public body to carry out inquiries on its behalf. Kyle indicated that while the CCRC has the power to compel the production of documents, it does not have any power to compel witness interviews. The CCRC has not, on the whole, encountered problems in speaking to witnesses but Kyle advised that the CCRC would like to see legislative change in this area.

In some cases, the CCRC will interview the applicant but this is not done routinely. The CCRC does not require the applicant to assert that they did not commit the crime. As discussed in greater detail below, Kyle explained that the circumstances in which a conviction might be unsafe are far wider than the narrow question of whether the applicant is factually innocent.

Kyle said that the CCRC routinely informs applicants of what lines of inquiry are being taken, but generally they do not disclose evidence as they find it. Applicants should be made to understand that they are not partners in the investigation. They are given a chance to make submissions and the commission gives reasons for both referrals and refusals. Internal work of the members such as advice, memos and discussions are not shared with the applicant. The information to be disclosed is that which supports the decision. An applicant may re-apply.

(b) Test for Referral

In deciding whether to refer a case back to the Court of Appeal, the CCRC employs the “real possibility” test set out in section 13 of the \textit{Criminal Appeal Act 1995}\.\textsuperscript{86} If the Commission is satisfied that there is a “real possibility” that the conviction will be quashed by the Court of Appeal, it shall refer the case back to the Court of Appeal. A decision to refer a case to the Court of Appeal can only be made by a committee of at least three commissioners.

The Commission serves as a gatekeeper to the Court of Appeal to whom it refers cases. The Commission does not concern itself with guilt or innocence, just whether there is a real possibility that the conviction is unsafe. The court decides whether the conviction is safe and, if it is not, they must quash it.

The CCRC’s concern is whether a person is rightly or wrongfully convicted, considered on an objective, evidential basis. Wrongful conviction can mean that someone has been convicted of an offence which he did not commit – he is innocent in the absolute sense – or it can mean that a person was convicted in a flawed trial or because significant, relevant, new evidence has come to light which might have affected the verdict of a jury. The real possibility test has to be applied in finding new evidence or a new factor which could have caused the trier of fact to act differently.

\textsuperscript{85} T40148-T40151.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Criminal Appeal Act} 1995 (U.K.), 1995, c.35.
The Commission does not reassess matters which a jury has considered. Kyle said that they try to identify lines of inquiry likely to result in a remedy. They look for time and resource effective investigative paths through a rigorous process of investigative planning.

Where a decision to refer is made, a statement of reasons is issued and the case is sent to the Court of Appeal. The statement of reasons is a comprehensive document, setting out the case at trial, the issues on appeal and the investigative steps taken. It also contains the CCRC’s analysis of the facts and issues, and the impact of new information on the safety of the conviction. A copy of the reasons for making the reference is sent to every person likely to be a party to the appeal proceedings. Kyle explained the grounds of appeal are now limited to those identified by the CCRC in its statement of reasons, unless the applicant obtains leave to extend the grounds. If the case if referred to the Court of Appeal, the involvement of the CCRC is at an end. The applicant is required to prepare and argue the appeal. The Court of Appeal will allow an appeal against conviction if they think that the conviction is unsafe.

Kyle discussed the test for making a reference to be that “…there is a real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence would not be upheld were the reference to be made”.

The reference must be made on argument or evidence not raised in the proceedings which led to it – for example, either at trial or on appeal. And the weight of the new evidence or new argument must be such as to provide the basis for a serious challenge to the safety of the conviction. Examples are new forensic evidence and evidence from recently discovered witnesses. An uncorroborated recanting witness will not likely provide reason enough for a referral. The Court of Appeal is cynical about them. There are two types; one recants his trial evidence and the second comes forward to take all the blame when two people have been convicted. All sorts of pressures cause witnesses to recant, some having nothing to do with the truth. Elapsed time is an important consideration. “What caused you, after all this time, to come forward?” Only a handful of cases have been sent to the Court of Appeal based on recantations but, that said, a recantation can cause inquiry into other evidence at trial.

Where a decision is made not to refer a case to an appeal court, the CCRC must also provide a statement of reasons for its decision to the applicant. As a matter of fairness, applicants are given an opportunity to make further representations. They are given 20 working days to respond to a provisional view not to refer their case. If no response is received, a statement of reasons is then issued and the case is closed. If a response is received, any issues raised by the applicant are considered and the case is passed to a Commissioner to make a decision. If there are grounds to refer the case, a statement of reasons is issued and the case is sent to the appeal courts. If there are no grounds to refer the case, a statement of reasons is issued and the case is closed.

In Kyle’s words:

…..If we make a decision to refer a case to the Court of Appeal, we make that decision, and articulate the reasons for doing it. If we are thinking that this is a case – and this is so in the majority of the cases that the Commission deals with – that it’s not a case where there is a basis for referring the case to the Court of Appeal, then we are required to indicate that as a provisional conclusion, and invite representatives – invite further representations from the applicant which we can then take into account before making the final decision not to refer a case. And there is the further requirement that, at the point of notifying the applicant of a provisional conclusion that there are no grounds for referral,
we are required to disclose all the evidence and information that we have relied on for the purpose of reaching that provisional conclusion.” (T40102-40103)

…

“Q. And we’ll see some statistics later, but I think about 70 percent of the cases you send to the Court of Appeal result in a remedy; is that roughly –

A. Between 60 and 70, yes.

Q. And from your perspective, is that the right number as far as the real possibility?

A. Well, the real – there is no definition of real possibility and necessarily there has to be a gap between the real possibility evaluation and the outcome in the Court of Appeal itself, and although there may be some who think that the gap is not wide enough, the view which the Commission has traditionally taken is that to find the Court of Appeal, if you like, agreeing with our evaluation in two-thirds of the cases and disagreeing with one-third suggests that we are applying a responsible approach to our evaluation of what is a real possibility.

Q. And is it correct to say that your Commission does not decide the guilt or innocence of an applicant?

A. No, it doesn’t.

Q. And does not directly provide a remedy setting aside the conviction or anything of that nature?

A. No.

Q. And that it’s up to the court to decide, whether or not the verdict is safe?

A. Yes.

Q. And your role is simply to decide whether or not the applicant should have another chance to go there?

A. Yes.88

Kyle spoke of the meaning and practical application of the “real possibility” test used. He described it as setting a relatively low threshold. In his article entitled “Correcting Miscarriages of Justice: The Role of the Criminal Cases Review Commission”, he wrote that: “Real possibility is not defined by the statute, and the Commission has consistently taken the view that it should not be given a restrictive interpretation, a view with which the court is on the face of it content.”89 The courts have described “real possibility” as “more certain than an outside chance or a bare possibility, but which might be less than a probability, or a likelihood, or a racing certainty.”90

88 T40102-T40103; and T40039-T40040.
89 Supra note 82 at 666.
90 Ibid.
The CCRC does not concern itself with questions of guilt or innocence in the absolute sense but rather the safety of the conviction.

Q. And again, in your view, then, does a person have to demonstrate or establish factual innocence or innocence in the absolute sense to establish that he has been wrongfully convicted?

A. Not from the point of view of the application to the Commission’s test in deciding whether there is a real possibility that the Court of Appeal might find that conviction to be unsafe. I mean, I would make the general observation that whilst, if you do have a situation and you may not ever know whether you do or don’t have a situation, but if you do have a situation where someone is innocent in the absolute sense, it would, of course, be very desirable and very gratifying if that could actually be established, but the reality is that that rarely can be established, it’s very rare indeed when carrying out investigations into a conviction which is alleged to be a wrongful one to find wholly-exonerating evidence. In the great majority of instances where the Commission has referred cases to the Court of Appeal it has been on the basis of that other category of wrongful conviction which I’ve just described.

Q. And so if we had a situation where a person was convicted and then 10 years later it became apparent that there was evidence that had it been presented at trial may have affected the verdict of the jury and the Court of Appeal then quashes that conviction, again, in your view, would that then be a wrongful conviction of that person?

A. Yes.

Q. Regardless of whether that person can or cannot establish his factual innocence?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us, in the work of the CCRC, is factual innocence something that is any part or a significant part of what you investigate?

A. Umm, no, and it’s – it certainly isn’t any, in any way a motivating factor behind how we go about the investigation. It may be, at the end of the investigation, we do acquire evidence which we can then say “this not only shows the conviction to be unsafe but it also appears to demonstrate that the defendant is factually innocent”, but that, if you like, is a bonus, if it happened, but it isn’t essential to the meeting of the test or referral to the Court of Appeal.

Q. And is it fair to say that, at least how you’ve described it, where the English Court of Appeal quashes a conviction that you’ve referred to them on the basis that the conviction is not safe because new information came to light that might have affected the verdict, that that would be a wrongful conviction, and that the Court would not look at the issue of factual innocence?
A. No, because the Court would only be concerned with the question whether the
conviction was safe or not, and safety doesn’t depend on the establishment of
factual innocence.

Q. Well how –
A. Well unsafely, I should say, doesn’t depend on the issue of factual innocence.

Q. And then, generally speaking then, are – people who have had their convictions
quashed after being referred to your Commission, I think you are telling us, would be
considered wrongfully convicted and in some instances entitled to compensation on
the basis, solely, that their conviction was quashed; is that correct?
A. Yes. I hesitate for – I’m trying to get the full import of that question. The – a person
who is convicted and then successful on appeal may bring themselves into the
frame for compensation, but it by no means follows that simply because someone’s
conviction is quashed on appeal, that they are necessarily entitled to compensation.

Q. Even though I think you are saying they would be wrongfully convicted, the question
of compensation depends on other factors, is that –
A. Well, certainly. I mean for the – I mean what I am saying is that the question
of whether someone should be compensated for having been convicted, and
subsequently that conviction is quashed, is a different question to whether that
person has been safely or unsafely convicted.

Q. And I take it the compensation part is not something you people either deal with
directly or consider in any way in any of your work?
A. No, we don’t. There was a suggestion in the early times, early life of the Commission,
that the Commission should actually take over responsibility for considering
compensation claims from the Home Office, and the Commission resolutely resisted
that suggestion.

Q. And I take it, then, that, once the conviction of a person is quashed, that person
reverts to the legal presumption of innocence?
A. Absolutely.

Q. And is innocent in that sense?
A. Yes.91

(c) Review of CCRC Operations

Kyle testified that the number of applications received by the CCRC has remained fairly steady at between
70 to 80 per month. He explained that approximately 1/3 of applications received do not qualify (generally
because the appeal process has not been exhausted). Of those applications that do qualify, approximately
2/3 can be dealt with fairly quickly in a streamlined process with the remaining 1/3 constituting more

91 T40045-T40049.
complex and time consuming cases. Overall, the CCRC’s rate of referral to the appeal courts is approximately 4 percent. Of cases that are referred, the success rate in the appeal courts is approximately 70 percent. The CCRC’s 2006/2007 Annual Report states the following:

At 31 March 2007 the Commission had referred 356 (4 percent) out of 8,951 cases completed. The appeal courts, including the House of Lords, had determined a total of 313 referrals, quashing 187 convictions (68 percent of those referred) and upholding 88 (32 percent). In the same period, 33 sentences (87 percent of those referred) were varied and 5 (13 percent) upheld. The remaining 43 cases were still to be heard at 31 March 2007. The combined rate of convictions quashed and sentences varied was 70 percent.92

The majority of cases where a remedy is granted do not involve misconduct or deliberate wrongdoing, said Kyle. Rather, the cases resulting in referral involve either the discovery of relevant new evidence, or, some flaw in procedure due to human error. In his article “Correcting Miscarriages of Justice: The Role of the Criminal Cases Review Commission”, he wrote:

…From the Commission’s perspective, cases that result in referral tend to fall into two broad categories. The first is cases in which relevant new evidence appears, occasionally if rarely being wholly exculpatory, but more often being of a nature that, had it been heard by the jury, might reasonably have caused them to come to a different verdict…The second category, more closely aligned to the types of issues raised by applicants themselves, involves some flaw in the investigation, prosecution, or trial process not brought about by malice but rather, in plain terms, because someone has not done his or her job properly – and this may well be something to which the defence lawyers have contributed. In today’s complex criminal justice system, opportunities for falling down on the requirements of a fair trial are legion, but it is not the simple fact of failure that counts, but its significance to the safety of the conviction, taking account of the whole circumstances of the case.93

The time it takes the CCRC to make a decision on whether a case should be referred to an appeal court will depend on its complexity. On average, the CCRC aims to complete its investigation and make a decision on referral within six months.

The CCRC’s annual budget is approximately £7 million. The population of the United Kingdom, excluding Scotland, is approximately 65 million, which is roughly double the Canadian population.

When the CCRC came into existence there were some who predicted that the floodgates would be opened, but Kyle indicated that the number of applications received by the CCRC on a yearly basis has remained fairly steady. Applicants can apply more than once and some do. This is likely a hallmark of the accessibility of the system. Many applicants apply on their own but there is also the availability of legal aid. While only a small fraction of applications are referred, Kyle explained that in his view, investigation of an unsuccessful complaint of wrongful conviction is as valuable to maintaining confidence in the judicial system as exposing a wrongful conviction.

92 Supra note 79.
93 Supra note 82 at 672.
6. Comparison of Canadian and British Systems

The key to any successful system of reviewing claims of wrongful conviction is attitudinal. Wrongful convictions must be seen as inevitable rather than exceptional, and there must be openness in admitting them and resolve in correcting mistakes.

David Kyle wrote:

However, because it is idle to pretend that things will not go wrong in even the best regulated criminal justice system, there is a question of critical cultural importance. Will whatever mechanism that is adopted to address the cries of those who claim to have been wrongly convicted have at its heart the will to own up to mistakes and learn lessons, or will it strive to preserve the status quo?94

In Canada, while it is acknowledged that wrongful convictions regrettably can and sometimes do occur, they are still regarded as exceptional. And so they are, in numbers at least. But they are disproportionately serious in nature, striking at the heart of the legal presumption of innocence upon which the fairness of our criminal trial process depends.

In his article entitled “Facing up to Miscarriages of Justice”, Graham Zellick, Chairman of the CCRC, said:

No criminal justice system, however good it is or is thought to be, will be immune from error. That, of course, is acknowledged in all developed systems by the process of appeal, but not all errors can be detected at that stage. Evidence may emerge only later, there may be developments in law and practice, there may be later evidence of impropriety, error or irregularity. Thus, in every system, however good and whatever its trial and appellate arrangements, there will be wrongful convictions or miscarriages of justice.

Most developed systems regard the reopening of convictions once the normal appellate processes have been exhausted as fairly rare and extraordinary. A power is usually vested in some person or body with appropriate authority, but it is typically immensely difficult to disturb a conviction or even persuade the relevant authority to reopen the matter for further investigation. These arrangements cannot be said to provide an adequate system for dealing with the inevitability of wrongful convictions. That is why it is essential to have standing machinery of some kind to deal with these issues. Finality in civil proceedings has everything to commend it: finality in criminal proceedings, where liberty and reputation are at stake, is a singular evil.

It must, however, be emphasized that post-conviction review machinery is not a substitute for getting the criminal process right, for striking the correct balance between the prosecution and defence, and for having the appropriate procedural rules and safeguards. Post-appeal review presupposes a robust, effective and fair criminal justice system. Otherwise, the burden placed on it will be unsupportable.

The ability and willingness of the criminal justice system in any country to confront miscarriages of justice and wrongful convictions is a fundamental test of its humanity, decency and fairness. Justice demands no less.95

94 Supra note 82 at 660.
(a) Proactive v. Reactive

The Canadian conviction review system, notwithstanding legislative changes made in 2002, remains essentially a reactive process. Not so the English CCRC, as Kyle explained:

…and the key, it seems to me, whoever this power is exercised by, it doesn’t matter whether it’s – for these purposes, practical purposes it doesn’t matter very much whether it’s done by a government minister or by an independent person, the key to exposing wrongful convictions is having the will and the resources to go out and investigate to see whether there is anything wrong and not simply sit back and say to the applicant, well, if you can show me something new I may react to it, but if you can’t, I’m sorry, there’s nothing I can do.96

An individual in prison can apply on his or her own and an investigation will be triggered. The process starts with the CCRC gathering relevant records from the court, defence and prosecution, and the police. There is recognition that convicts face great difficulty in getting the evidence, and in developing the argument needed to overturn the wrongful conviction.

Applicants, and even legal counsel, do not have the expertise required to identify the issues which could make a difference to the safety of the conviction.

The conviction review system in Canada is not so accessible. Application requirements are onerous and beyond the ability of most convicted persons. The onus of identifying all the grounds of the alleged miscarriage of justice is heavy.

These difficulties are reflected in the small number of applications received by the federal Minister. His Annual Report for 2007 indicates that in the year ended March 31, 2007, a total of 18 application requests were made.97 Of these, only four were completed. The remaining 14 were partially completed, meaning that the applicant has submitted some but not all of the forms, information and supporting documents required by the Regulations. Only completed applications are considered by the Minister.

In his report to Commissioner LeSage in the Driskell Inquiry, Professor Roach noted that the statistical information now reported by the federal Minister in the annual reports demonstrates “the comparative rarity of applications and the greater rarity of successful applications under s. 696.1.”98

Access to the review process is more restrictive here than in England, where the emphasis seems to be on an openness to listen to everyone’s complaint and accord it appropriate investigative resources.

(b) Independent v. Political

Prior to creation of the CCRC, conviction reviews were handled by the Home Secretary, the Member of Cabinet responsible for criminal justice. In 1993, the Runciman Report on the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice recommended the establishment of a new body independent of both the government and the courts, to be responsible for dealing with allegations of miscarriages of justice.99 This recommendation was based on the concern that the role assigned to the Home Secretary was incompatible with the constitutional separation of powers, as between the courts and the Executive.

96 T40080.
97 Supra note 54.
98 Supra note 56 at 11.
99 Supra note 80.
Chapter 6  Canada’s Conviction Review Process

The argument is not quite as straightforward in Canada, a federal state, where jurisdiction over criminal law matters is shared between Canada and the provinces. The federal Minister, in our case, found herself removed from the process which convicted Milgaard. Still, the appearance of interest remains. Brown testified that the public makes no distinction between Saskatchewan Justice, and Justice Canada. For many it seems that a prosecutor is investigating a prosecutor.

The CCRC is an executive non-departmental public body. It receives funding from the Secretary of State for the Home Department. While the CCRC acknowledges a duty to account fully for funds received from government, it has the independence to decide individual cases without interference or pressure. The CCRC states in its Annual Report 2006/2007 that “our ability to do justice in all cases means that we must also have the freedom to decide how we go about our work, what categories of cases we investigate, and how decisions are reached. These responsibilities are cast on us by Parliament, they are critical to the decisions reached in individual cases, they underpin the confidence our stakeholders have in us, and they must be exercised fearlessly.”

In his article noted above, Zellick argues that the most appropriate model for conviction review is a free-standing statutory body. He argues that where responsibility for conviction review is located within central government, as part of the responsibility of a minister, the system will never inspire the degree of confidence that is necessary:

There is also the issue of principle, namely, that it is no part of a ministerial role to be involved in the administration of justice as it relates to individual cases. It is true that there is a long tradition of such involvement in the British system deriving from the Crown’s role in exercising the royal prerogative of mercy. But the historical explanation should not be taken to legitimise a current ministerial role, which also implies a degree of parliamentary scrutiny. That is to risk infusing an individual criminal conviction with a political dimension, which is entirely undesirable…

At the Inquiry, Kyle testified that political pressure is not brought to bear on the CCRC in its handling of individual cases. He commented that were a case to be raised in Parliament, the responsible Minister, presumably the Home Secretary or the Attorney General, would simply indicate that the government had no standing in the way in which the CCRC made its decisions in individual cases.

The Prime Minister, in his memoirs, has said that he intervened in Milgaard’s conviction review applications being conducted by his Minister of Justice. Notwithstanding legislative amendments made in 2002, applications for conviction review are still decided by the federal Minister of Justice. So long as the responsibility for conviction review remains with the federal Minister of Justice, an elected politician, there will be the potential for political pressure to play a role in the decision making process, or, at the very least, for the perception to exist that the decision was influenced by political pressure. The conviction review system must not only be truly independent, it must be seen to be independent.

(c) Inquisitorial v. Adversarial

The CCRC brings a non-adversarial and inquisitorial approach to the process of conviction review, and that is its strength, in Kyle’s view. There is now an expectation on the part of applicants and their counsel that the Commission will conduct an investigation with the result that applicants defer to the

100 Supra note 79.
101 Supra note 95 at 240.
CCRC’s expertise, in preference to investigating themselves or launching media campaigns. A feature of independence is the ability to inquire without regard to vested interests.

The adversarial nature of the conviction review process in Milgaard’s case was largely of the applicant’s own making, but the system itself is partly at fault. In the “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Trial and Conviction of James Driskell”, Commissioner LeSage endorsed the recommendation made by Commissioner Cory in the “Report of the Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow” that there should be a completely independent entity established which can effectively, efficiently and quickly review cases in which wrongful conviction is alleged. In making this recommendation, Commissioner LeSage noted his concern about the adversarial nature of the current conviction review process. He wrote the following:

I concur in this recommendation, especially in light of the submissions of the WPS, and the evidence of Chief Ewatski, recognizing the difficulties encountered with the post-conviction review process. In particular, I am concerned about the adversarial nature of the present process. Driskell could not launch an application until he had sufficient disclosure to satisfy the Department of Justice standard for launching a section 696.2 review. However, the WPS would not make disclosure for purposes of a section 696.2 review until Driskell’s application was made. This is a classic “catch 22” situation. If there was an independent inquisitorial body, as in the U.K., it could, after having been satisfied that a threshold, not necessarily a high threshold, has been met, commence the section 696.2 process of its own initiative. In this way, information that is unavailable to the applicant because of their inability to compel disclosure, would be available to the independent agency to allow them to make a better determination of whether a miscarriage of justice occurred.

(d) Low Threshold v. High Threshold

In the U.K., the CCRC investigates applications on behalf of those alleging they were wrongly convicted or unfairly sentenced, and then decides whether a matter should be referred to the Court of Appeal. In determining whether a referral should be made, the CCRC employs the real possibility test set out in section 13 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. Section 13 indicates that a reference of a conviction shall not be made unless the CCRC considers that there is a real possibility that the conviction would not be upheld by an appeal court.

The real possibility test has been described as setting a relatively low threshold for an applicant, consistent with the CCRC’s view of itself as a gateway into the Court of Appeal. At the Inquiry, Kyle commented that “we see the real possibility test as being a relatively low threshold, it’s not a hugely difficult hurdle for an applicant to overcome.” Kyle also confirmed that it is up to the court to decide whether or not the verdict is safe. The CCRC’s role is simply to decide whether or not an applicant should have another chance to go there.

Pursuant to s. 696.3(3) of the Criminal Code, the Minister of Justice may grant a remedy on an application for ministerial review if he is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a miscarriage of

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102 Supra note 69.
103 Ibid at 121.
104 Supra note 86.
105 T40213.
Justice likely occurred. This test is similar to that used by the Court of Appeal when hearing a case that has been referred to it by the Minister of Justice.

In *Truscott*, the Ontario Court of Appeal explained:

> The two kinds of potential fresh evidence described above raise different issues for an appellate court to consider. However, there are two important characteristics that the two kinds of evidence share. First, both attack the reliability of the verdict. To succeed on appeal, whichever kind of fresh evidence is offered, the appellant must ultimately convince the appellate court that the fresh evidence sufficiently undermines the reliability of the verdict so as to warrant the conclusion that maintaining the verdict would amount to a miscarriage of justice. Second, both kinds of evidence lead to the same result: the quashing of the conviction. The second stage of the fresh evidence analysis, that is, the determination of the appropriate remedy, must follow regardless of which category of fresh evidence leads to the quashing of the conviction. At the remedial stage, the court can look at all of the material tendered by the parties.106

The test used by the Minister and by the Court are necessarily similar because s. 696.3(3) gives the Minister the power not only to refer to the Court of Appeal but also to order a new trial.

It is objected that the gatekeeper Minister should use a lower test than that employed by the Court of Appeal. That objection, in my view, is answered by the fact that under s. 696.3(3) the Minister is more than a gatekeeper. He can order a new trial himself, a fact which actually simplifies matters for an applicant with a strong case. However, were a review agency to be established to act as a gatekeeper as does the CCRC, it would not have the power to order a new trial and could therefore reasonably employ a less onerous test – one of reasonable possibility.

(e) Delay

Processing the first Milgaard s. 690 application was delayed by incompleteness and incremental advancement of grounds. It is not a good example of how quickly claims could be processed at the time. That said, the CCRC is quicker than the Canadian system, probably because the applicant there faces fewer documentary requirements before investigation can begin.

(f) Cost

The Commission is not in a position to provide a cost comparison of the two models. However, without early and efficient intervention by an independent, proactive agency, the costs associated with resolving claims of wrongful convictions will remain unacceptably high.

(g) Public Confidence

Public confidence in the administration of criminal justice was shaken in the Milgaard case by a strident media campaign which found an easy target in the federal Minister of Justice, depicted as lacking in independence and accountability. An agency such as the CCRC, freed of constitutional constraints and political connection, could act with more transparency and effectiveness.

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106 Supra note 60 at 349.
7. Recommendations

It is my recommendation that the investigation of claims of wrongful conviction should be done by a review agency, independent of government, established along the model of the English Criminal Cases Review Commission. Applications would no longer be made to the federal Minister of Justice under s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code. The agency would refer worthy cases to a Court of Appeal where the successful applicant would argue his case as though it were an appeal from conviction at trial.

I am not the first Commissioner to conclude that Canada’s conviction review process is in need of change, nor am I the first Commissioner to recommend the establishment of an independent review body. Rather, I add my voice to those who, in four previous provincial commissions of inquiry, have recommended the creation, or study into the advisability of, an independent entity to review and investigate alleged wrongful convictions.

In the “Report of the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution”, Commissioners Hickman, Poitras and Evans recommended that:

1) the provincial Attorney General commence discussions with the federal Minister of Justice and the other provincial Attorneys General with a view to constituting an independent review mechanism – an individual or a body – to facilitate the reinvestigation of alleged cases of wrongful conviction; and

2) the review body have investigative power so it may have complete and full access to any and all documents and material required in any particular case, and that it have coercive power so witnesses can be compelled to provide information.107

A similar recommendation was made by Commissioner Kaufman in the “Report of The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin” where he stated:

Recommendation 117: Creation of a Criminal Case Review Board.

The Government of Canada should study the advisability of the creation, by statute, of a criminal case review board to replace or supplement those powers currently exercised by the federal Minister of Justice pursuant to section 690 of the Criminal Code.108

Commissioner Peter de C. Cory made a similar, but more concrete recommendation in the “Report of the Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow” where he stated:

I recommend that, in the future, there should be a completely independent entity established which can effectively, efficiently and quickly review cases in which wrongful conviction is alleged. In the United Kingdom, an excellent model exists for such an institution. I hope that steps are taken to consider the establishment of a similar institution in Canada.109

With Commissioner Cory’s recommendation in 2001, a total of three public inquiries into wrongful convictions in Canada had recommended the creation of an independent review tribunal. Nevertheless,
the federal Minister proceeded with legislative amendments to the s. 690 process in 2002 in favor of implementing an independent review tribunal. Section 690 was replaced with ss. 696.1 to 696.6 of the Criminal Code in 2002, but further change has been called for.

In the “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Trial and Conviction of James Driskell”, Commissioner LeSage agreed with the recommendation advanced by Commissioner Cory in the Sophonow Inquiry. He stated:

In the Thomas Sophonow Inquiry Report, Commissioner Cory recommended that:
...there should be a completely independent entity established which can effectively, efficiently and quickly review cases in which wrongful conviction is alleged ...  
I concur in this recommendation, especially in light of the submissions of the WPS, and the evidence of Chief Ewatski, recognizing the difficulties encountered with the post-conviction review process. In particular, I am concerned about the adversarial nature of the present process.110

The 1998 Consultation Paper cited above said of the review process:

A number of objections have been raised regarding the current section 690 process. In general, critics suggest that the present review procedure under section 690 is inadequate and should be replaced with an independent review mechanism. The criticisms may be summarized as follows:

- the role of the Minister of Justice as Chief Prosecutor is incompatible with the role of reviewing cases of persons wrongly convicted;
- the procedure has led to inordinate delays in the reviews of individual cases;
- the procedure is largely conducted in secret and is consequently without accountability;
- counsel who review section 690 applications are former prosecutors who will look at miscarriage of justice evidence with a prosecutorial bias and will therefore not investigate allegations of error in a fair and objective manner;
- only a handful of cases have ever been re-opened in Canada;
- the response of the Courts to the occasional section 690 referral has been unsatisfactory.111

Noted as well in the 1998 Consultation Paper was the rejection, in 1991, by a federal-provincial-territorial working group of the Marshall Inquiry recommendations:

In 1989, the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution recommended that provincial Ministers responsible for the administration of justice meet with the federal Justice Minister to consider creating an independent mechanism to facilitate the re-investigation of alleged cases of wrongful conviction.

A federal-provincial-territorial working group was established to examine the Marshall Inquiry recommendations and to report to the next meeting of Ministers. The working group

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110 Supra note 69 at 121.  
111 Supra note 1.
was satisfied with the existing section 690 procedures but recommended that compulsory powers to compel witnesses and documents would be desirable. In its report, tabled at the 1991 meeting of Ministers responsible for criminal justice, the working group rejected the recommendation of the Marshall Inquiry pertaining to the section 690 reform. It concluded that establishing an independent review body was undesirable because:

- the Marshall Inquiry did not criticize the section 690 review mechanisms that were in place at that time;
- persons who claim that they were wrongfully convicted had the full benefit of the presumption of innocence, a trial in which their guilt had been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and appeal procedures;
- a review mechanism would create another level of appeal that would detract from the notion of judicial finality;
- the establishment of a mechanism as proposed by the Marshall Inquiry would likely result in many requests for reviews, most of which would likely be pro forma. The proposed mechanism would permit the re-investigation of cases but would not provide any remedy for the wrongfully accused person;
- the review of these cases would incur significant costs that would divert resources from cases deserving review;
- section 690 of the Criminal Code enables the Minister of Justice to order a new trial or an appeal in appropriate cases;
- the section 690 process is independent from the prosecutions conducted by the provincial Attorneys General. It satisfies the requirement for an independent review mechanism, but could be improved by the provision of powers to compel individuals to testify; and
- the review of judicial decisions by a non-judicial body would be inappropriate.\(^{112}\)

The reasons expressed for rejection of the Marshall Inquiry recommendations demonstrate a lack of understanding of the inevitability of wrongful convictions, which often occur for reasons which do not appear until the appeal process has been exhausted. As well, the reasons make a flood gate argument, that has not been proven in the CCRC experience.

In response to the 1998 Consultation Paper, AIDWYC filed a written submission with the Minister urging the creation of a system modeled on the British Criminal Cases Review Commission. Before this Commission, AIDWYC pointed out that the proposed legislative amendments to s. 690 were the subject of much discussion and debate by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights in October 2001.\(^{113}\) The Standing Committee heard from the Minister of Justice, representatives of AIDWYC and senior counsel with the Criminal Conviction Review Group of the Department of Justice.

The debates of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights indicate that the members recognized that there was an immediate need to reform the s. 690 process, and that while the proposed legislative amendments might not fully address all concerns with the conviction review process, they would constitute an improvement. It was discussed that further amendments could be considered once the recommendations from the Milgaard Inquiry were received. In particular, the members thought it

\(^{112}\) Ibid.
important to hear from the Milgaard Inquiry on the question of whether an independent review body to investigate alleged wrongful convictions was necessary.

Sections 696.1 to 696.6 of the Criminal Code came into force on November 25, 2002. The Minister’s decision to reform the conviction review process through legislative amendments was later explained:

> From the submissions received, as well as other contributions from legal experts and interest groups, it was possible to identify several reform options for more detailed consideration. These options ranged from the creation of a separate agency to review criminal convictions, similar to the Criminal Cases Review Commission in the United Kingdom (a change long advocated by some critics of the old review process), to the elimination of section 690 altogether with a proposed broadening of the scope of appellate review.

> After this broad consultation, a decision was arrived at whereby the federal Minister of Justice would retain the power to review criminal convictions, but legislative changes would be made to improve the process. These changes, known as the “reform model”, represented a compromise position between a separate review agency similar to the United Kingdom model and the status quo under section 690 of the Criminal Code. The reform model had the full support of the provincial and territorial Attorneys General and Ministers of Justice. The Government of Canada then proceeded with legislative and non-legislative changes to implement the reform model.114

The reform model chosen was not a complete answer to the need for reform of the conviction review process. In particular, the role of the federal Minister was preserved, as was the reactive nature of the Minister’s approach to applications for conviction review, and the threshold for the granting of a remedy.

This Commission will be the fifth provincial commission of inquiry to recommend the creation of an independent review body to investigate cases in which wrongful conviction is alleged. Such reform is necessary in order to adequately address the inevitability of wrongful convictions in this country. Public inquiries will continue to be desirable, or even necessary, in some situations, but they are very expensive exercises, and they are not the answer. The answer lies in the creation of an independent review body which will be able to investigate, detect and assist in remedying wrongful convictions.
